INTELLIGENT PHILANTHROPY

EDITED BY

ELLSWORTH FARIS
FERRIS LAUNE AND
ARTHUR J. TODD

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PREFACE

This volume grew out of the desire of the directors of Wieboldt Foundation to get the advice of specialists with reference to fundamental principles involved in philanthropy. In attempting to direct the expenditure of a fund for philanthropic purposes, many questions of policy inevitably arise. There are numerous angles from which these questions might well be considered. For instance, in a program looking toward the future improvement of social conditions, both heredity and environmental influences as well as social, economic, religious, ethical, and other considerations apply. The articles presented here were contributed by persons selected for their eminence in these respective fields.

The details of the project have been in the hands of an editorial committee consisting of Professor Ellsworth Faris, of the University of Chicago; Professor Arthur J. Todd, of Northwestern University; and Mr. Ferris F. Laune, of the Foundation staff. This committee, organized early in 1927, formulated the problem, selected the authorities to be consulted, co-ordinated the various papers, and arranged the manuscript for publication.

Professor Todd, in the introductory chapter, points out the relationship of each of the various social sciences to the problems of philanthropy and presents some specific questions to be answered in each of these fields. The main body of the book consists of the contributed papers. The final chapter by Professor Faris analyzes these contributions and sums up and harmonizes the various points of view.

It is the hope of the Wieboldt Foundation that the publication of these papers may stimulate general thinking on the "why" and the "how" of philanthropy.

FERRIS F. LAUNE

May, 1930

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MAINSPRINGS OF PHILANTHROPY

ARTHUR J. TODD

It would sometimes seem that mortal man does nothing so badly as his attempts to do good. If man is endowed with a definite instinct to do good, that alone—judging by its results—is a sufficient cause for doubting the value of mere instinct as a guide to civilized social life. This reason takes on added strength if you stop to consider that instinct is by very definition fixed while circumstances and situations change with every passing hour. Indeed, there are good grounds for believing that many if not most of the ordinary calls for charitable aid result from the fact that instinct or natural inclination has failed to gear into the social environment. In other words, culture moves on faster than human impulse. Or if you consider man as an organism undergoing domestication, he has not yet been able to adjust completely to life in organized society. His native impulses sometimes come into violent conflict with the niceties and restrictions of the social order. Hence such problems as the illegitimate child, the truant, the deserted family, the criminal, or that whole array of sexual disorders, complexes, and neuroses which constitute the stock in trade of Freudian psychologists. In any event, instinct may turn out to be a very flimsy and unsafe guide to civilized conduct or social polity.

But if we reject instinct as a basis for doing good have we not cut the ground from under our feet? For what worthwhile alternative can we depend upon? Common sense? The advice of friends? Experience? All these are slender reeds. Can we turn to science, then, to guide us? Is there any science of doing good? Has science reached the point where it can offer authentic and demonstrable help to bewildered folk who want to do good but want to be sure that their good is really good and not wasted effort or, even worse, a source of positive evil? Even if there is not so far a highly developed body of scientific rules, can we claim that there is at least a sort of rough First Aid to Givers?

One need not go very far in these days to discover that these are not idle questions tossed off by the academic mind. Julius Rosenwald recently declared:

> It is trite to speak of the burden of wealth, but there are few possessors of large fortunes in the country to whom the worthy disposal of their wealth has not become a genuine concern. Viewing the matter in retrospect, I can testify that it is nearly always easier to make $1,000,000 honestly than to dispose of it wisely.

It is only a few years ago since an examination of six thousand appeals to Mrs. E. H. Harriman, as analyzed and digested by Mr. William H. Allen, provoked the following more or less dogmatic and opinionated but nevertheless suggestive conclusions:

1. That nowhere have givers adequate means of learning what is most needed in their communities
2. That even the simpler forms of philanthropy are not comprehensively organized even in those cities where relief is supposed to be thoroughly organized, while in most cities and in practically all smaller communities helpfulness is not commensurate with easily remediable necessity
3. That agencies already well financed, and with reputable managers, are more certain of an audience with the rich than are new activities representing urgent needs
4. That needs of an earlier generation have readier audience than present needs or anticipated needs of future generations
5. That letters of appeal are educational opportunities which rich men and women, in their own as well as in the public interest, would enjoy using and have an obligation to use
6. That there is need for a correspondence school in the art of appealing and the art of giving
7. That large giving may be done in a way that will enlist the co-operation of all who read of it even though they do not write letters of appeal
8. That those who give "without missing it" are sure to miss it in their giving

9. That neither appealing nor giving can be placed on an efficiency basis until there is frank, open discussion of the methods and purposes of appealing and giving
10. That free discussion of benefactions and malefactions will be impossible until the facts regarding present practice and results are made available
11. That to make experience available to all there is need for a local clearing house in each state and each large city, as well as for a national clearing house, which shall welcome appeals from individuals and from organized agencies, study them and make educational use of them among givers, appealers, newspaper writers and students of social forces
12. That agencies are needed in every state, every city and every county which will advertise ways out of trouble, just as the big correspondence schools market education and as the big correspondence stores market ice cream freezers or dry goods
13. That just as the mere accident of writing an appeal does not in itself entitle a writer to relief, so in any sane scheme of social advance the accident of not writing an appeal should not preclude possibility or likelihood of obtaining relief
14. That private philanthropy, no matter how lavish and wise, cannot take the place of efficient government or of the philanthropic motive in private business

The situation has somewhat improved in the last fifteen years, but modern social life is so increasingly complex and social causation so intricate that one need not be surprised that people who want to do something for their fellow-men sometimes still stand back aghast at the unforeseen consequences and repercussions of their benevolence. Nevertheless the stream of philanthropy flows on and at levels never dreamed of before in the whole history of mankind. It has been frequently asserted by experts that the gifts from private sources for public welfare in the United States total annually between two and three billion dollars. The very magnitude of such giving constitutes a social problem of unexampled proportions. What wonder, then, if there is a demand, vague as it may be in terminology, for both a science and an art, a philosophy as well as a technique of giving.

The problem takes on even greater difficulty with the multiplying of philanthropic foundations and the piling-up of charitable trust funds. For if there is no sure judgment on the present worth of philanthropy and no unerring perception of right objectives or methods, the creation and projection of such enormous funds into perpetuity will almost inevitably compound any error in the present motivation and administration of these funds. In the short space of fifteen years charitable foundations in the United States mounted to a total equal to the entire wealth of the United States a century ago and just about equaling the total public debt of this country before the outbreak of the great war. Moreover, the trend seems to be in the direction of increasing such funds. Indeed, foundations seem almost to have become the fashion. If so, all the more reason why the whole subject of giving, both large scale and small scale, should be scrutinized anew in whatever light science is able to furnish. Public policy and perhaps even cosmic considerations no less than the emotions and conscience of the philanthropists themselves enter into the situation.

Frequently the very givers who have attempted to do most for their fellows have been put upon the defensive and subjected to ridicule, suspicion, and abuse. Their motives have been questioned, their judgment attacked, their integrity befouled. At times the cynic would almost be justified in thinking that it is the benefactor and not the transgressor whose way is hard. But it was not a mere "defense reaction" which prompted the Wieboldt Foundation to undertake the symposium represented by the papers in this volume. It was rather the commendable desire to *know* not to *guess*, if perchance knowing is possible at the present level of human intelligence and science. It was a move to make giving if possible doubly effective, by aiding what appeared to be worthy agencies and projects, while at the same time improving the art of giving itself through setting up an adequate working philosophy. For a foundation has certain obligations which perhaps do not attach themselves to the small individual giver. I say "perhaps" largely because of the fact that usually it is bigger, more conspicuous, and therefore more open to imitation than the private giver. Hence its mistakes may easily radiate more widely and do more damage. Fortunately most of the larger foundations are of recent creation, and have been able to avail themselves of past experience with the dead hand in charity, hence have not permitted absolute fixity over a long period to foredoom them to futility and social execration. In any event most of the foundations have recently been catechizing themselves rather vigorously, partly because of their own administrative experience, and partly because the public has been framing pertinent questions.

This process of self-examination follows certain lines rather clearly revealed by the questions which are hereafter set down. It should be equally clear that adequate answers to them would build up that very philosophy which the foundations are seeking. The questions cluster around two main points. The first of these is the more general, namely, Why should we give at all? That is, what are or what should be the motives that prompt giving in general? What are the mainsprings of philanthropy? Are they part of man's original nature and constitution or are they acquired and prescribed through social experience? Does it make any difference, so far as their validity is concerned, whether they are natural and "instinctive," or whether they are inculcated, that is, acquired through education and social pressure?

The second focal point has to do with questions of the results of charitable effort. For example, can you really do anything for anybody else? Doesn't charity contravene the inexorable law of struggle for existence, selection, and survival of the fittest? Isn't poverty or crime one of the "costs of progress"? What is the use of philanthropy anyhow, if we are to have the poor with us always? Has not public relief always done more harm than good? Have we not the record of the Roman "bread and circuses" to prove that charitable doles corrupt the people, and that pauperism is bred of unwise philanthropy? Isn't the sturdy individualist right in maintaining that the best social policy is to mind your own business and let the other fellow severely alone? Can we be sure that the appeal to history or biology or economics or any other body of clearly organized fact will reveal causal connections between philanthropy and social well-being or its opposite? Such are the questions that surge about these two central points.

The social scientist and perhaps some large givers not yet sure of themselves may be interested also in such questions as whether giving is on the increase; or whether giving has followed the general rise in income or real wages; or how much should be given. But experienced givers who want to make their work really count for something project their minds far beyond such rather elementary questions. They are not seeking to follow a fashion nor to set a mode. They are not hunting for the temporary flush of generous emotion that comes from a well-meant gesture. If there is any thrill at all in the business of giving they want it to come from a sense of engaging in a real social adventure, a quest for new and enduring forms of truth, beauty, and righteousness. Hence they are more concerned with such fundamental questions as, What objects of giving are most worth while and productive? Can a community be pauperized? How much can a community afford to give or to receive in the shape of philanthropy? How can a charitable trust or foundation be safeguarded against dry rot or the dead hand? How long can it safely last? Where can it turn for scientific guidance? How can it utilize research? Can it rely upon its own business judgment as a guide or is there need for help from the expert in judging of objectives, administration, and results? How far can the amateur safely go without calling in the professional or the scientist? How long should philanthropy continue to be merely palliative or remedial before it reaches the stage of preventive effort? Can anybody tell with absolute authority what is "preventive effort"?

The summoning of the experts whose papers form the main body of this volume came as the result of long cogitation over such questions. It was recognized that the main considerations upon which ultimate policy might be based must be derived from historical, economic, biological, religious, ethical, sociological, and philosophical fields. For example, without considering history as an exact science, but rather as a method of orderly presentation of the past, it was assumed that history should be able to furnish many examples of earlier efforts to handle the almost universal problem of human poverty and distress. The records of past ages tell us of famine, pestilence, invasions, migrations, climatic changes, and other large-scale events which almost inevitably have brought distress in their wake. If the historian could tell us of the measures taken to handle these misfortunes and of how they worked out, we should have at our disposal a vast laboratory experience. We want to know about ancient Jewish relief measures and the mutual-aid societies of classic Greek and Roman times. We should like an unbiased statement of the philanthropic work of the early Christian church, of the monasteries, and of the various benevolent orders. An authentic and wholly unprejudiced history of the English poor-law is still to be written. Likewise the history of the Industrial Revolution, particularly in its relation to social disaster and philanthropic effort.

It may be that human nature and cultural situations have changed so greatly in the past ten or twenty centuries that the wisdom and experience of the past no longer apply. But even if we refute Bernard Shaw's claim that we have not progressed an inch since the days of the Hittites, and even if we reject the doctrine that human nature does not change, nevertheless we are confronted by the apparent fact that it changes very slowly. Hence we need not be surprised at the recurrence of the same or nearly the same old problems from century to century. The Roman politician of Caesar's time was brother of Tammany Hall. The monastic doles had not quite conveyed their lesson to a large charitable foundation which within the last fifteen years wanted to open a warehouse where the poor could come with their baskets. Time after time public authorities have offered subsidies to wage-workers: with what effect on wages and industry? On the care of the orphan and the illegitimate child history should be able to shed a clearer light than we now enjoy. It could present to us the various competing or alternative motives which have prompted charity in the past and indicate those which seem at least to have proved most valid. It could offer some facts as to the relative effectiveness of public as contrasted with private welfare effort. But, above all, history should be able to descry rhythms, cycles, swings, modes, and long-time trends in welfare activity. For these are what we most need from human experience to determine present-day policy and to forecast its probable effects upon future social welfare. Hence it seemed wise to attempt to secure historical light from two sources: one which might be called the general history of human thought; the other the specialized history of philanthropic effort itself, having to do rather with specific institutions and technique.

In earth science a maxim has long been current to the effect that geology is past geography. Likewise in certain fields of social science it has been customary to define history as past politics. No reputable historian would in these days so limit his subject unless politics be explicitly understood to include the whole range of organized social activity. In any event the problem of giving has been in the past and still is so intimately connected with politics in its larger sense that we are warranted in calling for expert testimony from that field in addition to the word of the historians. The reason will be doubly clear from two or three illustrations. Both public and private welfare efforts are frequently branded by radicals as attempts to drown revolution in free soup. The partisans of aggressive social change likewise sometimes bracket charity and religion together as opiates for the people.

On the other hand, I was interviewing one of the leading manufacturers of Great Britain in 1921 about the Unemployment Insurance Act. There had been a great outcry both in England and in America that this insurance was not insurance at all but simply a huge system of doles to idleness, a left-handed scheme for exploiting the rich for the benefit of the thriftless, the last expiring gasp of a group of self-styled liberal politicians in their effort to win the rabble. The situation was tense. "As a business man," replied my host, "I am against the Unemployment Insurance Act, because it penalizes my efficiency for the benefit of my less efficient competitor. The larger my pay-roll the more I have to pay into the fund. Yet as a citizen of the Empire I am for it, because it saved us from a revolution." And many competent students of recent English history agree that his judgment was accurate, and that the insurance acts eased up the terrible rigors of demobilization and served at least as a stop-gap at a time when Russia and Germany were floundering in the chaos of revolution.

We remember also that Bismarck a generation before had headed off internal trouble by stealing the thunder of his socialist opponents and inaugurating comprehensive social-insurance legislation. Even more recently Americans witnessed a similar move in the strategy of the Progressive party by which the practicable essentials of the socialist demands were embodied in the Progressive platform. And all of us are familiar with the Christmas funds and Thanksgiving turkeys distributed to the faithful by ward politicians, to say nothing of the use of welfare legislation as a raft to float ambitious political leaders into larger power. Hence there is no blinking the fact that philanthropy and politics have been and still are closely associated.

But we want to get beyond these well-known facts and to find out if possible some helpful clues from the generalized political experience of mankind. We need guidance from principles of political philosophy if any such principles have been wrought out. The administrators of both public and private philanthropy need a clear statement of whether the state or any political unit has any final and definitive responsibility for the health or economic well-being of its citizens. If there is any such responsibility, how far does it or should it go? Is there any such reality in either law or practice as the welfare function of the state? Is it synonymous with the police power of the state? Is the police power an original, inherent power of the state or is it something imposed upon it, wished on it, assumed by it as the result of expediency or social pressure? Is the state in origin and function just an instrument of force, a policeman? Does the concept "policeman" mean merely repressive force, or does it go much deeper and imply a constructive civilizing power? If the state is a party to social welfare what should it contribute? On what theory should it contribute? To prevent revolution? To keep the masses of the people reasonably content and in a frame of mind to accept political leadership and rule? To maintain a body of citizenry fit for economic production, personal service, and military defense? To raise the quality of average citizenship in the interest of more enlightened political life?

How far may the state go in subsidizing private families or individuals for health, education, recreation, provision for old age, or aesthetic satisfactions? How far should the state go in using the taxing power to equalize incomes and relieve or prevent poverty? Should the state tolerate private philanthropy at all? Should it supervise its activity if tolerated? Is there any danger that large-scale private philanthropies may become involved in politics or menace sound political life? Is there danger that without becoming involved in politics such philanthropies may pauperize the public and vitiate healthy political and social life?

Is there any body of political wisdom which can tell us specifically how the philanthropic field might best be divided between public and private agencies? Should the state lead the way in philanthropic experiment and endeavor or should it wait conservatively and accept responsibility only as it is thrust upon it and only along lines of accepted and well-demonstrated activity? Should the state wink at and even encourage private effort in the field of social research and welfare pioneering? Is it true that private philanthropy represents a "cultural lag" between perception of social needs and public activity to meet those needs? If so, is there any evidence that political agencies (in the best sense) are more and more overcoming that lag or that even without a socialist state we are headed toward a situation in which there is no longer any room for private charitable effort but the state by a gradual evolution and without duress acquires a sort of natural residuary monopoly of welfare activity? If politics were honest and public administration both honest and efficient would there be any real need for charity at all? Such are the questions which we hope that the experts from the field of law and politics may be able to answer with some degree of authority.

Even in the absence of any explicit sociological teaching the foregoing questions imply an underlying social unity which makes it utterly impossible to mark off with absolute precision any field of human thought or activity from all the rest. For when we were inquiring about the objectives of political activity for social welfare we were inevitably beginning to untie the wrappings of whole bundles of questions from other quarters, notably economic and ethical. Regardless of whether or not the state was organized to protect the exploiters in the enjoyment of their winnings from war, banditry, or chicanery, and regardless of the cry, "Keep government out of business," the political and the economic organizations are inseparably woven together and interdependent. And at no point is this more clearly revealed than in their mutual interest and concern over charitable efforts. The farmer, the business man, and the theoretical economist are all interested in a government proposal to fix wages or guarantee wages, to provide out-of-work benefits, to stabilize employment by adjusting public-works construction to times of business depression. Old-age pensions, compulsory vocational training, mothers' pensions, so called; legislative limitation of hours, methods of payment, conditions of work and immigration; tariffs, or income and inheritance taxes, or expenditures for saving hogs, cotton, or Indian corn—all these lie along the border line of political and economic life and have to do with the public welfare.

Without in any way committing ourselves to an exclusively economic interpretation of history or present-day social life, it remains nevertheless clear that the economist is vitally concerned with every phase of effort for social well-being whether by private or public agencies. He is concerned not only with the abstract consideration of wealth, how it is created, conserved, utilized, or distributed; he also, whether rightly or wrongly, occupies himself with the functioning of wealth in human welfare. The stamina of the working population is of no less concern to him than is any other natural resource. He is concerned with the basic factors of conservation and optimum utilization of all productive factors. Hence he must face the question of whether charity makes for increased wealth and welfare or whether it hampers and perhaps destroys them. Does it penalize thrift, initiative, and self-help, and reward inertia and slacking? Does it interfere with free competition and burden the competent with the heavy, dead weight of the incompetent, the useless, the rejects, the superannuated, the defective, the immoral, and the hopelessly unadjusted? Does it encourage reckless overpopulation? Does it withdraw capital from productive enterprise and divert it to unprofitable if not really antisocial purposes? Or, on the other hand, does it keep money in circulation? Does it help to maintain a higher level of productive fitness or at least maintain a marginal reserve of producers and consumers available in times of intense industrial activity or crises like war? Does it serve as a rough sort of insurance against violent disturbances of the economic organization like social revolution, or as a shock-absorber against the otherwise restless demands for higher wages and other embarrassing improvements in working conditions?

Social workers and the administrators of great philanthropic foundations would like to know whether a better distribution of the national income would eliminate poverty and thus the need for most forms of social work and large-scale philanthropy. They would also welcome some definitive pronouncement from the economic standpoint on the question raised earlier, namely, what is the most effective division of labor between public and private charity, supposing that the need for charity be accepted as part of our current social code? Even more necessary is the determination, again from the economic standpoint, of what forms of social welfare or philanthropic work are most worth while. For example, are such slogans as a "living wage," a "family wage," "family allowances," "state endowment of motherhood," economically sound? From the economist's experience shall we go in for, encourage, and subsidize movements for eugenics or child welfare, birth control and companionate marriage, economic independence of women, old-age pensions, and other forms of social insurance, trade-unionism among women, nursery schools, abolition of child labor, vocational guidance, model housing, garden cities, credit unions, employees' welfare work, or any of a hundred other measures all directed ostensibly at raising the level of public welfare?

Does the economist have any tried measure for social progress which he can put into our hands as a policy guide? Is the policy of wisdom best directed and expressed as L. P. Jacks puts it, "in terms of giving impulse to goods rather than in terms of putting 'stops' to evils"? For example, supposing that we fix the annual economic cost of crime at the conservative figure of four billion dollars (a great many estimates run as high as fifteen billions), should philanthropic foundations invest their money and effort in promoting education of the police, improving criminal procedure, making probation and parole more effective, research on glands, or dactyloscopy? Or on bettering education, wholesome recreation, vocational guidance and adaptation, the stabilization of employment, the building-up of ethical codes of conduct for business and of equitable relations between employer and employee? Here again we encounter the parting of the ways between remedial and preventive effort. Are they mutually exclusive? If not and both can be pursued at the same time, what shall determine the proper allocation of money and effort to each?

Certain other questions might be added of even more specific economic character. For example, what is the effect of business conditions upon philanthropy? Is strenuous business activity (often characterized as "greed" by reformers) a factor in prosperity and thus a factor in preventing poverty? If so, would not money now diverted to philanthropy and governmental expenditures in social service fields be of greater value in preventing business depression with its consequent necessity for aid? How can a man engaged in competitive business best use his surplus? In increasing the volume of business and consequently the demand for labor? In general philanthropy? Except as a good example, what is the net effect on society and on employees of an individual business concern's policy of paying a wage-rate higher than that of competitors? Is there a correct proportion between capital used for production and capital used for benevolences?

In short, we ask the economist to tell us not only whether charity in general is a waste, but if so what special types of charitable effort are most wasteful. But we cannot let him off with that. If he declares that such effort is a positive social and economic contribution, we want to know what types give the largest return on the investment—return measured in health, productive efficiency, standards of living and social surplus, or margins available for improving the amenities of life.

It is at this point that the ethical aspect of philanthropy appears. For ethics as an outlook on life is not concerned with life as such: that is the business of the biologist or perhaps the philosopher. Ethics is satisfied with nothing less than the good life and the terms on which it may be attained. While historically it is a derivative from philosophy and religion, and while sociology assumes to offer the genetic explanation of most ethical concepts, nevertheless ethics is nowadays more and more reckoned as an independent field of study and an independent source of guidance in forming public opinion and social policy. We should expect from ethics a rational explanation of what are, for example, a man's fundamental rights and duties. And we rightly expect that such an explanation be objective and expressed in terms of human nature and its adjustment to a real world. Our immediate and specific quest would lead us to ask at once, Is charity a right, a duty, or a privilege? Is there any rational reason why the strong should support the weak, the "haves" the "have-nots"? Is it inherent in the very nature of man or is it dictated by mere social expediency? Is charity a positive good or merely the lesser evil? What should be the real and valid motive for giving? Is sympathy or pity a weakness if not a positive evil?

If philanthropy is a fundamental mode of the moral life, what is its best form, how far should it go, is it right to work for abolishing the need for it? If it is a makeshift, what form is least objectionable, least disastrous to human personality? Should it be public or private and in what degree? Does organization or professionalism dry up the springs of genuine benevolence and degrade the character of the recipient? Can human nature stand receiving charitable relief? Can human nature stand the accumulation of large wealth even though it be given away or administered with a sense of social stewardship? Is poverty or the need for philanthropy a confession of ethical shortage in the makeup of possessors of large wealth whether they bestow it in charity or waste it on themselves? Is property an absolute right? Are political measures to even up the distribution of wealth—such as income or inheritance taxes, public aid to mothers, old-age pensions, social insurance—ethically sound? Is public relief any more ethical than private charity? Granting that mutual aid is socially and ethically valid, is it becoming more or less needful? How far may it go before losing the essential quality of mutuality? If ethics has to do with character and the upbuilding of human personality as the supreme end of social life, must we not conclude that the most effective philanthropy would be directed toward promoting character-building agencies? If so, what are those agencies? Do they need help or should we trust to evolution to uncover them, give them their force, and direct them toward the desired ethical end? Do we know enough of human nature yet to answer such questions? If not should philanthropic effort, speaking from the ethical standpoint, be directed toward encouraging and supporting research into human nature?

Many people will not be satisfied with a merely rational definition of human nature or of man's relationship to fellowman. To them such a sanction for conduct is barren and feeble if not utterly degenerative. They claim a more authoritative source of truth and appeal to a more absolute authority. To them religion transcends mere human reason and speaks the final word. In one sense it would be futile to ask the man of religion for advice about a policy of giving. For his advice would almost inevitably take the form of ethical imperatives based upon some declared religious revelation. He would make certain assumptions and lay down certain postulates as to the nature of man, his origin, his destiny, his duties to God and fellow-man in terms of a closed system of truth derived from ancient sacred books and interpretations of them handed down through generations of commentators. And whether one turns to Buddhism or Mohammedanism or Hinduism or Judaism or to orthodox Christianity one meets the same characteristic response. That is to say, to religious orthodoxy the whole business of philanthropy becomes a mere phase of prescriptive dogma, and may or may not be related in the slightest degree to present-day problems and needs. But the concept of evolution, although not overtly accepted by all religious bodies, has none the less compelled a certain flexibility in the dogmatic attitude; with the result that outstanding representatives of religion now are willing to communicate with us in terms more like those used by the philosopher, the ethical teacher, or the scientist.

But quite regardless of that fact there is another reason why it is necessary to ask the man of religion for his view of charity in modern life; it is, in short, that every great religious body has in the course of its history handled many phases of charity, encountered many relief problems, tried out many schemes of administration, and, it is hoped, accumulated a considerable amount of communicable wisdom in its course. Still more to the point, the lion's share of philanthropic contributions in America still goes to religious purposes. It is constantly dinned into our ears that religion is on the wane, that it is played out, that modern youth is indifferent if not aggressively hostile to religion, and that scientific naturalism is replacing religion and a religious ethic. But how shall we account for the fact that in 1927 nearly 50 per cent of all charitable gifts went to religious objects? It is true that in a typical American city surveyed by the Bureau of Economic Research over a period of twenty-five years the amount given to religion declined remarkably, but in 1925 a quarter of the total still went to religion. By the very fact that organized religion is such a preferred beneficiary it owes us a definite answer as to what it is doing for the public welfare with this huge income, and on what grounds it continues to accept charitable gifts. Is a religious agency in possession of a superior wisdom or guiding light in well-doing? Can it communicate that light and wisdom to secular welfare agencies?

We need to know whether poverty is inherent in the world-order or whether there is religious experience to warrant the belief that it can be extirpated. May we expect that charity properly directed will eliminate the need for charity? What are the objectives of charity from the religious standpoint? Whom should charity seek to benefit? Is its primary purpose the soul welfare of the giver, a training in proper attitudes, a storing-up of merit, and a form of heavenly insurance for the believer? Or is it the constructive relief of the needy? Is it primarily a concern of this world or a preparation of the soul of the recipient for a better world? Is poverty good or evil? What is the basis of one's obligation to engage in charitable activities? Is there any element in religion that would limit philanthropy to mere palliative giving or does it include obligations to remedial or even to preventive and constructive activities? How far should charity contribute to emotional satisfactions and does religion depend primarily upon the emotional content?

These questions will not down. For example, in a recent number of the official organ of the American Eugenics Society a symposium appeared on the subject "Is Christian Morality Harmful?" Harry F. Ward answered the question by saying that a social ethic based on the principles of Jesus will not weaken and destroy society by the perpetuation of its weaker and degenerating members; and holds that such a short-sighted judgment overlooks "the vital fact that such an ethic requires not merely ministration to the weak, is not even content with their melioration but aims at their transformation." He goes further and claims that "its aim is a healthy society where all are strong." Father John A. Ryan in the same symposium attacks the idea that the weaker members of society ought to be left to perish in order that society as a whole may reach a higher average of welfare or achievement, and concludes that "one who does not identify right with might can produce no cogent reason for treating the weak as of less intrinsic worth than the strong, even though the former may be in the minority." On the other hand, Dr. Karl Reiland admits that "there is and ought to be a 'controversy' between some science and most orthodox religion," and declares flatly that "it was an early Christian concept that the world should be despised, the body disparaged and the rational faculty distrusted." He concludes that these concepts still hold sway in theory and to a very great extent in fact and constitute a sort of "foot binding" which is a drag on the progress of religious thought and which keeps the church from "stepping out." Likewise, Rabbi David de Sola Pool contributes to the symposium a contrast between the eugenic effects of Hebrew morality fortified by specific legislation and the dysgenic effects of the Christian teaching of charity and love not based upon or supported by definite code of laws. In short, he claims that "the charge that Christian morality favors a dysgenic tendency through nurturing the subnormal and unfit and allowing these types to multiply and reproduce themselves is an outgrowth of the fact that Christian ethics is the fruit of a purely religious teaching which in western countries has not been integrated and developed in a legal code."

Is there, then, any body of religious experience which can serve as authoritative guidance to charitable practice? Has religion contributed anything of importance to philanthropic methods? Can religious charity ever be scientific? Would organized religion lose anything worth while if it ceased trying to engage in philanthropy and committed the poor to secular agencies? Is it equipped to do philanthropic pioneering, or can religion serve best by offering ethical guidance and inspiration to the work of individuals and secular agencies?

A moment ago we raised the question as to the possibility of religious impulse running counter to the biological welfare of the race. There is a disposition on the part of some people calling themselves scientists to brand all ameliorative or remedial philanthropic work as a form of counter-selection running against natural selection and defeating the principle of survival of the fittest. Recently, for example, an influential English writer opposing birth control was obliged to meet the criticism of being purely destructive by offering an alternative. His great measure to combat and remove degeneracy consisted in a declaration to the effect that "only *that* life should have sanctity which offers some guarantee of future worthiness," and that therefore "all acute cases of malformation, degenerative stigmata, crippledom, abnormality, should unhesitatingly be done away with. . . . . Out of our pity for the sound, therefore, we ought to be able to put painlessly away all incurable sufferers, just as we do incurable sufferers among animals." He cries out against burdening the taxpayer with the upkeep of human foulness and rubbish.

Such a program is putting into concrete terms Nietzsche's doctrine. In one place he makes Zarathustra cry:

> War and courage have done more things than charity. Not your pity but your bravery lifts up those about you. Let the little girlies tell you that "good" means "sweet" and "touching." I tell you that "good" means "brave." . . . . Be hard. . . . . Not peace at any price, but war! Not virtue, but efficiency. The weak and the botched must perish: that is the first principle of our humanity. And they should be helped to perish.

To meet such a doctrine it is not sufficient to quote Alfred Russell Wallace or Darwin himself, although Wallace wrote once:

> Humanity . . . . the essentially human emotion . . . . has caused us to save the lives of the weak and suffering, of the maimed or imperfect in mind or body. This has to some extent been antagonistic to physical and even intellectual race-improvement; but it has improved us morally by the continuous development of the characteristic and crowning grace of our human as distinguished from our animal nature.

And Darwin likewise held that while man is the only animal that allows its poorest to propagate, still it is in obedience to the instinct of sympathy. In the *Descent of Man* he declares:

> Nor could we check our sympathy if so urged by hard reason, without deterioration in the noblest part of our nature . . . . if we were intentionally to neglect the weak and helpless, it could only be for a contingent benefit, with a certain and great present evil.

The question will not down by mere weight of authority but requires redefinition and restatement by the biologist. The inquiring philanthropist who wants to make his work count for most in human welfare demands of the biologist not only a balance sheet of those forces which apparently work ill and those which work good to the human race. He wants in a form intelligible to the average man some authoritative statement as to the biological processes themselves. For example, any charitably disposed person in these days wants to know whether it is possible by taking thought to improve the human breed physically and mentally. Is there any such thing as positive eugenics? Could we hope by combining public and private forces to dry up the streams of human defect and degeneracy? Is it possible by manipulating social conditions to promote race health? Is there anything to the argument that the unfit multiply more rapidly than the fit, and that by an unwise policy of social ethics, charity, and religion the race is going to seed? How long must we wait before a present investment in eugenics might begin to produce results? Do we know enough of the mechanism of heredity now to be able to legislate toward sterilization, segregation, or extinction of the unfit? Is it possible to control prenatal forces and predetermine sex or character? Is the emotion to give and to help part of man's original biological endowment or is it a foolish, acquired disposition which ought to be bred out of us? Is it necessary for the philanthropist to apologize to the biologist for trying to do good?

While it is true that the foundations of biology have been disturbed by the new discoveries in the physical sciences, and while biology does not claim yet to have reached any authoritative level, have we not the right to expect some measure of light on the problem of human nature even at this stage of the game?

In a preceding paragraph I pointed out that the question of rights and duties linked up at one end with religion and at the other, particularly in its genetic aspects, with sociology. Social origins give the clue to customs and institutions, to attitudes, prejudices, and superstitions which determine human conduct and history. In its analysis of the movement of social life from its earliest forms to the present, sociology usually fixes upon three conditioning forces or sets of forces, and it is customary to speak of these as the influence of the physical environment, man's biological endowment—physical and mental—and man's own self-created social inheritance. Questions arising from the biological field have already been put. In the absence of a geographer the sociologist will have to answer for the physical environment by saying that in general the whole history of mankind reveals an inverse ratio between human intelligence and the direct effect of the physical environment. Notwithstanding the relatively high present level of human intelligence and organized knowledge, the sociologist admits that man has not yet established absolute control over the vicissitudes of nature, hence we are still called upon to repair the ravages of climate, cataclysms like earthquake, volcanic eruption, tornado, fire, and flood. In so far as these phenomena bear upon the problem of charity, they call for philanthropic encouragement of research and invention, or they call for intelligent demand upon organized social agencies to set in motion the necessary engineering procedures to prevent those hazards which even at the present level of science are preventable. There still falls to the sociologist a field of questioning which has to do with whether man is a victim of his own institutions, beliefs, customs, and traditions, and whether some of his own measures such as charity are really sound and justifiable in the light of social history.

Is there, as a matter of fact, then, any distinctive social or sociological motive for charity aside from the economic or religious or political motives? By the same token is there any distinctive sociological objection to charity as such or to any particular form of it? Does charity run counter to man's nature, either original or acquired? Is charity part of the process of "domesticating" man?

How far is charitable activity a fundamental mode of social life? Is it one of the derivatives from mutual aid or some similar integrative principle? Is there an "instinct for seeing others well off"? Is charity an outgrowth of the parental relation? Has it made for social solidarity? Has it weakened the social group? Is there any body of fact in the history of social life which can tell us how much or what sort of charity is best for developing a healthy group life, or how it should be administered? Can sociology say whether specialized institutions can discharge the function of charity better than the elementary institutions like the family or church?

What social qualities and attitudes in both giver and receiver are fostered by philanthropy? What, if any, is the historical relationship between "power" and "charity"? Is the sociological ideal the elimination of all charity and the need for it? Why? How might this ideal be achieved? Is there any connection between the ideal of social surplus and elimination of charity? How do standards of living affect concepts of philanthropy? Is charity to be reckoned as one of the elements in social control? Is there any sociological objection to philanthropic foundations, charitable trusts, or other forms of high-powered welfare work?

Any teacher or any parent knows that it is immeasurably easier to ask questions than to answer them. It is equally evident that the sheaf of questions just propounded will require more than an easy gesture of reference to some encyclopedia or *summa theologica* or textbook. Perhaps the present state of science will not account for all of them satisfactorily. But even if a reasonable proportion of them can be cleared up, the pathway of philanthropic effort will be less slippery and trying. The mariner's compass gave the first promise of man's dominion over the seas. A refinement of that instrument enabled man to spring into the air and assert himself in a new element. Creative social welfare work now seeks similar guidance and calls upon the experts to furnish compass, charts, and all the other equipment for action in the most difficult medium of all—human behavior.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

LYNN THORNDIKE

"Charity never faileth," as the King James Version has it, may not be the most accurate translation for the words of Paul to the Corinthians, *he agape oudepote piptei.* But it is enough to suggest that altruistic emotion and the practice of philanthropy were no new-found revelation or inspiration of the Christian community but old as history and human experience, and that the apostle to the Gentiles wrought wisely in basing the new faith upon this bed rock rather than upon the transient and dubious gift of tongues or the varying progress and somewhat restricted possession of knowledge. Already the great epic poet of pagan Rome had written, "Here too are tears for suffering and human woes touch the heart." A generation earlier Cicero had discussed beneficence and liberality to those in distress in the *De officiis.* Some centuries before Buddhism had proclaimed that all other forms of righteousness "are not worth the sixteenth part of the emancipation of the heart through love." Two millenniums before Christ, Hammurabi was severe in his code against rapacious moneylenders, and made the protection of widow and orphan, and of the weak against the strong, his aim and boast. Indeed, it is hardly conceivable that any human legislator or religious teacher ever ventured to state as his aim the oppression of widows and orphans, or to boast that he had helped the strong against the weak. Conversely, the occasional largesses by despotic rulers that have been written so large on the page of history, which resembles the modern newspaper in devoting much of its space to advertisements, were probably not peculiar to them but were adduced by their eulogists to show that they did not fall short of the conduct demanded by common humanity.

The study of savage and uncivilized peoples, among whom something of primitive ways and viewpoints seems to have survived even to the threshold of the present, reveals the fact that many tribes feed the hungry, refuse payment for lodging, and virtually share their goods in common. Hospitality to strangers has long been recognized as a virtue of primitive peoples, while charity, if we accept A. H. Keane's dictum, "is almost a law of nature."[1] Since other animals than man appear to display at least vestiges of it, it may be accepted as a factor in evolution, which would thus be not merely a struggle for existence, but marked by a spirit of mutual helpfulness. History likewise agrees with Aristotle that man is a social animal and as such must and does co-operate with and assist his fellow-men. On the other hand, artful beggars and professional mendicity have doubtless existed not only from Irus in the *Odyssey* and the beggar whom Apollonius of Tyana had stoned to death as the cause of a pestilence, down to *les fourberies des mendiants* depicted in the ballads of Eustache Deschamps about 1400, but long before as well as ever since.

Consideration of the status of the poor and needy and of charitable activity on their behalf through the course of history soon convinces us, however, that these are largely dependent upon, and affected by, other factors and circumstances which may vary greatly from time to time. Therefore we could scarcely compare all periods, or even two given periods, in commensurate terms, even assuming that we had reasonably full and adequate information available concerning them. Moreover, hitherto historians have occasionally changed their minds as to the prosperity or indigence of certain periods and classes; for example, as to the condition of the French peasantry on the eve of the French Revolution. Density of population, vital statistics—were they recoverable—and standards in living conditions have differed greatly with the process of time as well as in different regions, and must obviously be historically investigated with great care before we can pass intelligently upon the problem of poverty at intervals of time and in different countries. If examination of skeletons unearthed from a Norse barrow convinces anatomists that most persons in the settlement died between the ages of nineteen and thirty-one years, it is clear that the care of the aged would be no great problem in that community. Sanitation and public health are matters so closely related to charity organization that their history also should be mastered so far as may be. It is furthermore almost self-evident that an age harassed by incessant wars and invasions, and visited by frequent famines, cannot serve as a model for the administration of poor-relief by a more stable, quiet, and prosperous society, nor can the experience of the latter profit the former much.

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[1] "Charity, Primitive," in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

Then there are certain past social customs and institutions, such as slavery and the exposure of infants in antiquity, or the practice of commendation in the early Middle Ages, which greatly altered the situation from that to which we are accustomed. So long as the practice of leaving unpromising infants to die of exposure was permitted by law and approved by custom, it is evident that illegitimate births and abandoned infants, congenital idiots, crippled and defective children, and the existence of large families among the poorest classes would not constitute so great a burden and problem for society as in medieval and modern times. On the other hand, the seeming heartlessness of the usage is no sure proof that human charity and kindliness did not take other forms of expression.

Slavery and clientage formed a nether stratum into which the weaker and less capable members of society might sink, particularly through failure to pay their debts, and from which the more capable and ambitious might rise, without in either case occasioning direct expense or concern to the public or state. In fact, one reason for the oft-repeated assertion of modern economists that free labor is superior to (i.e., more paying than) slave labor is this element of poor-relief in the institution of private slavery. The chief *desiderata* of early modern poor-laws—that the poor should be made to work and, if necessary, be beaten; that they should receive a minimum of food, shelter, and clothing; and that they should stay put in one place—all these had been fulfilled with surprising fidelity by the institution of private slavery. Sick slaves were often cared for by humane masters. Household slaves might receive individual attention such as is denied the inmates of large charitable institutions. But being sickly or impotent or aged did not qualify one for slavery, so that that institution was far from solving the problem of poor-relief in antiquity in its entirety.

Clientage and commendation were modified forms of personal dependence. The needy Roman client received free legal advice and protection from his patron and occasional invitations to dinner or baskets of food, out of which the public distribution of grain or bread developed at Rome from the days of the Gracchi on. In the centuries of barbarian invasion and German kingdoms following the break-up of the Roman Empire there came to be regular formulas of commendation for those who did not have the wherewithal to feed and clothe themselves, and hence commended themselves to the protection and support of some powerful lord whose men they became. Such persons, it is true, in other periods would probably have been prosperous and self-supporting members of society. But if such persons fell into a condition of personal dependence, we may be sure that the dregs of society suffered a similar or worse fate, though very likely without any legal document to mark their descent into serfdom or personal servitude. It should be added that in serfdom, too, the lord had certain obligations to relieve his peasants when in distress. In Russia, for example, if the serf's cabin burned down, the lord must let him take wood from the forest to rebuild it; if the serf lost his only horse or cow, the lord must replace it; and in case of famine the lord was bound to dispense grain from his store.

Such illustrations may suffice to demonstrate that the different social and political structure of times past must be competently discounted before we attempt either to criticize or to profit by their charitable institutions in the stricter sense of the word, and that the annals of the poor are far from being so short and simple as the poet thought. There is the further consideration that the Industrial Revolution of the last two centuries and the capitalistic organization of modern economic activity have made a breach between ours and past civilizations which is becoming increasingly difficult to bridge. Nevertheless everything has its past, total ignorance of which is certainly more embarrassing and disadvantageous than a partial knowledge. And charity, as has been already implied, has its past quite as much as anything else. In our brief survey thereof we shall be concerned especially to question certain generalizations which seem to have been made unwarrantably, and to emphasize certain aspects of the subject which have in some quarters passed neglected.

We have already suggested that other great religions than Christianity have emphasized charity. That Judaism did so is evidenced by many injunctions of the Old Testament from the Pentateuch on,[1] such as that not to reap the corners of the field and to leave the gleanings for the poor, who were also allowed to pluck standing corn and eat grapes off the vine, or the reservation of the scantier crops of the fallow sabbatical year for them, or the relief accorded debtors every sabbatical year. Buddhism, for its part, not only boasted a founder who had himself borne the beggar's bowl, but inculcated various right ways of giving, such as to give in faith, carefully, quickly, firmly, and so as not to injure one's self or the recipient; or, according to another version, to give carefully, thoughtfully, with one's own hand, not to give merely what one would otherwise throw away, and to give with the hope that the recipient will return for later donations. The Koran teaches kindness to the poor, orphan, and stranger; forbids the exposure of infants; and enjoins almsgiving.

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[1] See the chapter on poor-laws in Schaeffer, *Social Legislation of the Semites* (1915). The passages following are from Lev. 23:22; Exod. 23:11; and Deuteronomy, chap. 11.

This is not to assert that charity was necessarily the child or inseparable companion of religion. Some of the regulations just cited are rather legal or social. Indeed, it is often difficult to separate the religious from the secular in ancient cultures. In Babylonia and elsewhere the temple might be not merely a place for worship, but a bank, public granary, and center for agrarian or poor-relief—perhaps also, as in ancient Greece, a resort for the sick.[1] Two great strides in the progress of philanthropy were taken when the practice declined of burying as much of a man's property as possible with him and the usage grew of disposing of it by will in part at least for charitable purposes. This, of course, was a gradual transition through such intermediate steps as bequests for a grave cult for one's self and religious endowments for priests to assure one's hereafter. The second great stride was when sacrifice and donations to the gods gave way to charity to one's neighbor and foresight for the improvement of society. Not but that selfish motives continued to obtrude themselves in the charitable as in the funerary bequests. In ancient Greek as in Egyptian and Babylonian foundations, says Laum, the motive was throughout of an egoistic nature.[2]

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[1] See M. Hamilton, *Incubation or the Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches* (London, 1906; 227 pp.); but also consult R. Pohl, *De Graecorum medicis publicis* (1905), who holds that Greek medicine was developed by laymen and not so indebted to temple-training as has been thought.

[2] Bernhard Laum, *Stiftungen in der griechischen und römischen Antike: Ein Beitrag zur antiken Kulturgeschichte* (Berlin, 1914; 2 vols.), Band I, *Darstellung;* Band II, *Urkunden.* The numerous recorded instances of ancient foundations and

Throughout history three characteristic attitudes toward poverty and charity are discernible. One is the idealization of poverty and preference of it to riches which we encounter among ascetics of all ages, among Hindu sages and Stoic philosophers, in the ideal of apostolic poverty which was such a force throughout the Middle Ages and was especially sanctified by St. Francis of Assisi. "All those at whom we marvel for their great deeds," wrote Apuleius in the second century, "were the nurslings of poverty from their very cradles." "And all the wise that ever were, by aught I can espy," wrote Will Langland in the fourteenth century, "praise poverty as the best life, if patience accompanies it, and both better and blesseder by many fold than riches. . . . . Porphyry and Plato, Aristotle, Ovid, and eleven hundred, Tully, Ptolemy—I cannot tell their names—prove patient poverty the prince of all virtues." Manifestly a period when such an attitude is widely prevalent will grapple with the problem of caring for the poor and sick in a different manner than will a period which likes to repeat the supposed utterance of a leading millionaire and philanthropist that it is one's Christian duty to make all the money one can, save all the money one can, and give all the money one can.

The second attitude may be briefly distinguished as the desire to relieve poverty and distress. The third attitude lays more stress on the repression of mendicity than on giving to the poor, and aims to enable or force the poor to work, less with the idea of making them independent than of reducing the expenditure on their behalf. This third attitude we find especially prevalent in the early modern period from about the year 1500 on, when poor-law measures display a decidedly penal character.

A noticeable historic change takes place in the value of

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endowments are here elaborately classified under divers headings such as the motive of the giver, the legal form adopted, whom the foundation benefited, its purpose or nature, etc.

words such as "charity," "pauper," and "hospital." The workhouse so altered its character at one stage of the English poor-law that the only classes of persons admitted to it were precisely those who could not work—children and the impotent poor.

In the ancient Greek city-state the struggle for existence was hard and poverty widespread. Overpopulation and economic distress required frequent application of the remedies of emigration to colonies and of reform legislation. Of the latter the famous and sweeping reforms of Solon at Athens constitute a good example. Even in a commercial and imperial center such as Athens the diet and living quarters of most of the population were very restricted and unsanitary, and the total private capital wealth less in purchasing power than a single large fortune of today. But the city-state, if prosperous, paid dividends from the surplus of public wealth to its citizens, and an oration of Lysias shows that cripples received a daily allowance or pension for their support.

Anent the former point Aristotle wrote:

> Where there are revenues, the demagogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus. The poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy. Measures should be taken to bring them lasting prosperity; and as this end is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among them, if possible, in such amounts as may enable them to purchase a small farm, or at least to make a start in trade or husbandry. If this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other groups, and meantime the rich should pay the fee for attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies, and should in return be excused from useless public services.

Aristotle also made the keen observation that it is more blessed to give than to receive because the benefactor is active and derives the satisfaction of self-expression from his good deed, whereas the recipient is passive and does not have his best self drawn out.

In Roman, as in Greek, history two ever recurring problems, which border closely on the domain of charity but dwarf it by their greater conspicuousness or magnitude, were the agrarian question and that of private debts and their relief. The problem of food supply and corn laws also was paramount for popular welfare, as it was again to be in England of the early nineteenth century. There is some reason for thinking that food was distributed to the poor at the Temple of Ceres as well as by patrons to their clients. At any rate, ultimately we come to the *cura annonae* and the *frumentationes*, or public distributions of grain, and to the *congiaria*, or largesses of the emperors. The governing classes saw the desirability of keeping the proletariat amused as well as fed, so that *panem et circenses* has become a trite quotation. But bread was not always at hand for the emperors' subjects in provinces. When Apollonius of Tyana

> came to Aspendus in Pamphylia [in Asia Minor], he found nothing but vetch for sale in the market, and the citizens were feeding upon this and on anything else they could get; for the rich men had shut up all the corn and were holding it for export from the country. Consequently an excited crowd of all ages had set upon the governor and were lighting a fire to burn him alive, although he was clinging to the statues of the emperor.[1]

After Apollonius had calmed the mob and got at the truth of the matter, he summoned the corn-dealers and drew up so fierce an indictment against them that they speedily filled the market place with corn.

The early Roman Empire has commonly been represented as a time of peace and prosperity, but this was partly a matter of contrast with the preceding period of conquest and civil wars, and the following period of decline and barbarian invasion. Poverty was still widespread and the lot of the lower classes hard. In addition to the descriptions of a gardener

[1] From Conybeare's translation of Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* i. 15.

and workers in a mill which I have quoted elsewhere,[1] one more vivid glimpse of the life of the needy may be borrowed from Apuleius.[2] A wealthy citizen had brought together a great number of bears for public spectacles and wild-beast contests. But the animals began to sicken and soon lay dying everywhere through the squares of the city. "Then the lower classes, whom uncouth poverty without decent food drove to satisfy their gnawing hunger with whatever sordid supplement they could get for nothing, came running from all directions to attack the feast that lay before them."

Among the manifold bequests and endowments made by testament or during the lifetimes of the donors in the Empire, the leading place from a charitable point of view is taken by the alimentary foundations, especially of the emperors, for the support of needy boys, particularly orphans, until their eighteenth year, and of a smaller number of girls until their fourteenth year. Italy was divided into fourteen districts for the administration of the endowment. Pertinax was the first emperor to misappropriate the funds. By 315 A.D. the institution was no longer known, and was very likely not the only example of a pagan charity that disappeared when the Empire became Christian. The needy had their own charitable associations in the Roman Empire, *collegia tenuiorum*, to which even slaves might belong, and whose main purpose was mutual burial, to which their *columbaria*, like the Christian catacombs, still bear mute witness.[3]

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[1] Lynn Thorndike, *A Short History of Civilization* (1926), p. 189.

[2] *Metamorphoses* iv. 14.

[3] On the charitable side of Roman corporations see J. P. Walzing, *Les corporations romaines et la charité* (1895). On Roman poor-relief in general, besides such articles in classical encyclopedias as "Alimenta" in Pauly-Wissowa and "Mendicité" in Daremberg-Saglio, may be mentioned J. J. Esser, *De pauperum cura apud Romanos* (1902), a dissertation in Latin written some years previous to its date of publication; and A. de Marchi, *La beneficenza in Roma antica* (Milan, 1899). Older treatments are E. Brousse, *De l'assistance publique chez les Romains*, and Naudet, "Des secours publics chez les Romains," *Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, Vol. XIII (1838).

Of mutual aid and charitable activity on the part of the other oriental religions and mysteries in the Roman Empire we have not much surviving evidence, though we see Orpheus in art as the good shepherd bearing a lamb on his shoulders. But when Tertullian boasts that the voluntary contributions of the Christians to their monthly chest were not spent on banquets and drink, but for the needy, destitute, aged, shipwrecked, yet later in the same chapter[1] admits a moderate amount of eating and drinking at the Christian love-feast, we suspect that we are to infer not merely that the contemporary pagan associations indulged in the banquets and drinking with which he by implication charges them, but likewise spent a moderate amount, at least, upon the aged, destitute, and unfortunate. The great city of Alexandria, both in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, abounded in such societies and brotherhoods. However, pagan contemporaries and opponents, such as Lucian and the Emperor Julian, were impressed by the mutual aid and charity of the early Christians, though their withdrawal from much of the life of the world about them necessarily restricted their social service.

As Christianity became recognized by the state, the love-feast of Tertullian's time degenerated into the dole of food of Augustine's day. In the Theodosian code, a compilation of the legislation of the Christian emperors made in 438, four kinds of charitable institutions are mentioned: hospices (*xenodocheia*) or guesthouses for strangers and wayfarers, poorhouses, orphanages, and foundling asylums. The sermons of Chrysostom give glimpses of the poor-problem in the new capital of the Empire, Constantinople, but offer less by way of solution. "The appeal to give alms is constant, but the positive counsel on charitable work is nil."[2] Chrysostom did, however, urge that the poor of the great city, estimated at fifty thousand in number, should be supported by the state or at public expense, and should all be fed at one place for the sake of economy and efficient organization—an interesting example of the tendency toward centralization in charitable administration which we shall encounter again in the absolute monarchies of early modern times. Three thousand women were fed from church funds at this time; a register was kept of them. Chrysostom found the selection of deserving applicants a very troublesome task. Tramps, vagabonds, and idle poor were a scourge of the Byzantine Empire, and public works were established to give them employment. If they refused to work, they were to be driven from the city or condemned to slavery. The sick poor might visit Constantinople but must be registered while there and eventually return to their abodes.

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[1] Tertullian *Apology*, cap. 39.

[2] C. S. Loch, *Charity and Social Life* (1910), p. 218.

In the abandoned capital, Rome, which had sadly declined in prosperity and population, we get a similar glimpse of charitable administration under Pope Gregory the Great (590–604), who appears to have maintained with slight modifications the methods of pagan Rome,[1] with inspection of the sick, street by street, as perhaps a new feature.

We have now entered the medieval period from the fifth to the fifteenth century, and it becomes necessary to refute the general assertion which has often been made that the church was the only charitable agency during the Middle Ages, or that charity was entirely administered by it. With this has gone the corollary that medieval charity is of slight interest in the solution of modern problems or in attaining the goal of social progress. It is not at all certain that the corollary would follow from the first proposition, if this were valid. But it is erroneous. It represents the same attitude which regards medieval history as merely a part of church history. It is true that the period was pre-eminently Christian, and that other activities were likely to take on a religious coloring. It is also true that the church laid much stress upon almsgiving, which was classed as a good work and often substituted for the performance of penance. It is true that gifts to the poor and to the church were for a time scarcely distinguished, since by the laws of the late Christian Roman emperors property which was left vaguely to the poor went to the church as their legal representative. But since 817 there has been no universally binding ecclesiastical legislation concerning poor-relief.[1] "So long ago did laicization commence in charity."[2] Indeed, already in 806 we have an impressive instance of state legislation on the subject in a capitulary of Charlemagne. Touching on the subject of vagabond beggars, he desires that each of his vassals shall support his own poor from his *beneficium* or private holding and not permit them to go elsewhere to beg; and that where such persons are found, no one shall presume to give them anything unless they labor with their hands.[3]

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[1] For further details see *ibid.*, pp. 212–13.

It is only necessary to recall that every medieval monarch and great feudal lord had his almoner, an official to distribute alms to the poor, to see the absurdity of the contention that the church was the only channel of charity. But far more important than this—especially in the period from the twelfth century on, when medieval civilization reached its height, and we have the most information concerning it—was the vast outpouring of gifts by private individuals, the formation of lay brotherhoods for charitable purposes, and the social service performed by the industrial guilds and political communes. In none of these three great sources and channels of popular charitable activity did the clergy or church necessarily either dictate the form which the benefaction should take or dispense the funds which were provided. Only in the first case were they likely to have any considerable influence.

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[1] Ratzinger, *Geschichte der kirchlichen Armenpflege*, p. 236.

[2] C. S. Loch, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[3] "Capitula missorum Nuimagae datum 806 m. Martio," *Capitularia regum Francorum* (ed. Boretius), I, 132.

The motives of the givers were no doubt in part primarily religious and in part with an eye to their own future salvation, reward, and punishment, but they were also in part actuated by human kindliness, solidarity, and zeal for social welfare. These donors, whether individual or corporate, gave not merely of their property but of themselves in service, and their benefactions in great measure took the form, not of passing largesses to beggars, but of permanent foundations, buildings, and endowments.

Charity, then, was a community affair in the Middle Ages, not merely the concern of church or monastery. More than this, the first and elementary form of community organization often had been charitable, and the medieval municipalities in many cases were an outgrowth from charitable fraternities which had been the earliest form of anything like popular and democratic organization in the regions concerned. It was under the cover of such pious fraternal and charitable associations of laymen that training in common counsel and action was had, and that conspiracies were hatched against feudal or episcopal rule which resulted in winning political and economic freedom and self-government. Let us illustrate this point and at the same time show how deep the charitable and popular organization of the Middle Ages penetrated by the example of a rural commune in Provence. Jules Roman writes:

> As for the commune of Ollioules, it originated, like other rural communes of Provence in the *parlamentum* which gathered in one assembly all the *caps d'ostal*, that is, all the heads of families. Such assemblies date far back. They met as occasion required at irregular intervals under the lord's *bailli* as presiding officer. Ordinarily they appointed a syndic or committee to carry out the matter concerning which they had deliberated. This was only a rudimentary organization, but the Fraternity of the Holy Spirit (*Caritas Sancti Spiritus*) supplemented it. Such brotherhoods, whose origin sometimes dated back to the twelfth century, were for the purpose of assisting the poor and administering hospitals. They had a council, priors, and guardians of the poor. Their council comprised the leading men

> of the region and occupied itself not merely with works of charity but with the ordinary affairs of the community. They took the initiative in calling general *parlamenta* when the situation seemed critical. Such was often the origin of the *conseil étroit* and of the permanent syndics.[1]

So closely intertwined was charity with the other vigorous local and popular institutions of the Middle Ages!

The extent and multifariousness of medieval charitable establishments would be difficult to overestimate or exaggerate. In 1225 Louis VIII gave one hundred sous to each of the two thousand houses for lepers within his realm, which at that time had hardly reached one-half the extent of modern France. It is estimated that there were nineteen thousand houses for lepers in western Christendom. Many modern hospitals and other eleemosynary institutions and methods may be traced back to the medieval period, while many other medieval charitable establishments failed to survive through early modern times to the present. In the Department of the Aube in the thirteenth century there were sixty-two hospitals or hospices, of which twenty-one were located in rural communities. Of these last but one remained in the eighteenth century, and it too has now disappeared.[2] Too frequently modern writers on poor-relief and charity have begun their accounts with the sixteenth century. One such author, noting the recommendations repeated several times in royal proclamations of that century, "that each city should support its poor," dismissed it with the remark that it remained an exhortation and was not enforced, but failed to realize its implication that the cities formerly had supported their poor.

These forgotten and neglected charitable institutions of feudal states, municipalities, and rural communities, which long anteceded the development or taking-over of poor-relief by the modern nationalist state as such, are now being investigated in detail by localities. These monographs, of which a few specimens are listed in the accompanying note,[1] should provide valuable material and suggestion for social workers and scientists of the present. In the first place, these materials from the closing medieval centuries are far more abundant than any records we have or are likely to have for ancient, Moslem, and far eastern charities. In the second place, the medieval municipalities, with their community spirit and prominence of business men and leading citizens, have a closer affiliation with our democratic institutions, community chests, and the like than have the absolute monarchies and the bureaucracies of early modern times.[1]

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[1] "La société provençale à la fin du moyen âge," *Le moyen âge*, XII (1899), 233–47, based on Charles de Ribbe's book of that title. Passage quoted at pp. 245–46.

[2] Arbois de Jubainville, *Voyage paléographique dans le Département de l'Aube*.

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[1] A number of works on medieval hospitals will be listed in a subsequent note, although they are with difficulty distinguishable from other medieval charitable institutions. Discussions of charities and hospitals will also be found in most local and town histories.

AUTORDE, F. *Les charités de la ville de Felletin* (*Creuse*) *au XV^e siècle* (1897; 119 pp.); he edits *Le terrier des charités*, an inscription of *rentes*, with the amounts of grain or bread due from each, indicating a regular revenue.

BEAUREPAIRE, CH. DE. *Statuts de la Charité de Saint-Cosme, Saint-Damien, et Saint-Lambert en l'église de Saint-Denis de Rouen.* 1888.

BORDEAUX, R. *Les confréries de charité.* Evreux, 1868.

CHAILLAN. *Recherche et documents inédits sur l'orphanotrophium du pape Grégoire XI à Avignon.* Pp. xxxii+96. 1904.

DESCROZAILLE, HENRI. *Étude historique sur les hôpitaux, aumônes, charités, œuvres de bienfaisance de la ville d'Aubin.* Pp. 167. Rodez, 1911.

GERMAIN, A. "De la charité publique et hospitalière à Montpellier au moyen âge," *Mémoires de la Société Archéologique de Montpellier.* 1855.

GUIBERT, LOUIS. *Les confréries de dévotion et de charité et les œuvres laiques de bienfaisance à Limoges au moyen âge.* 1883.

GALLEY, J. B. *Les origines de l'Hôpital et de la Charité de Saint-Étienne.* Pp. 853. 1923.

LANGE, HERMANN. *Geschichte der christlichen Liebestätigkeit in der Stadt Bremen im Mittelalter.* Pp. xvi+204. 1925.

MOELLER, E. VON. *Die Elendenbrüderschaften: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Fremdenfürsorge im Mittelalter.* Pp. 176. 1906.

NIMAL, H. *Les beguinages.* Pp. 126 from *Annales de la Société Archéologique de l'Arrondissement de Nivelles.* 1908.

RAMBAUD, PIERRE. *L'assistance publique à Poitiers*, chap. 1: "Le moyen âge." Pp. 668. Paris, 1912.

SAINTE-MARIE-MÉVIL. *Chartes de la charité de la couture de Bernai.* 1855.

SARDAC, DE. *Étude sur l'assistance publique à Lectowe.* 1908.

SIMON, A. *L'ordre des Pénitents de Sainte-Marie-Madeleine en Allemagne.* Pp. xxv+289. 1918.

VEUCLIN. *Documents concernant les confréries de charité normandes.* 1892.

WINCKELMANN, OTTO. *Das Fürsorgewesen der Stadt Strassburg vor und nach der Reformation bis zum Ausgang des 16ten Jahrhundert.* Pp. xvi+301. 1922.

It is desirable in passing to correct the common misconception that in the Middle Ages education was only for a favored few, notably the clergy. On the contrary, popular education in both church and secular schools was more widespread at the height of medieval civilization than during the modern period previous to the nineteenth century, although men did not go to the present extreme of making elementary education compulsory and so depriving it of its chief attraction. But provision was made for the free education of children of poor parents by the church, the towns, and by private individuals. The numerous elementary schoolmasters—and sometimes schoolmistresses—in even small places were mainly supported, however, by fees paid by the children's parents. From this we may infer not only that elementary education, and even further training, was fairly widespread, but that child labor did not exist on a large scale.

The history of hospitals antedates the Middle Ages, since the *Xenodocheion*, or house for strangers, was a Greek and Jewish institution, and we hear of private infirmaries in the first century of the Roman Empire. In the Christian period under Basel (330–79) the two purposes were fused, and the hospice or hospital became a refuge both for wayfarers and sick patients. This was also likely to be the case in the medieval period, when the record of hospitals grows richer, as some indication of special studies concerning them will show.[2] We

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[1] The fundamental principles of medieval and present charity have been compared by J. N. Foerstl, *Das Almosen: Eine Untersuchung über die Grundsätze der Armenfürsorge in Mittelalter und Gegenwart.* Pp. 156. 1909.

[2] Atgier. *L'ancien Hôtel-Dieu de St. Martin-de-Ré.* Pp. 150 from *Recueil de la Commission des Arts, etc., de la Charente-Inférieure et Société d'Archéologie de Saintes*, Vol. XVIII (1912).

[Footnote is continued on page 42]

are now leaving the numerous leper-houses out of consideration. The medieval hospital was usually small, especially if located in the country. Hospitals were very numerous, being founded in rural communities as well as towns and on every highroad or at every bridge and ferry. Even in a town there

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Boudrot, J. B. *Petit cartulaire de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Beaune.* 1880.

Braquenay, Aug. *Histoire de l'Hôtel-Dieu Saint-Nicolas* (*1200–1874*) *et de l'Hospice des Orphelins de Monteuil-sur-Mer.* Pp. 309. 1907.

Brièle. *Collection de documents pour servir à l'histoire des hôpitaux de Paris.* 4 vols. 1887.

Buscarini, U. *Origini e fondazione dell'ospedale civile di Piacenza, 1471.* Pp. 56. 1915.

Chevalier, U. *Hôpitaux de Romans.*

Coquelle, P. *Maladrerie de Janval* (twelfth to eighteenth century). Pp. 31. 1908.

Coyecque, E. *L'Hôtel-Dieu de Paris au moyen âge, histoire et documents.* 1891.

Dufour, A. *Notes pour servir à l'histoire des Etablissements Hospitaliers de la ville de Corbeil: la Maladrerie—Saint-Lazare et l'Hôtel-Dieu.* Pp. 20. 1891.

Gauthier, Jules. *L'Hôpital du Saint-Esprit de Gray* (*1238–1790*). Pp. 53. 1910.

Hauser, Caspar. *Der Spital in Winterthur, 1300–1530.* Pp. 84. 1916.

L'Abbe, E. B. *L'Hôtel-Dieu de Beaune.* 1881.

Liebe, G. *Die mittelalterlichen Siechenhäuser der Provinz Sachsen.* Pp. 36. 1905.

Mackay, D. L. *Les hôpitaux et la charité à Paris au XIII*^{e} *siècle.* 1923.

Moore, Sir Norman. *The History of St. Bartholomew's Hospital.* 2 vols. London, 1918.

O'Donoghue, E. G. *The Story of Bethlehem Hospital: from Its Foundation in 1247.* Pp. 448. 1914.

Pansier, P. *Les hôpitaux d'Avignon au moyen âge.* Pp. 33. 1907.

Pecchiai, P. *L'ospedale maggiore di Milano.* Pp. 772. 1927.

Petit, E. *Archives de l'Hôpital de Tonnerre.* Pp. 27. 1907.

Pinzi, C. *Gli ospizi medioevali e l'ospedale di Viterbo.* Pp. xvi+430. 1894.

Rigal, J. L., et Verlaguet, P. A. *Documents sur l'ancien Hôpital d'Aubrac, I* (*1108–1341*). Pp. 686. 1913–17.

Salter, H. E. *A Cartulary of the Hospital of St. John the Baptist.* Vol. II, 1916; Vol. III, 1918. Pp. 575.

Van Puyvelde, L. *Un hôpital du moyen âge.* Pp. 124. 1925.

Wickersheimer, E. "Médecins et chirurgiens dans les hôpitaux du moyen âge," *Janus*, Vol. XXXII (Jan.-March, 1928).

Wörner, A. *Das städtische Hospital zum heiligen Geist in Schwäbisch Gmünd.* Pp. 308+265. 1905.

Zechlin, E. *Lünebergs Hospitäler im Mittelalter.* Pp. 82. 1907.

was likely to be a number of small hospitals, founded at intervals by different persons or societies and dedicated to varied purposes. "Our fathers," says a modern French writer on the subject, "loved diversity and not uniformity which so pleases us today." It is therefore as difficult to describe a typical medieval hospital as a castle or town. A small hospital for general use would usually have a common hall where poor pilgrims and others might sleep overnight, a chapel, and a few separate rooms and beds for the sick. In 1351 the Maison-Dieu of Corbeil had fourteen beds and a staff consisting of a director, four brothers, and four sisters, who cultivated their own lands to supply their needs.[1] Sometimes the persons who founded hospitals themselves served therein, devoting the rest of their lives to the care of the sick. There were municipal hospitals in Southern France by the thirteenth century.

These medieval hospitals appear to have been clean and well kept, intelligently and conscientiously administered and inspected. Even the poor wayfarer was given fresh sheets to sleep in. Such matters as bathing and shaving were carefully regulated. The number of brooms used in a year at the Hotel-Dieu of Paris indicates that the premises were kept scrupulously clean. The poor and sick were also kept warm. At Sherburn in Northern England, "Every morning the woman must 'make the poor men a fire against they rise and a pan of fair water and a dish by it to wash their hands.' "[2] At Paris movable stoves were wheeled up to the bedsides of the sick in winter. Perhaps the chief complaint which may be made against medieval hospitals is that the insane often were housed rather indiscriminately in the same institution with other sick and poor, whereas we hear of separate asylums for the insane centuries before in the Moslem capitals. There came, however, to be hospitals especially for the insane in the Christian West, such as St. Mary of Bethlehem, or Bedlam in London.

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[1] This information comes from a very detailed inventory of the establishment made by Jean de Villescoublain, inspector of charitable institutions in the city and diocese of Paris. His report breaks off at this point, since he was taken ill as he started to visit the house for lepers in Corbeil (see Dufour, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–10).

[2] Rotha M. Clay, *The Medieval Hospitals of England* (London, 1909), p. 173.

Despite so much provision for the sick and needy, a growing unrest in society becomes noticeable from the fourteenth century on. Various reasons may be suggested for this. One is the depopulation, distress, displacement of labor, and break-up of families and other social groups produced by the Black Death of 1348 and its repeated subsequent outbreaks. Others are the disorder of the Hundred Years' War and the ravages of mercenaries, the schism in the church, the weakening of the feudal and manorial system and of serfdom, the failure of the towns and communes to advance farther along the road to democracy. There was much dislocation of individuals, much wandering about, apparently an increase in begging, and a more marked contrast between extremes of luxury and misery. This produced in contemporary literature such vivid descriptions of the wayfaring life of the time[1] and the various classes of poor—deserving, impotent, sturdy beggars and "wasters," lunatic "lollers," and the like—as we meet many times in *The Vision of Piers the Ploughman*, composed in the second half of the fourteenth century; such personal contact with the shady side of society as we see in the fifteenth-century poet François Villon; or such fervid championship of the underdog as flames forth in the verse of Meschinot (1430–1509), the gloomy squire of fifteenth-century poetry.

Le peuple donc qu'en main tenez
Ne le mettez à poverté
Mais en grant paix le maintenez

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[1] Of secondary works on the subject Jusserand's *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages* is almost a classic, while concerning French conditions may be mentioned Siméon Luce, *Les clercs vagabonds à Paris sous Louis XI* (1879), and Gaston Paris, *François Villon* (1901).

Car il a souvent povre esté
Pillé est yver et esté
Et en nul temps ne se repose
Trop est bastu qui pleurer n'ose.[1]

In the economic revolution which is supposed, at the close of the fifteenth and opening of the sixteenth century, to have marked the transition from medieval to modern conditions, most of the population were on the underside of the wheel of fortune. The wages and living conditions of the working classes had fallen below what they were in the thirteenth century, while the working day was longer. The *livre tournois* in 1200 contained 98 grams of fine silver; by 1600 it had only 11 grams.[2] Such depreciation was largely the work of the monarchs of the larger states who also, in order to finance their insensate wars, wasted the wealth of the new world and bled white the once financially prosperous towns within their boundaries. As a result, these towns had little left for internal improvement and development, or even for charity. Thus it was a period of economic decline, not progress, which saw the passing of medieval civilization and charity. This economic decline neither the invention of printing nor the study of classical literature nor that will-o'-the-wisp, the spirit of the Renaissance, served to abate.

On the eve of the sixteenth century there were numerous complaints that the clergy and religious orders were turning the revenues of hospitals and other charitable endowments

[1] The people then that you control,
Do not reduce to penury,
But maintain them in perfect peace.
For they too often have been poor,
Pillaged in winter and in summer,
Never allowed a moment's rest,
And beaten so they dare not weep.

[2] Richard Ehrenberg, *Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance* (1928), p. 17, "Note on the Currencies," citing D'Avenel, *Histoire économique de la propriété, des salaires, etc.*, I, 62.

to their own uses. But there seems to be little to support the assertion that charity first became constructive with the Protestant Reformation or Scotch Presbyterianism—though Quaker philanthropy might put in a stronger claim to consideration—or the assertion that philanthropy has been most highly developed in English-speaking countries. During the convulsion of society produced by the Reformation many *confréries* and charitable endowments were repressed or confiscated in Catholic as well as Protestant lands. The wars of religion, unusually bad crops, and frequent epidemics increased the distress, so that we are not surprised that the situation became critical, and that kings and their councils made frantic and repeated efforts to repress mendicity and force the able-bodied to work, with public ateliers and whippings or worse penalties. French and English poor-law legislation in the sixteenth century passed through similar cycles of development, and it seems clear that both countries were confronted with similar conditions and problems.[1]

Though monarchs might storm and bluster, the towns still really led in charitable administration. Their action was usually the outcome of a general assembly of townsmen called to discuss the poor-problem. Ypres was in 1524 the first to enforce the influential treatise of the Spanish humanist, Vives, upon the poor-law. Lyons was a model for all France in its Aumône générale of 1533, which cared for as many as nineteen thousand poor, some of whom were more than once quartered upon the citizens under penalty of a fine. In 1614 the Aumône gave way to a general hospital, Notre Dame de la Charité, where the poor were housed. Its success led the central government later to attempt to make the institution general throughout the realm. This tendency to amalgamate hospitals may, however, be traced back almost two centuries earlier in Italy. In 1456 Francesco Sforza, the despot of Milan, founded the Ospedale Maggiore which absorbed the previous hospitals of St. Vincent, St. Celsus, St. Dionysius, St. Simplicianus, Santa Maria Maggiore, S. Caterina, S. Gottardo, S. Stefanoalla Ruota, S. Giobbe o Ospedale del Brolio, and in 1475 two others. We encounter the same situation in early modern education, when it became common to combine into a single school a number which had decayed and which the town could no longer support. Another Italian innovation of the later fifteenth century was the Monti di Pietà, where the poor might borrow at easier rates than from the ordinary pawnbroker or usurer.[1]

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[1] It would take too long to set forth here the history of the English poor-law or laws since 1500. A good succinct outline of the legislation may be found in Medley, *English Constitutional History* (3d ed.), pp. 404–16, or in Redlich and Hirst, *English Local Government*, I, 100–111. See also Perris, *An Industrial History of England*, pp. 216–27, and the various chapters on the subject in different volumes of *The Social History of England* (ed. Traill). H. Heaton, *Yorkshire Woollen and Worsted Industries* (1920), pp. 64–65, gives an interesting account of the efforts of the municipality of York to provide work for the poor in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

For French conditions and measures since the sixteenth century one may consult Christian Paultre, *De la répression de la mendicité et du vagabondage en France sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1906), and Paul Hubert-Valleroux, *La charité avant et depuis 1789* (1890). Especially in the former volume will be found bibliography of more detailed and local studies on the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.

To say nothing of Germany, prostrated by the Thirty Years' War, misery continued widespread in France during much of the seventeenth century.[2] It was not much cheered or alleviated by Louis XIV's policy of centralization and uniformity in care for the poor as in everything else. The general hospital to which we have already referred was a huge combination of infirmary, asylum, poorhouse, and prison, where a vast medley of old and young, sick and vicious, debauched girls, incorrigible boys, orphans, imbeciles, insane, and poor of all degrees were housed together, though usually in distinct dormitories. The prison element tended to predominate. Most of the small medieval hospitals had already disappeared by the beginning of the century, and their endowments with them. Louis XIV added such rural charitable endowments as had survived to the general hospitals in the towns, leaving the peasants practically without relief or infirmaries. More popular was his annual distribution of medicine chests through the provinces. There was a re-establishment of charitable fraternities toward the close of the century.

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[1] Concerning this institution consult Heribert Holzapfel, *Die Anfänge des Montes Pietatis (1462–1515)* (1903, Italian trans., 1905), and Marino Ciardini, *I banchieri ebrei in Firenze nel secolo XV e il monte di pietà fondato da Girolamo Savonarola* (1907). Pp. cxv+103.

[2] A. Feillet, *La misère au temps de la Fronde* (1862); A. Joubert, *Etude sur les misères de l'Anjou* (1886); E. Ebrard, *Misère et charité dans une petite ville de France (Bourg-en Bresse) de 1560 à 1862.*

In most parts of Europe the masses now had little opportunity for education, although a promising individual might find a benevolent patron. Despite the law of 1696 in Scotland that there should be a school in every parish, there was much illiteracy in lowlands as well as highlands. In England toward the close of the seventeenth century the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge organized charity schools, and in Catholic countries religious orders and sisterhoods established schools for both sexes.

We now approach the effect produced upon the poor and institutions for them by what are usually regarded as the two most important movements in modern history, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution which began in England. Strange as it may seem, the French revolutionary assemblies and the First Reform and Liberal Parliament dealt the poor two of the hardest knocks that they had ever sustained. The relation of the French Revolution to charity and social welfare is a topic for which one will search in vain in a standard textbook in English on the revolutionary period, but a full treatment is given in Hubert-Valleroux's *La charité avant et depuis 1789*. The abolition of tithes and feudal dues deprived the hospitals of a third of their revenue. The confiscation of goods belonging to the clergy and religious orders took away still more from the poor.

A Committee on Mendicity was appointed which made six reports containing much information and many suggestions, among which the chief was a grandiose proposal to confiscate all private charitable endowments and to make charity national but no longer call it by that opprobrious name, since the needy citizen was entitled to state support. But the assembly could not collect taxes and did nothing except further to suppress the assistance to hospitals and the distribution of medicines which the royal government had provided. The Convention and Directory tried to check and restore the damage which had been inflicted, but it was then too late.

The great change from hand to machine labor, felt first in England in the cotton and other textile industries, was inevitably accompanied by much temporary dislocation and distress, but also by a rapid increase in population.[1] The latter was encouraged more than the former was relieved by the poor-law policy of Parliament, locally administered by the justices of the peace, in the closing years of the eighteenth and early years of the nineteenth century. Inadequate wages were supplemented from the poor-rates; the larger a man's family, the more he received in dole; even the birth of illegitimate children was encouraged by allowances made to the mother. Similarly, the convention in France proposed to pay a bounty for families of more than two children and furnish secrecy for *filles-mères*. But then the Reform Parliament by the new poor-law of 1834 dropped the practice of supplementing wages and forced those who received relief into workhouses, suddenly drawing a hard-and-fast legal line between paupers and the rest of the population and between complete independence and the workhouse which did not fit the actual conditions and evoked a great wave of popular discontent and social bitterness. The new poor-law did nothing to assuage industrial unemployment; the policy of outdoor relief was soon resumed; and since the World War the number of British unemployed supported by the state has run into the millions.

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[1] In this connection the reader may be reminded that Malthus's famous *Essay on the Principle of Population*, first published in 1798 and become in the fifth edition of 1817 a three-volume work, contains a great deal on the condition of the poor and theories of charity at that time. Although Malthus contended that "dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful," he insisted that a main purpose of his *Essay* was "to improve the condition and increase the happiness of the lower classes of society."

If there is any one thing that history seems to teach, it is that there is nothing more harmful—unless it be to do something for the poor which the poor have no desire to have done for them—than the sudden and jerky attempts of doctrinaire legislators or bureaucratic administrators or professional reformers to make something the law which is not the fact, and then add insult to injury by berating society for "not observing the law." History and social science observe facts. There is also the danger, which the French abolition of feudalism has just illustrated, that legislation aimed in one direction will have unsalutary repercussions in quite unexpected quarters. This is not only true of the possible effect of other legislation upon charities, but also poor-laws may affect the complicated social organism adversely in other respects. For example, the English Act of Settlement of 1662, which allowed the removal by the local authorities of any poor man to the place of his birth within forty days of his arrival to settle in another parish, checked the free flow of superfluous labor from overcrowded districts and discouraged it from seeking its natural markets.

Social legislation is not necessarily harmful, however, or if so, at least it seems a necessary evil. The condition of the working masses since the Industrial Revolution has developed trade-unionism, socialism, labor parties in politics, syndicalism, and, in Russia, the soviet revolution. Fear of such developments or an enlightened sympathy with social welfare induced existing governments to embark upon programs of social legislation. Of these the two most extensive were, in Germany of the late nineteenth century, Bismarck's Sickness Insurance Law of 1883, the Accident Insurance laws of 1884 and 1885, and the Old Age Insurance Law of 1889; and, in Great Britain of the early twentieth century, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, the Old-Age Pensions Act of 1908, the Labor Exchanges Act of 1909, and the National Insurance Act of 1911—all the work of the Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith liberal ministry.

JEWISH PHILANTHROPY: TRADITIONAL AND MODERN

MORDECAI M. KAPLAN

INTRODUCTORY

There are two questions which come to mind when we think of charity as a religious obligation: first, What have the historic religions contributed to the meaning and method of charity? second, What bearing has that contribution upon some of the mooted problems of modern philanthropy?

In attempting to answer these questions from the standpoint of the Jewish religion, we shall avoid much confusion by stating outright which of the varying interpretations of the Jewish religion we here adopt as the ground whence to survey the problem of charity, both past and present. Even if we were merely to record what Judaism taught in the past with regard to the duty of helping the poor and what measures and agencies it created for the discharge of that duty, our selection of the facts, and the conclusions we would draw from them, would differ according as our leanings were either traditionalist or modernist. All the more impossible is it to escape the need of taking sides when we wish to articulate the message of Judaism for those who today are seeking to reorient themselves in the value and function of social service.

We regard as untenable the tradition that Moses received the Torah on Sinai and delivered it to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders, and so on until our own day,[1] because, according to that tradition, the Jewish religion is essentially a supernatural phenomenon. Equally untenable, in our opinion, is the view which represents Judaism as a religious philosophy, or as a static system of doctrines and practices analogous to the systems advocated by the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, or the Neoplatonists. While this view implies that Judaism is a natural human phenomenon, it misrepresents the true character of Judaism by giving the impression that it is committed to a definite and unalterable philosophy of life. We hold that Jewish religion is the spiritual life of the Jewish people, and therefore a human, changing, and dynamic process. In so far, however, as all spiritual life is conditioned by environmental factors and cultural development, it is but natural that the Jewish religion should have suffered marked changes in the course of its long career. A survey of that career discloses three distinct periods, each period revealing some outstanding habit of thought and world-outlook of its own. No statement about the Jewish religion can therefore be correct unless it take into account the fact that what may be true of one stage of that religion may not be true of the other two stages.

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[1] Abot 1:1.

Accordingly, instead of accepting the traditional view that the Jewish religion began as a highly developed spiritual monotheism, we subscribe to the conclusion arrived at by modern scholarship, that at first there was little to differentiate it from the type of religion found among the ancient nomad tribes. The term Y H W H, usually translated 'Lord," and taken to denote the one universal God of Jewish monotheism, was originally the name of the patron deity of Israel. Allegiance to Y H W H was expected on the basis of the tradition that a covenant had been made with him by the Israelites in the course of their journeyings in the wilderness of the Sinai peninsula. This limited conception of God marked the first stage of the spiritual life of Israel. We may therefore designate that stage as henotheistic. The second stage was ushered in by the canonical prophets. Only after they taught that Y H W H was the creator of the universe and the wielder of human destiny, and one national calamity after another seemed to confirm this conception of Y H W H, did the Jewish religion become truly monotheistic. New historical factors had to come into play during the three or four centuries after the return from the Babylonian Exile before Judaism entered its third stage by becoming eschatological in character. During the last two thousand years it has been dominated by the assumption that life in this world is essentially a preparation for the life in the world to come.

The environmental factors and the general cultural development of the present time are so radically different from those which prevailed in the past that the Jewish people may be said to be now standing on the threshold of a new stage in its spiritual career. In other words, the Jewish religion is now undergoing a process of reconstruction. No small part of that process will consist in reckoning with the problem of social service in the light of the newer values of human life, and of the more extensive knowledge to which the modern man is heir. Hence, there is nowadays no authoritative Jewish attitude to the problem of charity. If we wish to define the position taken by the Jewish religion in respect to philanthropy, the most we can do is to record the status of philanthropy in the Jewish religion immediately before the challenge of modern life and thought, and to indicate what is likely to be the status of philanthropy in the Jewish religion after it shall have adjusted itself to the cultural and environmental influences of the era ahead of us.

In describing the system of charity which functioned during that stage out of which the Jewish religion is now passing, we shall rely mainly upon the authoritative Jewish literature, viz., the Bible, the Talmud,[1] the Midrashim,[2] and the codes.[3]

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[1] The collection of laws known as Mishnah redacted by R. Judah the Prince (born *ca.* 150) plus the discussion based thereon known as Gemara. The Jerusalem Talmud embodies the discussions of Palestinian rabbis from the second to the middle of the fifth century, and the Babylonian embodies the discussions of rabbis in Babylonia from about 200 to the end of the sixth century.

[2] Various collections of legalistic and homiletic interpretations of the Bible.

[3] The three main codes are the *Yad Ha-hazakah*, written by Moses Maimonides in the twelfth century; the *Tur*, by Jacob Ben Asher in the fourteenth century; and the *Shulhan Arukh*, by Joseph Karo in the sixteenth century.

Like the rest of the Jewish religion in this third stage of its development, that part which deals with philanthropy is a synthesis of the ideas and values which were evolved in the previous stages of its career, though they no doubt underwent considerable transformation as a result of the eschatological doctrines which held possession of the Jewish mind during the last two thousand years. The Bible played a part in Jewish life not while it was in the making, but in the era designed as "post-biblical." In so far as that was the case, even those teachings in it which originated among conditions of a primitive character managed to survive down to our own day, though, to be sure, with their meaning and intent much altered.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM OF JEWISH CHARITY

The important principle to bear in mind when we want to understand the traditional sanctions and objectives in the Jewish system of charity is that they are rooted in the traditional conception of God's relationship to the poor. The ancient logic always moved in the circle of religious ideas. Reasons and explanations always led to some assumed fact about God. The very belief that man counted for something had to be based upon his relationship to God. To the Hebrews that relationship was based upon the fact that man was made in the image of God. What, for example, could be more axiomatic than the law against bloodshed? Yet the ancients felt the need for a rationale. That rationale was none other than that man was made in the image of God.[1] This is why in all matters pertaining to man's duty to his fellows the fulcrum of the argument is placed not in human welfare but in the character of God. Likewise, the attitude of traditional Jewish religion toward the poor was derived less from the consideration of the interest of the poor themselves than from what was believed to be God's interest in the poor. Not their needs, but the conception of God's character, furnished the reasons for helping them. The three outstanding biblical assumptions on which the duty of charity is based, and which are further elaborated by the rabbis,[1] are: (1) that the poor are God's wards and pensioners; (2) that God, as a God of justice, demands that restitution be made to the poor for what they have been deprived of; and (3) that God, as a God of compassion, expects us to sympathize with all who are in want and to do all in our power to relieve them. These are the three motifs which continually recur in the spiritual symphony which the Jewish religion created out of the urge to benevolence.

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[1] Gen. 9:6.

A. THE POOR AS GOD'S WARDS

In respect to their maintenance, the poor belong to the same class as the priests and Levites. Those who were occupied with the sanctuary, and the offerings brought there, were unable to earn their own livelihood, and were dependent upon the gifts brought to God. It was from his hands, so to speak, that they received their sustenance. According to the Torah, the priests and the Levites were not to get any part of the land when it was apportioned among the various tribes of Israel. In being thus disinherited they were thrust upon God's bounty. He became, as it were, "their portion."[2] In the same spirit were regarded the poor, the widow, the orphan, and the stranger. In so far as they were without those possessions which God had allotted to the rest of his people, they were entitled to some of his other resources. This is the principle underlying the law that they were to be given a share, together with the Levites, in the offerings of the pilgrimage festivals.[3] Moreover, the law prescribed that the poor were to be assigned parts of the produce of the fields and orchards, in the same way as the priests and Levites.

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[1] A general name for the learned authorities of the Talmud and Midrash.

[2] Num. 18:19–24.

[3] Deut. 16:11, 14.

Every third year a tithe of all the products of the fields was to be set aside for the poor.[1] The spontaneous growth of the fields and gardens during the sabbatical year, when the land lay fallow, though free to all, was applied mainly to the support of the poor.[2] The practice of leaving the corners of the field,[3] the gleanings dropped in the process of reaping, the grain that had been overlooked,[4] and the gleanings in orchards and vineyards when gathering in the fruit probably had its origin in the pagan custom of leaving those portions of the intake as an offering to the divine spirits of the field. When the Israelite view that the poor were pensioners of God became prevalent, these offerings were diverted to their maintenance.

The conception of the poor as God's wards finds chief expression in the Pentateuch, which has served as the basis of the Jewish spiritual life since the days of Ezra (458 B.C.). If this conception is seldom alluded to in the other parts of the Bible, it is because the contents there afford no occasion to deal specifically with the legalistic phase of the Jewish religion. For the reassertion of that view we have to turn to the rabbinic writings. There prominence is given once again to the teaching that the indigent, by very reason of their want, are entitled to God's patronage. Commenting upon the scripture "Rob not the weak because he is weak; neither crush the poor in the gate,"[5] the rabbis add, "If one is poor, of what can he be robbed? The scripture must therefore refer to the gifts which the law commands to set aside for the poor, namely, the gleanings, the forgotten sheaves, the corners of the fields, and the tithe to be given to them every third year. To fail to give them these gifts is to be guilty of robbing them of what belongs to them. Not content with what the owner of the fields possesses, he would even rob the poor of that which

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[1] Deut. 14:28, 29.

[2] Exod. 23:11.

[3] Lev. 19:9, 10.

[4] Deut. 24:19–21.

[5] Prov. 22:22.

God has granted them!"[1] The Talmud[2] tells of a poor man who came before Raba[3] and asked for food. Raba said to him, "What are you accustomed to have?" He answered, "Stuffed chicken and old wine." "Do you not think," Raba asked, "this is rather too much of an expense for the community?" "It is not their food I eat," the beggar replied, "God grants it to me." The beggar, not being an ignorant man, quoted the interpretation of the scripture, "The eyes of all wait for Thee and Thou givest them their food in due season."[4] "This implies," he said, "that God wants everyone to obtain the food he requires." That the poor are part of God's household is also voiced in the following: "Said the Holy One to Israel: 'Thou hast four classes of people in thy household; thy sons, thy daughters, thy manservants, and thy maidservants. Even so have I four classes: the Levites, the strangers, the orphans and the widows.' "[5] From this notion with regard to the poor there grew up in the Middle Ages the principle that "whatever wealth one possesses is a trust fund received from God to be used in accordance with His wish. It is God's wish that part thereof be distributed among the poor. To give to the poor is therefore only to return to God what is due Him."[6]

The fact that the poor were included among the special protégés of God found expression in the communal responsibility for supplying their wants, with organized charity as its concomitant. The *annona civica*, or annual distribution of corn among the Romans, was also a state function. It became that in so far as it was a political measure to keep the proletarian mobs under control. But among the Jews organized charity bore the same religious stamp as individual charity. The public administration of charity funds was perhaps the most remarkable product of Jewish self-government. It was maintained through a system of taxation which, as has been truly pointed out, had in it the elements both of compulsion and voluntarism. The community had the right to assess everyone according to his means, and to place an injunction on his personal possessions,[1] or to take them in pledge immediately before the Sabbath, though such procedure was precluded in the case of any other assessment. Among the most important communal leaders were the *gabbae zedakah*, or charity overseers, who were formally elected to their position, which was considered both a mark of social distinction and an unequaled opportunity for observing the divine commandment to help the needy and the suffering. Said R. Elazar,[2] "It is more meritorious to get others to give than to give of one's own."[3]

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[1] Num. Rabba V.

[2] Ketubot 67*b*.

[3] Died 352.

[4] Ps. 145:15.

[5] Pesikta (ed. Buber) 100*a*.

[6] *Tur*, Hilkot Zedaka, 247.

Prescribed methods of collecting and distributing funds are known to have existed even before the destruction of the second Temple in the year 70. Two types of funds in particular survived from that early period almost to our own day. They were known as *Kuppah* and *Tamhui*. *Kuppah* was the community chest made up of the weekly money collections. Thence the local poor were provided with their necessaries for at least a week's time. Thence too provisions were made for the support of orphan children. When a poor couple was married, the husband would have his rent paid, and the wife would receive her clothing outfit from this *Kuppah*. The *Tamhui* consisted of the weekly collections not in money but in kind. That served as a sort of emergency supply for the vagrant poor and also for the resident poor who needed food immediately. As new needs arose, special funds were organized under the auspices of the charity overseers, or specially appointed committees. The various regulations which governed the communal administration of charity are formulated in the law codes, where they occupy considerable space. The regulations pertaining to the study of Torah, which is considered the basic duty in Jewish life, occupy in the *Tur* only two sections, whereas the regulations governing charity occupy thirteen sections.

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[1] *Ibid.*, 248.

[2] End of the third century.

[3] Baba Batra 9*a*.

To what shall we attribute the fact that in the Jewish religion the duty of charity was not allowed to remain a matter of individual benevolence, but assumed the form of a communal responsibility? We might, to some extent, account for this remarkable development by referring to the impoverished condition in which a large number of Jews would always find themselves as a result of the continual migrations and depredations to which their persecutors subjected them. Scattered among other peoples and possessing no political rights, they led a precarious existence which drove them into finding some way of helping one another in times of distress. The high regard for the duty of charity and the efficient discharge of it, both by the individuals and the communities, were indispensable to the very life of the Jewish people. Had not the Jews, however, possessed cultural and religious incentives to goad them on to works of benevolence, nothing but stark disaster and the panicky struggle of each one trying to save himself would have been the consequence of the hapless misery which was ever their lot. We therefore believe that organized charity in Jewish life may be traced back to the social habit which was implied in the principle that the poor were the wards and pensioners of God.

Poor-relief being classed with the offerings that were brought to the sanctuary for the support of the priests and Levites, it was natural for the provisions which had been called into existence to meet the needs of the priests and Levites to be extended also to the offerings that were intended for the support of the poor. We know that Nehemiah, in the middle of the fourth century B.C., organized the collection and distribution of the offerings to the priests and the Levites.[1] We have good reason to believe that the tithes for the poor were likewise brought under communal organization not long thereafter. In the Mishnah, the first codification of rabbinic law, the poor-laws are contained in a treatise called *Peah*—which means "corner"—because it deals chiefly with the provisions pertaining to the corners of the field which are to be left unreaped. That treatise belongs to the same "order" of treatises wherein are contained the laws dealing with offerings to the priests—*Terumot* ("heave offerings") and *Maaser Rishon* ("first tithe"). In the Tosefta, which is a kind of frustrated attempt at a code parallel to the Mishnah, we meet in the part that corresponds to the Mishnah *Peah* the first reference to the organization of poor-relief. It is there also that we learn of the ancient institutions of *Kuppah* and *Tamhui*.[1] Maimonides, in his code, also maintained the same close connection between the poor-laws which were in force in his time and the ancient agricultural poor-laws which had become obsolete.[2] This indicates to what extent the organization and administration of Jewish charity were animated by the same spirit as that which animated the agricultural provisions for the poor, the spirit which breathed in the principle that the poor were God's wards.

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[1] Neh. 10:38–40; 13:10–12.

B. GOD—THE CHAMPION OF THE POOR

The attitude which the Jewish religion has fostered toward the obligation to relieve those in need was not that of obedience to arbitrarily imposed laws. Though Judaism in the past was far from resorting to a humanistic rationale such as the Greek philosophers sought to formulate for all phases of human conduct, it made use of its own type of theocentric rationale to furnish its adherents with the why and the wherefore of its demands. It found in what it believed to be the nature of God the justification for what it considered the duty of man. Hence, we have to trace to the Jewish conception of God those sanctions for the duty of charity which have been characteristic of the Jewish religion.

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[1] Tosefta, Peah IV.

[2] Yad Ha-hazakah, Matnot Aniyim I–X.

The formula in the Psalms, "The Lord is righteous in all His ways, and compassionate in all His works,"[1] sums up for the Jew all that he cared to know about God. The Jews did not display any metaphysical curiosity which might have led them to arrive at a philosophic or abstract idea of God. They were primarily interested in those attributes of God from which they might infer the type of conduct that would be pleasing to him. The ancient religions, as a rule, associated godhood with objects or forces in nature which impressed man as capable of doing him harm or good. Those religions therefore taught man how to placate and win the favor of the gods by means of rites and oblations. But the Jewish religion, especially as the prophets interpreted it, has sought to associate godhood with the laws and customs which constitute the bonds of human society, and are essential to its continuance. This is why it looks for the meaning of godhood in the spirit of social laws and manifestations of human behavior at their best, with the purpose of keeping that spirit alive. It thus emphasizes the divine attributes of justice and mercy mainly in order to remind man how imperative it is for him to live up to the laws which reflect those divine traits.[2] From the standpoint of the ancient Hebrews, the attributes of God constitute the rationale of the laws which he revealed to Israel. Hence, we may regard the two attributes of God, his justice and his mercy, as the religious rationale for the duty of charity in all of its aspects.

The story of how the belief in the justice of God not only helped to call forth greater consideration for the poor, but led men to idealize the poor as the victims of their virtues, constitutes one of the most interesting chapters in the history of religion and ethics. The spiritual genius of the canonical prophets who transformed the religion of Israel from a henotheism to a monotheism was centered in the intuition that God was a God of justice. In the light of this intuition, they interpreted the misfortunes which befell their people as a penalty for the violation of the divine laws of social righteousness. This violation they beheld in the high-handed fashion in which those who were materially at a disadvantage were being exploited by the men of wealth and influence.[1] In contrast with the approximate equality which had obtained in the earlier days of Israel's history, the gulf between the few who were prosperous and the many who were growing ever poorer was widening. The lust after luxuries was becoming inordinate.[2] The wives of the rich would goad their husbands to accumulate wealth so that they might secure whatever their hearts desired.[3] When the failure of the crops made it impossible for the small freeholder to pay his debt, he forfeited his fields and sold either himself or his children into slavery.[4] Worst of all, the poor never stood any chance of obtaining redress in the courts because the judges were corrupted by bribery.[5]

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[1] Ps. 145:17.

[2] Gen. 18:15.

From the sociological standpoint, the prophetic movement was the religious expression of a social conflict between the town dwellers whose holdings in the country were growing apace and the impoverished farmers whose lands and persons were mortgaged to these men of wealth. With the inevitable tendency of the prophets to interpret what they saw of social conditions as defiance of the law of God, they could not arrive at the notion of a class struggle. Neither the rich nor the poor constituted a group to be reckoned with as such. Nevertheless, in course of time such a classification did insinuate itself into the Jewish consciousness, with the result that the rich came to be classed as wicked and ungodly, and the poor and the humble as virtuous and godly. In the same way as those who interpret history at the present time in terms of class struggle are likely to see in the proletarian only the victim of exploitation, and to overlook the fact that he too might turn tyrant and exploiter if given a chance, so there developed among the Jews a kind of religious proletarianism which idealized the poor and the needy by representing them as though their virtues made them the victims of the prosperous and the successful.

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[1] Isa. 3:14, 15.

[2] Amos 3:9–12.

[3] Amos 4:1.

[4] Amos 2:6, 7.

[5] Isa. 2:1–23.

The idealization of the poor was reinforced by the conditions which obtained after the return from Babylon, when the mass of the Jewish people was reduced to poverty, and wealth and power seemed to reside only among their foreign oppressors and the small class of prosperous Jews who hobnobbed with them. Humility and poverty thus became the insignia of loyalty to God. Those who were unequal to the struggle against all manner of odds, religious, social, and political, did not lose heart because they were certain God would ultimately reveal himself and manifest his power by bringing down the haughty and the prosperous, and by lifting up the meek and the needy.[1]

The prophetic championship of the cause of the poor left its indelible impress upon Jewish character. It has had the effect of inculcating in the mind of the Jew the realization that poverty is not a stigma of disgrace, nor a sign of inherent inferiority. Poverty might be due entirely to the existing standards of society, which permit injustice and greed to grow rampant. The Jewish civilization could not but have much in common with other civilizations in regarding benevolence as a religious obligation. Human nature being the same among all peoples, it is bound to find similar expression when it comes to elemental needs and duties.[2] But the Jewish civilization certainly stands alone during the pre-Christian

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[1] Ps. 37:28, 29.

[2] Cf. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Vol. I, chap. xxiii.

Era in upholding the cause of the poor, and in regarding their condition as brought on not by themselves but by the evils of the social order.

We cannot dilate here upon the far-reaching consequences of this idealization of the poor. One has but to take a casual glance at the Psalms to find this division between the prosperous and the wicked, on the one hand, and, on the other, the poor and the saintly sharply accentuated. This idealization of the poor rendered the Jewish scriptures peculiarly fitted throughout all ages and in all climes to voice the sufferings of the oppressed and the downtrodden in their hopeless struggle against their oppressors and tormentors. It was, moreover, this association of poverty with piety in the Jewish religion that was taken over by Christianity and translated into consequences never contemplated by Judaism. Among the first recruits to Christianity were the Ebionites, who, as the term indicates, made a cult of poverty. Although the Jewish religion never went as far as did Christianity in the glorification of the poor, it retained in full force the egalitarian principle which inspired its prophets. No one in modern times felt so keenly the significance of the moral values which this Jewish attitude to the poor brought in its train, and none fought this tendency with such fanatical vehemence as did Nietzsche. There can be no question but that the best of ideals may be made to function to excess. The world is indebted to Nietzsche for correcting the absurd lengths to which an early historical association of ideas about the poor gave rise. But so long as the Jewish and the Christian religions exist, the Nietzschian solution of the problem of poverty by extinguishing the poor will not be considered seriously.

The prophets did not change in the slightest the social order against which they fulminated. The very notion of changing the social order was undreamt of by them. But they succeeded in sensitizing the conscience of the Jews in the matter of bringing succor to the needy. One of the post-

Exilic prophets preached that righteousness must find expression not alone in undoing the injustice committed against the weak and the defenseless, but in feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. In defining the kind of worship God wants, he adds, "Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? When thou seest the naked, that thou cover him, and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?"[1]

As time went on, all of the enthusiasm which the prophets had evoked in behalf of social righteousness came to be centered upon eleemosynary aid. Thus *zedakah*, which originally meant "social justice," changed its meaning to that of "almsgiving." In the later Jewish writings we hear less of social righteousness and more of aid to the needy. In the Book of Job, which probably belongs to the period when prophecy ceased, we meet with passage after passage reflecting the popular conviction that helping the poor was a cardinal duty and its neglect a cardinal sin. Eliphaz, the Temanite, in defending God against the injustice with which Job has charged him, says to Job:

> Thou hast not given water to the weary to drink, and thou hast withholden bread from the hungry. And as a mighty man, who hath the earth, and as a man of rank, who dwelleth in it, thou hast sent widows away empty, and the arms of the fatherless have been broken.[2]

In the course of the argument, Job indignantly replies:

> If I have withheld aught that the poor desired, or have caused the eyes of the widow to fail; or have eaten my morsel myself alone, and the fatherless hath not eaten thereof—nay, from my youth he grew up with me as with a father, and I have been her guide from my mother's womb. If I have seen any wanderer in want of clothing, or that the needy had no covering; if his loins have not blessed me, and if he were not warmed with the fleece of my sheep; if I have lifted up my hand against the fatherless, because I saw my help in the gate; then let my shoulder fall from the shoulder-blade, and mine arm be broken from the bone.[3]

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[1] Isa. 58:7.

[2] Job 22:5–9.

[3] Job 31:16–22; cf. also 29:12–16.

C. GOD COMPASSIONATES THE POOR

The second trait in the character of God which is at the basis of the duty of charity is compassion. This is expressly stated in the command to treat the poor with kindness and consideration.[1] Although that trait of God is often emphasized as a reminder of his readiness to forgive sin, it is used no less frequently to point out his readiness to help those who are in distress. Hosea, in contrasting the character of the God of Israel with that of the gods of the other nations, describes him as one in whom the fatherless find mercy.[2] The quality of divine mercy is unlimited in its exercise. "The Lord is good to all; and His tender mercies are over all His works."[3] He, therefore, who is hard hearted in his treatment of the poor acts as though he ridiculed God for being compassionate; on the other hand, he who yields to the feeling of pity thereby shows and respects that trait in God. "He that oppresseth the poor blasphemeth His maker; but he that is gracious unto the needy honoreth Him."[4]

From the standpoint of compassion the practice of charity is enlarged in scope and enriched in sanctions. Charity is no longer limited to feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. It comes to include the rearing of orphans, redeeming captives, visiting the sick, burying the abandoned dead, providing dowries for poor brides, ministering to the dying, and extending hospitality to transients. The entire gamut of suffering becomes the occasion for man coming to the assistance of his fellow-man.

Compassion is able to discover in whatever relationship we stand to the needy valid reason for aiding them. If the one in distress be a kinsman, then all the more reason why he should be helped, for to be hard hearted against one's own blood is to act unnaturally, or, as the ancient Hebrew put it, contrary to the law of God. When the ancient lawgiver introduces the

[1] Exod. 22:25, 26.

[2] Hos. 14:4.

[3] Ps. 145:9.

[4] Prov. 14:31.

command to help the poor with the phrase, "If thy brother be waxen poor,"[1] he merely wishes to emphasize the fact that a member of one's own people is a brother and a kinsman and therefore entitled, by all that is reasonable and natural, to assistance. That one who is not a kinsman is not entitled to assistance never entered his mind. On the other hand, if he who throws himself upon our mercy be a stranger or an alien, his very loneliness and exposure to harm for lack of anyone to defend him evoke our sympathy. That it is natural to react with a sense of pity to one who is in a strange land is evidenced by the universal character of the practice of hospitality. Among the most primitive peoples the stranger who sought hospitality was protected by sacred safeguards which could not be violated without incurring the risk of divine vengeance. It is no wonder, therefore, that the disregard of the duty of hospitality figures in the Bible as the cardinal sin for which punishment was inflicted upon the ancient cities of Sodom and Gomorrah.[2] The duty of showing kindness to the stranger necessarily emanates from a corresponding quality in the character of God, who is described as loving the stranger.[3]

If, on the whole, the religion of the prophets is characterized by a passionate devotion to justice, the religion of the rabbis may be said to be dominated by the sentiments of compassion and sympathy. To be devoid of a sense of pity is, according to the rabbis, to be inhuman. Concerning the rich Jews of Babylon, Rab[4] said that they must be descendants of the mixed multitude that had accompanied the Israelites when they left Egypt, for when a scholar asked them to lend him money with which to engage in business they refused, and when he asked them to give him food they likewise refused.[5]

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[1] Lev. 25:35.

[2] Genesis, chap. 19.

[3] Deut. 10:18.

[4] Died 247.

[5] Bezah 32*b;* cf. Yebamot 79*a;* Num. Rabbah VIII, 4.

Recognized as a national trait[1] and consciously cultivated as the source of virtue, the trait of compassion gave to charity as practiced by the Jews an inwardness and depth which have to be seen in action to be appreciated. Fortunately, this product of the sense of compassion has been articulated in a term which emphasizes its true character as distinct from mere almsgiving. That term is *gemilut hassadim*—the bestowal of loving kindness—which, when translated into action, puts a new soul into the charitable deed. Once the significance of *gemilut hassadim* was grasped, it was no longer deemed dispensable. The principle laid down in the Talmud is that the amount of loving kindness which determines any action determines its right to be considered charitable.[2] Almsgiving which is divorced from the spirit of loving kindness is condemned. Rashi,[3] in his commentary on the Talmud, makes the following distinction between almsgiving and loving kindness: "Merely to give money to the poor is almsgiving, but to go out of one's way to help the poor is loving kindness, as when one brings the money to the house of the poor, or plans how the contribution might bring the greatest amount of good to the one who is to be benefited. Such personal service is the soul of the charitable act."[4] "Loving kindness," say the rabbis, "surpasses the giving of alms in three ways—in the giving of one's person, in being of help to the rich as well as to the poor, and in applying to the dead as well as to the living."[5]

The motif of compassion, which is never wanting in Jewish charity, is largely responsible for Judaism's realistic awareness of the evil of poverty. Poverty is described as outweighing all other kinds of suffering. Job is represented as having chosen all the evils that befell him rather than poverty.[6] It was not merely the physical hardship of hunger or lack of shelter that rendered poverty such an affliction, but the personal demoralization to which it was known to lead. Said Rab,[1] "To be dependent upon the generosity of others is to have one's world darkened." His disciple, Rab Hisda, added, "A life of poverty is no life."[2] The loss of personal independence resulting from poverty is so dreaded by the Jew that after each meal he repeats the prayer not to be in need of the gifts of flesh and blood.

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[1] Bezah 32*b*.

[2] Sukkah 49*b*.

[3] Famous commentator, born and died at Troyes, 1040–1105.

[4] Sukkah 49*b*.

[5] Idem.

[6] Exod. Rabbah 31:12.

Nothing but the element of sympathy could have given rise in the Jewish system of charity to the emphatic warning against aggravating the mental suffering which the poor endure because they have to depend upon charity. Every possible precaution must be taken to spare them the shame and humiliation of begging. R. Yannai[3] once saw someone giving money to a poor man in public. He said to him, "It would have been better for you not to have given him than to give him and expose him to shame."[4] The Mishnah alludes to the existence of a secret chamber in the Temple where the pious would leave their donations unobserved and where the poor could obtain what they needed without being observed.[5] It was common practice with the rabbis to leave money secretly at the doors of the poor. R. Jonah[6] called attention to the scripture in Psalms which reads, "Happy is he that considereth the poor." "Note that it does not say 'Happy is he who giveth to the poor,' but 'who considereth the poor.' It is your duty to give thought how to be of help to the one who is in need."[7] R. Jonah practiced what he preached, for whenever he learned of a well-to-do man who had become poor and who was ashamed to ask for assistance, he would go to that man and say to him, "I heard that a relative of yours died in a far-off country and left you an inheritance. In the meantime, take this and when you are better circumstanced you will pay me." When the man would not take what was offered, R. Jonah would say to him, "Meanwhile, take it as a present."[1]

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[1] Great Babylonian teacher, founder of the Academy of Sura (d. 247).

[2] Bezah 32*b*.

[3] Palestinian Amora, third century.

[4] Hagigah 5*a*.

[5] Shakalim V, 6.

[6] Palestinian Amora, fourth century.

[7] Lev. Rabbah XXXIV.

D. THE SANCTION OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

The sanctions for the duty of charity with which we have thus far dealt, while emanating from the conception of the character of God, were seen to have as their objective the well-being of those who were to be benefited. Whether the obligation to help those in need be due to the fact that God was their patron, their champion, or their guardian, or whether their rights or their needs were to determine the measure and character of the aid extended to them, their interest and not that of their benefactors was reckoned with. It would be entirely untrue to fact, however, to represent traditional Jewish charity as animated entirely by motives which take into account only the well-being of the beneficiary. We must not forget that before the advent of modern thought religion without the principle of reward and punishment was as inconceivable as without the belief in God. The only way in which they were able to conceive the fact that behavior determined man's weal or woe was by ascribing to God the function of meting out awards to the good and punishment to the sinner. With such a conception of God and of human conduct permeating their universe of discourse, it was inevitable that the practice of charity should be brought under the category of "meritorious deeds."

The belief that God was a just God led the ancients to conclude that he rewarded those who obeyed his laws and punished those who disobeyed them. Even so spiritual a prophet as Isaiah did not hesitate to draw this inference from the divine attribute of justice.[1] After urging the Israelites to be generous with their loans to the poor, the Deuteronomist concludes, "For this thing the Lord will bless thee in all thy work, and in all that thou puttest thy hand unto."[2] In the very act of pointing out that the way to worship God is not by fasting and prayer but by feeding the hungry and clothing the naked, the post-Exilic prophet adds, "If thou draw out thy soul to the hungry, and satisfy the afflicted soul; then shall thy light rise in darkness, and thy gloom be as the noonday; and the Lord will guide thee continually, and satisfy thy soul in drought, and make strong thy bones; and thou shalt be like a watered garden, and like a spring of water, whose waters fail not."[3]

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[1] *Idem.*

In their original setting, these promises were intended primarily for the nation as a whole. Before the Jewish religion was far advanced in its second stage, it had not yet attained that state of reflection in which the distinction was made between the fortunes of the group as a whole and of the individual as such. In their national experiences the Jews were certain they could trace a connection between their sin and their sufferings. But when the Jewish religion stood in need of coming to terms with the awakening of the individual, a phenomenon which seems to have manifested itself in various forms throughout the world in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., it naïvely translated the traditional promises of reward and retribution into specific goods and evils intended for the individual. Almsgiving then took first place among meritorious deeds which bring reward both in this life[4] and in the life hereafter.[5]

The reward was conceived in terms of life and well-being, of atonement for sin, and of a share in the world to come. Every penny that is given to charity is said to be like a link in a coat of mail.[1] The sum which it helps to make up is effective in helping man against harm. When R. Akiba's daughter was saved from death on the day of her wedding, R. Akiba[2] ascribed her narrow escape to her having given a wedding portion to a poor man who appeared at the door while the feast was going on.[3] The scripture "Righteousness delivereth from death"[4] is uniformly interpreted in the Talmud as signifying that the giving of alms is a means of postponing death.[5] Said R. Joshua ben Levi,[6] "Among the rewards of almsgiving is that of having children who excel in wealth, learning and wisdom."[7] As a means of atoning sin, it is no less effective than the offerings which one would bring in the Temple, and in the absence of the Temple it is an indispensable means. Every year on the High Holidays the ritual reminds the Jew that alms added to repentance, and prayer nullify the evil decree.

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[1] Isa. 1:19–20.

[2] Deut. 15:10.

[3] Isa. 58:10–11.

[4] Cf. Dan. 4:24; Tob. 12:8–9; Ecclus. 3:30.

[5] R. Akiba, Baba Batra 10*a*.

No less certain than the reward for the giving of alms is the punishment for refusing to give. One who is asked for charity should remember that it is God who made him rich and who can send reverses on him and make him poor. "Human life is like a wheel. Do not cause me to turn the wheel and make thee poor," says God.[8]

Parallel, however, to the tendency to affirm the doctrine of reward and punishment in the individualistic spirit indicated in the foregoing passages there existed the tendency to question that doctrine. As early as the days of Ezra, when the Jews dedicated themselves to a life of obedience to the Torah, there were already some who questioned the advantage of living in accordance with the law of God.[9] Side by side with the ability on the part of the more pious and trustful to

[1] Baba Batra *9b*

[2] B. 50; d. 132.

[3] Shabbat 156*b*.

[4] Prov. 10:2.

[5] Baba Batra 10*a*.

[6] Palestinian Amora, first half of the third century.

[7] Baba Batra *9b*.

[8] Shabbat 151*b*.

[9] Mal. 3:14.

overcome the doubts raised in their minds by the sight of the prosperity of the wicked, there were others who found the challenge of experience unanswerable.

The Jewish religion would undoubtedly have suffered the same fate as the other ancient religions had it not found a way of saving the doctrine of reward and punishment from being refuted by experience. It saved that doctrine by combining the doctrine concerning the resurrection of the dead, which it had borrowed from the Persians, with its own ancient teaching concerning the Day of the Lord as the day of ultimate reckoning, when God would redress long-neglected wrongs. Out of this combination there arose the belief in *olam habba*, or a new world-order which was to be established by God when the time would arrive for the present world-order to come to an end. Together with the rise of this new doctrine, considerable speculation began to be indulged in with regard to what was to happen to the human being in the interim between his death and the world to come. That led to the elaboration of ideas concerning paradise and hell. Thenceforth, the belief in reward and punishment had nothing to apprehend from the challenge of experience. The very facts that seemed to contradict that belief were proof of the existence of another world and another set of experiences in which the apparent inequities of this life would be set right.

From the moment that the Jewish religion entered upon this new stage, which we may designate as eschatological, its entire system of laws and observances acquired a new significance, in so far as they came to be regarded as the means which God afforded the Jew to achieve his share in the world to come. In addition to being theocentric, the Jewish religion thenceforth became also otherworldly, and it has remained such until our own day. The tradition concerning King Monobaz,[1] who distributed his entire inheritance among the poor, reflects the eschatological view of charity. When his kinsmen protested against his extravagance, saying, "Your fathers would always add to what they had inherited, but you have squandered your inheritance," he answered, "My fathers hoarded up for this earth; I store up for heaven. My fathers hoarded up in a place where the human hand can lay hold; I store up in a place where the hand cannot reach. My fathers hoarded up something that yields no fruit; I store up something that yields fruit. My fathers hoarded up money, and I store up human souls. My fathers hoarded up for this life; I store up for the life to come."[1] Is it a wonder, therefore, that R. Joshua[2] concluded that a beneficiary does more good to the benefactor than the benefactor to the beneficiary?[3] For the beneficiary derives from the alms that he receives only a temporal and transient good, while the benefactor derives from the alms that he gives a good that is eternal and unchangeable.

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[1] King of Adiabene and husband of Queen Helena who became a convert to Judaism about the year 30.

To be sure, there are rabbinic teachings that seek to divert the attention of the would-be benefactor from the motive of reward to the value of the charity for its own sake. In the first place, every Jew was familiar with the teaching enunciated by one of the earliest forerunners of the Tannaim, Antigonus of Sokho. "Be not like slaves who serve their master in the expectation of receiving a gratuity, but be like slaves who serve their master in no expectation of receiving a gratuity."[4] Commenting upon the scripture "Blessed is the man who fears the Lord, and in His commandments delights greatly," R. Eleazar adds, "In His commandments and not in the reward of His commandments."[5] Moreover, in the matter of charity there entered other factors to give it a disinterested character. "It affords the human being an opportunity to imitate God," said R. Hama,[6] the son of R.

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[1] Baba Batra 11*a*

[2] End of first century.

[3] Lev. Rabbah XXXIV.

[4] Abot 1,3.

[5] Abodah Zarah 19*a*.

[6] Palestinian Amora of the third century.

Haninah. "The scripture, 'Ye shall walk after the Lord your God,' should be interpreted to mean that we should strive to adopt the qualities of the Holy One. As He clothed the naked, so do thou clothe the naked. As He visited the sick, so do thou visit the sick. As He interred the dead, so do thou inter the dead. As He comforted the mourner, so do thou comfort the mourner."[1] Dominated as ancient man was by the desire to win the good will of God, apart from the well-being or salvation which the enjoyment of such good will resulted in, the motive of doing good to others because it rendered one God-like would undoubtedly often come into play.

No less effective as a means of rendering the act of charity disinterested is the motive suggested by R. Judah,[2] the son of R. Simon. "The poor man complains 'Wherein am I different from anyone else? Why is it that other people can sleep in their homes on their beds and I have to do without a roof over my head?' And thou comest and providest him with shelter, by thy life I will count it unto thee as though thou didst make peace between Me and him."[3] The act of kindness is thus conceived as a means of reconciling the poor to God. To the Jew, to whom the honor of God was precious, this fact alone would be sufficient for doing all in his power to relieve the needy. With all these occasional efforts to bring disinterested motives into play, it must nevertheless be admitted that on the whole the Jewish system of charity was vulgarized by the belief in reward and punishment.

II. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN PHILANTHROPY

The foregoing survey of the Jewish system of charity must on the whole impress one as having but little relevance to the type of problems which confront us in our social work at the present time. It sounds like trying to solve problems in astronomy by resorting to the Ptolemaic system of spheres. In contrast with the scientific spirit which nowadays pervades all inquiry into the *raison d'être* of philanthropic activity, the traditional Jewish system is entirely theological. This fact is realized not only by the outsider but by a great many to whom the future of the Jewish religion is a matter of deep concern. The greatest menace to a religion is irrelevance to life. Hence the movement in various quarters to bring the Jewish religion into line with the social and spiritual problems as they are posed at the present time. This movement, which takes on such forms as Reformism, Zionism, and Reconstructionism, is preparing the way for the next stage in the spiritual life of the Jews. In this coming stage the Jewish religion will no longer be theocentric and eschatological, but humanistic. In order to understand how that change will affect its conception of philanthropy and social service, it is necessary to indicate how it is possible for the Jewish religion to effect the transition from theocentrism to humanism.

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[1] Sotah 14*a*.

[2] Palestinian Amora of the fourth century.

[3] Lev. Rabbah XXXIV.

What theocentrism is we have had an opportunity of noting. Not only does it refer to God the ends and purposes of conduct, but also the means and instruments. Not only are we to help the needy because God, in keeping with his nature, so decrees, but the kind of relief, the amount we should be prepared to set aside for charity, the inherent right of the community to compel the individual to contribute his share, are all viewed as prescriptions emanating from God. God not only commands benevolence and the means to it, but also enforces that command by repaying charity with the gifts of life here and hereafter, and penalizing the refusal to help the needy with suffering both in this world and the next.

In direct antithesis to this theocentric approach, we have the humanistic, with which the Greek philosophers first acquainted mankind. The chief end of ethical conduct is human well-being. In the case of philanthropy, no other end is tolerated but that of so improving the condition of the poor and the helpless that they become more capable of helping themselves. To the extent that they attain the power of self-help and render the relief unnecessary, the philanthropic deed is rewarded. No other rewards or sanctions should be expected. As to the best way of attaining that objective, only the increased knowledge of human nature and efficiency in organization should serve as guides. This is usually designated as "scientific philanthropy." Those who consider scientific philanthropy self-sufficient hold that the time has come for the historic religions to keep hands off the problem of charity.

In the face of this challenge the Jewish religion refuses to abdicate. Its refusal is based, in the first place, on the assumption that religion is not committed to theocentrism. Theocentrism is but a temporary phase in its development, conditioned by a limited knowledge of human nature and history. Theocentrism goes hand in hand with the acceptance of miracles and supernatural revelation as normal phenomena. It is, furthermore, the mainstay of the authority of the past. The chief obstacle to departure from traditional methods and rules of conduct that have outlived their usefulness is the claim that those methods and rules derive from God. Were religion bound up with belief in miracles and the blind acceptance of the authority of the past, its days would be numbered. There are sufficient indications that the Jewish religion is emancipating itself from theocentrism, and adopting those elements in the humanistic approach to problems of conduct which do not negate the function of religion. With the surrender of theocentrism, the complex of eschatological notions about reward and punishment as sanctions for benevolence is bound to grow defunct. It is a fact that wherever Jews have only begun to adjust themselves to modern modes of thought and life the sanction of rewards to the benefactor in this life or in the hereafter has been abandoned without in the least weakening the social impulse to help those who are in need. Relief for the poor, hospitals for the sick, homes for the aged and the orphans, institutions for the blind, the poor, and the insane, and all other forms of eleemosynary aid are conducted by Jews without the incentive of the traditional beliefs concerning reward and punishment.

Moreover, the Jewish religion refuses to abdicate because it regards the humanistic approach by itself inadequate. Let human welfare in the most socialized sense, by all means, be the goal of conduct, and especially of our efforts to relieve distress. But with the increasing tendency to push our demand for a rationale for all human activities to the utmost boundaries of reality, we cannot possibly remain content with making even human welfare the ultimate reason for giving of ourselves and of our means and energy to those with whom fate has dealt unkindly. We must feel convinced or accept on faith that service has its justification in the very nature of reality. Unless the universe be accepted as a meaningful totality in which our actions somehow count, no humanistic scheme of social improvement can ever arouse much enthusiasm or call forth much sacrifice.

Accepting, therefore, humanism as a method and guide in the determination of the means and agencies best calculated to promote human welfare, and even its exaltation of that welfare as the highest criterion of the ethical quality of our individual actions and social institutions, the Jewish religion persists in regarding the attitude we take toward life as a whole as of supreme importance in validating all ethical endeavor.

In thus adopting humanism in place of the traditional theocentrism, the Jewish religion is entering upon the fourth stage in its career, the humanistic. This, however, does not mean that it will discard completely those values which it has achieved during its theocentric stage. That would spell discontinuity and death. That would be needlessly wasting accumulated spiritual energy. Instead, the Jewish religion will avail itself of the very results of humanistic research to revaluate or interpret its past values. It will make use of the new light thrown upon human nature, especially as that nature has functioned in the various religions of the world, from the most primitive to the most civilized, to determine what in the traditional Jewish values reflects those inherent *postulata* or demands which are bound to reassert themselves, no matter what level of culture we may have attained.

Thanks to the new psychology and sociology of religion, we are in a position today to delve beneath the surface of some of the most bizarre beliefs and practices and to discover the operation of fundamental human needs besides those of food and mating—needs which can find their fulfilment in nothing less than a religious conception of life. By means of these new sciences the Jewish religion in the period ahead of us will exploit the spiritual and ethical values which it created in the past to extract from them all the possible humanistic truths, and to learn from them the direction in which the human spirit is moving.

This adumbrates the answer to the question, Why reinterpret the old? Why not start *de novo?* Why go "to the dead for the living"? Once we learn to read the accumulated heritage of a religion not in terms of its own supernatural claims but as a complex of human experience, it becomes invaluable as an index of the trend of human aspirations. Even in the exact and demonstrable sciences, it has not always been advantageous to repudiate completely the erroneous assumptions and conclusions that have come down from the past. Many of the observations recorded in the Ptolemaic astronomy have been given their true significance in the Copernican astronomy. But in the matter of social ideals and aspirations, nothing is so important as verification of trend by means of past experience. That verification has not the force of logical or mathematical demonstration, but supplies the momentum necessary to give driving power to those ideals and aspirations which would otherwise remain inert and lifeless. The purpose of the Jewish religion with regard to philanthropy should be to contribute to modern philanthropy the momentum of human experience that is implicit in its traditional system of charity. We shall now take up the three leading motifs in that system to see wherein by reinterpreting them in humanistic terms we shall find in them instructive race experience in the matter of philanthropy, experience that should be reckoned with in any attempt to reorient ourselves anew in the problems of social service.

The poor as God's wards and pensioners.—It is a commonplace of the science of religion that ancient man was unable to articulate the notion of communal responsibility as an abstract principle. The patron deity of a clan, tribe, or nation was, from a psychological standpoint, the objectification of that intangible social force which is generated by the interaction of the individuals of a group the pressure of which is borne in on each individual member with irresistible energy. If we, with our developed powers of abstraction, still find it necessary to have statues of liberty and of justice, and a flag to convey the notion of country and all that it implies, the ancients could certainly not be expected to get along without either some visible or picturable representation of the community as an organic entity. Accordingly, from a humanistic standpoint, the significance of such statements as that the earth and everything in it belong to God[1] is that possession is not a relationship between the individual and the object, but a relationship mediated or conferred by society as a whole. Likewise, the fact that no individual truly belongs to himself alone, an accepted truth of modern social science, is implied in the teaching that all men belong to God. Accordingly, the classification of the needy with priests and Levites as entitled to special offerings which are at the same time offerings to God is tantamount, when judged from a humanist standpoint, to the community making itself responsible for the care of the poor. We have seen how among the Jews the conception of the poor as the pensioners of God found expression in the organization of charitable activities. This practical application of that conception in ancient times proves the correctness of the humanist interpretation we have given it, namely, as being a way the ancients had of emphasizing the social truth that the poor cannot be left to the mercy of the individual conscience.

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[1] Ps. 24:1.

This motif, besides having played an important part in shaping the social tradition of mankind with regard to the communal responsibility for the care of the poor and the need of administering relief work in organized fashion, contains far-reaching implications even for present-day social policy. The question is often propounded whether by contributing to social-work agencies one may fulfil the duty of charity as a religious obligation. From the standpoint of the pragmatic interpretation of the poor as God's wards, there is no room for doubt that organized social agencies, which incarnate the spirit of communal responsibility, are the normal outlet for charity as a religious obligation. In fact, the absense of such outlet curtails the opportunity for proper fulfilment of the religious duty.

The issue which is often raised, whether charitable effort should be carried on by means of volunteer associations or by the state, is not only a question of technique, but it involves the highly complex problem as to the function of the state. No doubt but that the experience of the Jewish people would help to reinforce the conception of the state as in duty bound to exercise the function of taking care of the poor. What agencies the state should employ to make sure that the best results are obtained, whether it should have commissions to control volunteer associations or entirely take over the work of poor-relief, cannot be answered in the light of this motif alone. But to deny the state the right to control philanthropic effort is to deprive it of its prerogative to ethicize and socialize the individual citizen.

God as a God of justice and compassion.—From a humanist standpoint, these divine attributes, the belief in which furnished the Jews with some of the most important guiding principles in the dispensing of charity, are to be viewed as the hypostasis of the tendencies in human nature that make for social welfare. The Jewish religion of the future will readily accept this conclusion of modern thought and weave it into its own texture of ideas whereby its adherents may be helped to experience life as a meaningful, and, therefore, divine totality. It will not permit them merely to stop with the negation of the ancient hypostasis. It will urge them to attach more than human significance to the tendencies that make for social welfare, to behold in them the extension into human life of laws that inhere in the very nature of the cosmos. All social endeavor which is based upon the tendencies in human nature that have been hypostasized as the divine attributes of justice and compassion amounts to taking sides actively with the *élan spirituel* of the universe. Such is the religious motivation which the Jewish religion will no doubt foster after it shall have adopted the humanist philosophy of life.

What are the tendencies in human nature which are hypostasized as the divine attributes of justice and mercy, and upon which religion will in the future bring its motivation to bear? The simplest answer would seem to point to the human qualities of justice and mercy. But we know all too well how vague the notion of justice is, and how limited the quality of mercy. We certainly need specific signs by which to identify those tendencies of human nature which are to be treated as so inherently worth while and significant that we might feel justified in viewing them as partaking of the laws of the cosmos. Mere reference to the human traits that cause us to act justly and sympathetically is not enough.

In our opinion, the most definite criterion by which we may identify the social forces that answer to the ideals of justice and mercy, whether they be thought of as part of human character or whether they be projected onto the nature of God, is that they should make for the complete realization of the powers of the individual human being at the same time that they make for a greater measure of unity and co-operation among individuals and groups. With the notion of justice we always associate obtaining that to which one is entitled. We naturally think of the ends of justice as being served best when it enables each individual to uphold all his powers for good. On the other hand, we recognize in mercy, loving kindness, sympathy, the qualities that make for co-operation. Hence, the modern social aspirations to a greater measure of self-realization and of co-operation correspond to the *desiderata* voiced by the ancients when they conceived the divine attributes of justice and mercy. The ideals of individuality and of collectivity are mutually exclusive as are those of justice and mercy. The very task of the social or spiritual life is therefore to achieve a synthesis out of these mutually contradictory forces. In any case, we have in this formula the unmistakable designation of those trends in human nature which, indeed, deserve to be characterized as cosmic.

This reinterpretation of the concept of justice and mercy would enable the Jewish religion to deal with a question which could never have been contemplated so long as charity was carried on in the theocentric spirit. Suppose, it is asked, it be proved that charity runs counter to the biological welfare of the race, would religion still urge charity as an essential part of a divine program? Such a possibility could never have been dreamt of in olden times. Now, however, with our more extensive observation of the behavior of dependents and our knowledge of the laws of heredity, we realize that through charity we might be perpetuating undesirable strains in the human race and encouraging deleterious social tendencies. Are we to shut our eyes to the possible injury that our charity might bring to subsequent generations, so long as we live up to the traditional duty to help the weak and the suffering? In the light of the foregoing argument, the only answer we can give is that religion must interpret as divine whatever human reason points to as making for the biological welfare of the race. The adoption of the principle that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be determined by the consequences which flow from it for the welfare of the race constitutes religion's acceptance of the humanistic viewpoint. The scope given to the attributes of justice and of mercy is infinitely greater when reckoning with the welfare of the race as a whole than when reckoning with the welfare of the poor themselves. If we are to be guided in our philanthropic efforts by the principle of striving for a maximum of human individuality plus a maximum of human co-operation, what else could we do if not reckon with the welfare of mankind, both present and future?

But it is more than spiritual momentum that the ancient conception of God as just and merciful can yield. The inferences which the Jewish religion drew from that conception with regard to the treatment of the poor may be found to harbor some very specific suggestions for our own day. In so far as the divine attributes chosen to serve as the rationale for charitable endeavor were justice and compassion, the primary good to be achieved by the act of charity could not but be the relief of the needy. Those attributes being for the most part extrovert, they could not but call forth actions of an extrovert type. To be sure, conclusions of an introvert type with regard to the soul welfare and personal advantage to be attained by the benefactor were also derived from the conception of the divine attribute of justice. But they never eclipsed the main conclusions that always focused the attention upon the well-being of the beneficiary. We therefore ought not to encounter any difficulty in discovering in the Jewish conceptions and methods of charity a great deal that is still relevant.

Of utmost relevance is the intuition of the prophets that there is a close connection between poverty and social unrighteousness. They were no social economists, and they formulated no theories concerning the proper distribution of wealth. But they were convinced that much of the poverty about them was far from inevitable. They were certain that the rich and influential classes were the cause of the utter helplessness to which many of their countrymen were reduced. If the prophets had their way, the ruling classes would have so changed their modes of transacting business, extending loans, and administering justice that the number of the dependents would have been reduced to those who were physically unable to eke out their own livelihood.

The prophets were the harbingers of the principle that the function of society is not merely to help the poor, but to remove the causes of poverty. This, of course, involves the enactment of measures much more thoroughgoing than palliative giving or even preventive activities which are confined to the poor. It is not only a question of social unrighteousness but also of social inefficiency. Not even a small grocery store can get along without an intelligent ordering of its affairs. Yet when it comes to the life of human society, we imagine that it can afford to be governed by blind habit and "rule o' thumb." The time will come when social efficiency will gain the upper hand. The harsh laws of economic struggle will be neutralized by intelligent ordering of economic resources so that there shall be no occasion for anyone to succumb to poverty because of conditions beyond his control. This is the spirit animating all forms of social insurance. The state should regard it as its function to provide work for every able-bodied person. The right to work is the main inference to be drawn from the notion of justice or its equivalent, self-realization. As an institution to foster justice the state should help its citizens to find employment that would prevent them from becoming dependent. These are the corollaries which follow logically from the teaching implied in ringing denunciations of the great prophets, namely, that no state can endure which permits poverty to exist alongside exorbitant wealth. There are unmistakable signs that modern communities are awakening to their responsibility. That awakening, however, would take place more readily and its effects would be more far reaching were religion to center men's attention upon the message of the prophets.

It will be a long time, however, before society will be sufficiently advanced to realize fully that the problem of poverty must be solved by removing the causes which go back to social inefficiency and unrighteousness. Meanwhile, much effort will have to be devoted to palliative and remedial activities. The spirit in which these activities should be carried on is nowadays determined by the principle that the purpose of charity should be to eliminate the need for charity. In the modern outlook on life, poverty is deemed an unqualified evil. The suffering both physical and moral that accompanies it is known to have no disciplinary value. To permit one's self to be reduced to a state of dependence upon charity is regarded as immoral.

Nothing could be more relevant to the objective which is nowadays set up for the palliative and remedial activities than the experience reflected in the element of the Jewish system of charity that is characterized by the motif of compassion. Although that motif too is conceived in theocentric fashion, it does not require much interpretation to see at once its humanist implications. To a greater extent even than the motif of justice the motif of compassion is intended to render the benefactor oblivious to all considerations but those which immediately concern the one to be benefited. It calls for the exercise of a personal interest in his well-being. It directs the attention upon the need of preserving his self-respect and his capacity for self-help.

The Jewish religion had no illusions about the possible disciplinary value of poverty. It advocated being contented with little, but it decried resorting to the generosity of others as morally and spiritually degrading. It therefore wanted the benefactor to realize that he must do everything in his power to forestall the degrading effect that his charity might have upon the beneficiary. Of course, modern philanthropy also urges all possible precautions against the degrading effect of having to depend upon charity, but unless reinforced by a religious sanction of long standing, which lifts the worth of the human soul to the plane of cosmic significance, those precautions are all too likely to be disregarded.

Likewise, the self-help which secular humanism recommends as the objective in poor-relief is likely to degenerate into an excuse for refraining from helping altogether. That certainly cannot happen when the self-help of the beneficiary is motivated by the complex of religious and ethical ideas denoted by the Jewish concept of *gemilut hassadim*. This concept might also have a deciding influence in determining whether the state should make itself entirely responsible for the care of the poor, or whether volunteer organizations should also be encouraged. It would appear that according to the conception of *gemilut hassadim*, so long as poverty is permitted to exist, the relief of its victims should be accepted as far as possible as a responsibility not only of the community collectively, but of each member individually. From a practical standpoint, individual responsibility will lead much sooner to the abolition of the social conditions that make for poverty than the impersonal responsibility of the state. Accordingly, volunteer organizations should be fostered, because when properly administered they help to keep alive the sense of individual responsibility.

These are but few of the outstanding implications of the traditional Jewish system of charity which are of special cogency for modern philanthropy. A detailed study of that sytem would undoubtedly disclose many more instructive principles and suggestions. It were foolish of humanism, intoxicated by the consciousness of its successes, to repudiate the lessons it might learn from the experiences and mistakes of the past. Those lessons religion is seeking to convey in a mode of speech and accent which it is acquiring from humanism itself.

THE CATHOLIC STANDPOINT IN CHARITY

WILLIAM J. KERBY

The theory of Christian charity is intimately bound up with the Catholic philosophy of life. Catholic practice in charity is profoundly affected by the personality of its representatives, by social organization, by the way in which poverty is caused, by class traditions, by the quality of social conscience that comes to effective expression, and by conflicts among schools of thought which deal with social conditions and social ideals. Again Catholic practice is affected and policy is shaped by the amount of poverty to be dealt with and by resources in money and personnel that may be brought to this task. Furthermore, the actual relations between distinctive Catholic service of the poor and the general movement of philanthropy will go a long way in determining practice.

In presence of such a complicated situation the choice of a point of view in exposition is attended with much difficulty. The one chosen seems to be called for because of the fundamental character of this study. Since the answers to the questions discussed gain their authority from theoretical principles, a number of these are set forth briefly before the questions are taken up.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The doctrine of religion embraces ultimate truths in personal and social life. These determine ultimate values in all human behavior. Morality is the relation between behavior and these values. Every responsible decision or action gets its worth from its relation to these values. Every individual life is one moral unity. Every responsible act has a moral quality. No act or attitude may be isolated out of this unity. A man brings his ultimate values and, therefore, his religion into the making of a contract, into the paying of wages, into his relations to the poor, and into the casting of his ballot. Care of personal health, the seeking of an education, the gaining and use of income, and all personal contacts with others are organically related aspects of personal life whose law is derived from its ultimate values and whose goodness or badness is determined by their conscious relation to these values. Hence the moral law extends its jurisdiction over all conscious life. The man who exempts any action or relation from this jurisdiction offends against it or indicates a kind of religion in fact which he would probably fear to assert in theory. To make religion one department of life to be coordinated with other departments of life, and to allow to it jurisdiction only within a limited field, involves a misunderstanding of all religion whatsoever. All conscious life has a religious quality because it is an interpretation of ultimate values.

Theoretically and from an ideal standpoint social life reveals a corresponding unity. The ultimate values that govern social life are the basis of social religion. The ultimate meaning of life governs not only each one but all relations among men. To judge any social interest in an isolated way, to permit it to make its own values and assert them without proper relation to life as a whole, offends against cultural truth, against social ideals, and against the unity of life. No matter how far we fall short of attaining to such unity, all cultural interpretations with which I am familiar do assert the unity of life and a scale of values around which that unity is organized. If, for instance, one seeks wealth out of relation to social and personal life as a whole and without disciplining the desire of it into right relations to social ideals, one disregards the cultural and ideal unity of life.

The moral law of social life arises out of the ultimate spiritual truths of social life. Hence the moral law has universal jurisdiction, and it permits no single interest to be exempted from that jurisdiction and to be sought or served independently. Thus, for instance, to seek the biological welfare of the race independently and without regard for the moral law which represents sifted race experience would, in effect, assert one race interest at the cost of another. This would offend against religious values and against the moral regulation of life which results from them. When any social interest aims to construct a philosophy of life around itself and in so far to become a religion, we meet a tendency toward integration which illustrates the point held in mind. When a body of objective truths is accepted as the doctrinal content of religion and all separate interests in life adjust themselves to it, we have a true conception of the function of religion in life.

The Catholic church asserts a series of spiritual truths which give ultimate meaning to life, which serve as the basis of universal moral law and furnish the values by which all personal and social behavior whatsoever is finally judged. God as creator, the personal immortality of each individual, moral responsibility for the direction of life as far as knowledge and will extend, the bearing of each deliberate act and attitude upon spiritual welfare, and the supremacy of moral values in every relation of life are fundamental. The divinity of Jesus Christ, the authority of his revelation as interpreted by the church, are essentials in Catholic philosophy. The organic unity of personal life and the organic unity of social life as set forth by Christ and corroborated by scholarship and experience are taken for granted.

In this divine revelation we find many truths that bear directly upon the relations of the rich and the poor. These teachings deal with social conditions, property institutions, the impulses of selfishness, and personal attitudes. When our divine Lord asserts the spiritual dangers of wealth-seeking and the obligations of the strong to serve the weak with kindly interest he indicates the bearing of spiritual realities upon social life and sets forth a scale of values which is imperative in the life of a believer. The general axioms of justice and charity, of the sanctity of the human person, and of the discipline of self-seeking are effective in the Christian life independently of any particular kind of social organization. Their application is related always to social conditions at any given time and to the requirements of spiritual truth in those conditions. In order, then, to interpret the Christian axioms of social life as the Catholic church understands them, it is necessary to take account of present social organization and conditions and to offer such interpretations as seem best to serve Christian ideals in social life.

II. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The poverty with which we are today concerned is an organic aspect of our social life. It is to a very large extent the effect of social organization and philosophy. Men, women, and children who are in fact unequal in body, mind, moral qualities, social reinforcement, and opportunity are forced to take a competitive attitude toward one another under an individualistic state which traditionally allowed a maximum of personal freedom and offered a minimum of restraint upon competitors who are thus forced to seek income in order to live. In this condition the strong win and the weak lose. We may make an arbitrary typical distinction between the strong and the weak in this way. Those who can gain no income or insufficient income or sufficient income at excessive sacrifice of health, family life, or the welfare of children are economic failures. All above that line may be considered as successful for the purposes of this exposition. Now the number who fail in the manner indicated constitute the poor. There are millions of such in the United States if we include those who cannot get along when emergency of any kind arises and they are unable to work full time without interruption. The poverty that we know, then, is massive, inert, and organic. It is due in large measure to social organization and conditions, to social causes that are beyond the control of the victims. Poverty thus conceived indicates not only economic failure but also cultural failure, the defeat of life, the agony of insecurity, reduced immunity against disease, demoralization, the blocking of human brotherhood, economic waste, moral weakness, and social menace. And in addition it reveals a faulty spiritual outlook among the strong, false valuations of wealth, and misunderstanding of the divine law of brotherhood.

Poverty is thus the plight of the individual poor as well as a problem of the state, of Christianity, of industry, and of human culture. The problem is aggravated because of the social stratification which follows income levels. Association and sympathy operate horizontally at given levels and fail in large measure to operate vertically among these economic levels. Thus the competitive psychology, the defensive attitude against life, indefinite expansion of desire for income, and social uses of income foreign to the primary aim of property concur in defeating personal and social culture and interfering with the organic unity of social life which is in the divine law. What is the position of the Catholic church in these circumstances?

Since the church deals primarily with the individual soul, its first message is directed toward the possessor of superfluous wealth. He is taught that wealth is a stewardship, and that after his legitimate needs are satisfied he must administer his superfluous wealth in the service of others who are in need. This is set forth as a spiritual law arising out of Christian brotherhood which makes of wealth an opportunity for service. As Professor Peabody said so beautifully at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, "We do not own our wealth. We owe it." When owners of superfluous wealth refuse to obey this command in individual cases they must be left to the care of their mistaken conscience, for the church can exercise no coercion upon them. When they fail of this duty in sufficient numbers to defeat the law of charity, the church turns reluctantly to coercive measures defensive of the poor with the help of the state. In this way many measures of social legislation are indorsed and actively supported in the interest of social justice, in a way to prevent the social causes of poverty from continuing their action.

Meantime, the victims of poverty are dealt with by the direct ways of relief in as far as resources make this possible. And this relief is administered in obedience to the specific law of Christ who placed the personal service of the poor at the highest level of spiritual dignity in the Christian life. Sisterhoods, brotherhoods, lay organizations of men and women and college youth are created and sent into the field as messengers of divine brotherhood to give relief, comfort, and protection in the highest possible measure. While this service has definite cultural value and it is highly approved in the name of humanity, it remains in Catholic philosophy a form of obedience to a divine command whose text is never revised although the methods of obeying it will be shaped to circumstances.

In the actual administration of relief we meet the human element inevitably. Catholic work as a whole seeks to profit by all of the lessons of experience in the administration of relief. It seeks guidance from social research in sociology, medicine, biology, law, and psychology. In some sections of the field of Catholic service we may meet a conservatism that is slow to change methods, but we also meet a progressive movement eager to bring the best results of human experience to the improvement of all relief work whatsoever.

Throughout this process the church carries her general principles into all policies. She constantly stresses the spiritual quality of service. While she finds the ability, scholarship, and resourcefulness of philanthropy admirable and effective, she looks with regret upon the tendency of that great movement to lose its distinctive spiritual basis and to conceive of charity as the outcome of humane impulses rather than the definite spiritual teaching of Christ. When she finds moral concepts and policies of philanthropy in conflict with the ultimate spiritual truths and moral interpretations which grow out of these, she is unable at such points to work wholeheartedly with it.

While the church's conception of the duties of charity lead her to offer service to all who need it regardless of race, creed, or color, practical considerations such as limited resources, fear of misunderstanding, and the advantage of a bond of common faith between the poor and their benefactors tend to confine many of her activities to the Catholic poor. In countless instances the victims of poverty are served without question as to faith, color, or creed.

III. POLICIES IN DETAIL

We may now take up certain specific questions.

1. What are the objectives of charity from the religious point of view?

The first objective in Catholic charity is to obey the specific command of Christ and to maintain the concept of human brotherhood in its ascendancy against social conditions, pursuits, and personal aims which are in conflict with it. The persistent tendency of selfishness, of false valuations of wealth, and of social stratification bear in the direction of obscuring that essential social truth of the Gospel. Social conditions stifle the impulses of Christian brotherhood. The church intends her assertion of its law to correct mind, attitude, and condition which are in conflict with it. This is a fundamental spiritual truth which conditions all right human relations. It is antecedent to social differences. Obedience to it tends automatically to correct them.

The second objective of charity is to give prompt service to those who need it and to give the kind of service that is needed. The whole condition of the person or the family is taken into account. Charity serves not only economic need but also physical, cultural, civic, moral, spiritual, and intellectual needs as these are found. All of the resources of the benefactor are brought to the service of all of the needs of the recipient. The implications of this aim require that help be given intelligently and that the poor be brought to self-support. Charity forbids that assistance be given in any way to cause harm. The degree in which this result is achieved will depend naturally upon the intelligence of the benefactor. The charity that expresses the Christian ideal aims to restore the poor to independence and to make further charity unnecessary. In view of the vast amount of poverty to be dealt with and the limited resources at hand, this course not only serves the dignity of the recipient but also prevents waste of resources and makes possible the wider range of necessary service. Relief in the measure and variety needed, the reconstruction and independence of the recipient and maximum services from the resources at hand, are therefore the objectives of charity dictated by the divine law of brotherhood as expressed in the command of Christ.

2. Whom should charity seek to benefit? Is the primary good the soul welfare of the giver or the relief of the needy?

Both are included in the scope of Catholic charity when performed in the spirit of Christ. The separation of them in any way misconstrues the divine law. We are concerned with the understanding of Christian brotherhood to be asserted in spite of separation, error, and selfishness among men. When the owner of superfluous wealth really believes in the divine brotherhood of man and renders service to the poor he displays social intelligence no less than spiritual understanding. He is a more wholesome citizen on this account. He subdues selfishness in right relation to social life. He is therefore more properly socialized. He is better fitted to take his normal place in life because he acts upon true values in human interest. The man who prefers the comfort of the needy before a new investment or an unnecessary addition to income is more nearly right minded, more truly cultured, than is the man who is indifferent to the sufferings of others and is in a corresponding degree selfish. The benefactor is always ennobled by his service. Hence from a natural standpoint the benefit of the giver has far-reaching sociological significance. If strength tends to be selfish and it is made unselfish, civilization is advanced to that extent.

Now the Catholic philosophy of life attaches specific supernatural merit to charity and counts it as spiritual enrichment before God. The benefactor who would look upon the poor as intended merely to give him an opportunity to be unselfish would, I think, strangely misunderstand the essential law of divine brotherhood. When Christ identified himself with the poor he asserted a dignity and value in human life which forbids any attitude or relation which falls below that level.

The giving of relief to the needy is a specific command of Christ. The giving of that relief intelligently is a problem of judgment. But the very concept of brotherhood forbids the attitude of superiority which would appear if the advantage of the benefactor alone were considered.

A form of charity that is indifferent to its effect is not charity at all. It is a lazy, one-sided view of a fundamental Christian obligation. A mother whose indulgent kindness to a child ruins the latter by making it selfish and wilful sins against the obligations of motherhood. A benefactor who gives relief to the poor and pauperizes them by his benevolence has no true understanding of the charity of Christ. After all, the moral obligation to be intelligent is permanent in all human relations. Intelligent love of the poor depends upon understanding of their plight, a survey of their problems, discipline of sympathy, and industry in dealing with causes no less than with effects. When relations between giver and receiver are personal, when knowledge is adequate and wholesome results are immediately in evidence, we approach an ideal condition. But when the poor are in large numbers, relations are impersonal and system becomes necessary for the prevention of fraud, oversight, and waste. The charity of the benefactor must seek guidance from approved methods of service and the lessons of experience. Otherwise charity is not intelligent. The whole development of modern social work is intended to stimulate and guide benefactors in order that the poor may be served intelligently, that poverty may be prevented, and that resources may be managed in a way to bring about a maximum benefit to the poor. This is the singularly noble aim of social case work. It reconciles the maintenance of personal relations in charity with systematic and large-scale service.

3. Can we expect charity to eliminate the need for charity?

If charity is mere relief giving, of course, we cannot expect this. While individual Christians may content themselves with the mere relief aspects of charity, their view is neither adequate nor representative. It is not adequate because benevolence which is indifferent to the causes of misery is not intelligent. Intelligent charity even in a single case requires that the benefactor not only give relief wisely but also aim to prevent recurrence of need. A Christian who would give food or pay rent for the family of a workingman who could not find a job and would do nothing to find work for him would show only a rudimentary concept of brotherhood. Christian charity looks upon material need as an introduction to a dependent family which furnishes an opportunity to rehabilitate it. If through ignorance or laziness this further effort is not made the charity in question falls far short of Christian stature. If we look upon the poor as a great social class, underprivileged and defeated by the operation of social factors, charity toward society as a whole appears with its mandate that we deal with social causes and undertake by every resource at command to control or modify them in a way to prevent poverty in the future as far as may be possible.

In so far as ignorance is a cause of poverty, education will help to prevent it. If occupational hazards are causes of dependency, improved welfare work in industry and social legislation will reduce them to a minimum. To the extent to which personal moral qualities are causes of poverty, right moral and religious training will contribute to the prevention of it. In so far as mistaken civic policies in cities permit deplorable housing conditions which degrade the poor, the correction of such conditions will help at that point. In so far as unequal bargaining power between employer and laborer sends wages down to the level of sustenance, if not below it, social measures which will reinforce laborers act upon this cause of poverty. In so far as enlightened public opinion can exert moral pressure upon the industrial system, the asperities of competition will be softened with advantage to the weaker classes.

But none of these measures separately nor all of them taken together permit us to believe that in the present state of civilization we may hope to eliminate the need for charity in the economic sense. However, the law of charity as the outcome of divine brotherhood is permanent in human life so long as men worship Christ and accept his commands. The aim of individual charity, of all social work, of all social legislation, and of all other large measures of social direction is to reduce economic need to the smallest possible limits, to effect reforms with that in mind, and to bring all of the resources in Christian brotherhood and sympathy to service of those poor who remain our brothers always.

4. What is the basis of one's obligation to engage in charitable activities?

The basis of this obligation is in the fact that ultimate human relations are spiritual, that social differences are secondary in life, and that reverence and sympathy between man and man take precedence in all relations. Cultural obligations of human sympathy and service spring out of the ideal of social life which in the Catholic view rests on spiritual truth. The basis of the obligation of charity is therefore spiritual and cultural. It takes form under present social organization in this way. The individual who possesses superfluous wealth is required by the laws of Christian life to look upon his wealth as a form of stewardship. Failure to exercise that stewardship in the interest of particular and common welfare is a flaw in spiritual life. Christ's command to render service to those who need it is specific. The cultural unity of life taken as an ideal is broken by the social separation of the prosperous and the needy. Both classes suffer as a result. The competitive attitude toward life shrinks imagination and sympathy and enhances the value of wealth out of right proportions in life. The spiritual and cultural attitude which is expressed in the service of the poor serves as a general corrective of these mistakes, and maintains a spiritual ideal with abiding faith. This spiritual motive travels as far through social life as the social causes of poverty extend. Charity toward society is as definitely spiritual as is charity toward the individual. All general service to public welfare in promoting social legislation, in clarifying social conscience, and in representing the claims of the poor are brought within the terms of Christian social service and satisfy its law.

5. Is there any element in religion that would limit philanthropy to mere palliative giving, or does it include obligations to remedial or even to preventive and constructive activities?

There is no element in religion that limits charity to mere relief. A distinction may be made to bring this out more clearly. An individual Christian may perform his spiritual duty toward the poor by giving relief according to his means to one in need of it. If he does this without intelligence, regardless of effect, his service is objectively faulty. If the giver is incapable of doing more he completes his personal duty, but the dependent in question presents further claims for service which should be rendered in order that his needs may be met. The charity of the benefactor would require him to seek out others who can render the service that is beyond his power. No one is required to do everything. But everyone is required to do something in the interests of the poor. Service that expresses the full spirit of intelligent charity moves beyond material need to other forms of it, from relief to prevention, and from prevention to social action which deals with larger causes of poverty. Hence the individual does his duty best in and through agencies which foster a wider outlook and deal in a large way with problems. When we meet large numbers of poor, system and organization become necessary.

This is seen more clearly if we consider the Catholic church as a whole taking its place as a factor in the conquest of poverty. The constant authoritative teaching of the Catholic church includes a large number of preventive measures in the interests of the weaker social classes. Severe criticism of the inhumanity of industry, of extreme political individualism, of unequal distribution of wealth, of the oppression of the poor, and of large-scale selfishness are found constantly in Catholic literature. Minimum-wage legislation, the ethical sanction of the organization of labor, mothers' pensions, workmen's compensation laws, demand for wider distribution of ownership of capital, child-labor legislation, and similar social measures are advocated in principle and to a very large degree in specific form as interpretations of the law of Christian justice and charity in present social conditions. Such measures represent an active organic spirit in the Catholic church which projects her concept of charity and justice far beyond mere palliatives and directly into the field of social reform whose aim is the effective reduction of the extent of poverty and the conquest of the element of degradation in it.

6. To what extent do liberal contributions to organized social work fulfil the religious obligation?

The answer depends largely upon circumstances. The spiritual obligation to love one's neighbor as one's self is fundamental. It rests on spiritual understanding and expresses itself in genuine readiness to serve. If contributions express this attitude as effectively as possible, the religious obligation is satisfied. If one is capable of doing more, and frequently this is not the case, further obligations will depend upon circumstances. Contributions actually given supplemented by readiness to do anything further as conditions invite it seem to fulfil the obligation. But contributions given indifferently or given for motives foreign to the spirit of Christian charity may not fulfil the law at all. The attitude is more important than the action. The former necessarily reveals the spirit of charity while the latter might not.

7. How far should charity contribute to emotional satisfaction and does religion depend primarily upon emotional content?

Emotional satisfaction is a by-product but never a purpose in Christian charity. The duties of that charity arise out of spiritual relationships, and they indicate law and relation that are theoretically independent of emotion. Emotional satisfaction is certainly an advantage, for it makes obedience to spiritual law personally attractive. Even though all such satisfaction be lacking, the obligations of charity remain imperative in the Christian life. The Christian law of forgiving one's enemies and of conquering hatred may not be accompanied by emotional satisfaction. On the contrary, it may be accompanied by emotional recoil. Nevertheless the Christian must obey it as a demand of spiritual relationship.

Religion does not depend primarily upon emotional content. Its doctrine embraces a series of ultimate spiritual truths. The laws of human relationship grow out of these truths without regard to emotional satisfaction. The constant teaching of the Catholic church warns believers away from agreeable emotional experience as a purpose while recognizing it as a valuable accessory in spiritual life.

8. Even if it is possible that the religious impulse for charity may run counter to the biological welfare of the race, should religion still urge charity as an essential part of a divine program? Is suffering a necessary element in moral or spiritual development? Is relief of suffering necessarily good or an obligation upon religion?

The relations of the spirit and practice of Catholic charity to the biological welfare of the race are indicated in the fundamental principles already set forth. It is not easy to define the biological welfare of the race. If we mean by it the mere physical well-being of the race, we meet a problem when we find individuals physically perfect but mentally inferior. If we include physical and mental elements in the biological welfare of the race, we are confronted by the healthy and cunning criminal, capable in mind and body but a menace to his fellow-men, an effective rebel against the social order. He makes inevitable murder, lust, and every other kind of crime. If we include health of body, normal mentality, and high moral qualities of character in the biological welfare of the race we are compelled to establish a scale of values among the three. Biological welfare includes a balance among the three interests. If, finally, we look upon man as a spiritual being with an immortal destiny in God as Christian philosophy does regard him, we are called upon to associate spiritual, mental, moral, and physical elements as organically related and inseparable aspects of the biological welfare of the race. In other words, following a dictate of social philosophy, we do not isolate the biological welfare of the race out of relation to its welfare as a whole. In the Christian philosophy of life we are guided by spiritual truth and moral values in judging biological welfare.

A man or a woman physically a cripple but endowed with superior moral sense and mentality can contribute effectively to the welfare of the race. One of fair health and average mentality can by genuine moral worth exert far-reaching influence in social life which ultimately contributes to the biological welfare of the race.

There is probably no parent in the United States who would not prefer high moral integrity in his children with physical and mental inferiority rather than see them physically perfect, mentally capable, and morally disreputable. Our civilization as a result of race experience and Christian teaching does give the ascendancy to moral values in human life. And this is the case in spite of the conflicting moral codes which confront us.

The Catholic church accepts these general truths in her judgment of race welfare. She looks upon the immortal destiny of the individual as his supreme interest. She regards as evil everything which is in conflict with that destiny. She accepts the natural moral law as revealing the constitution of the race and, therefore, in substance, the will of God. She looks upon the ascendancy of spiritual truth and moral law as revealed by Jesus Christ as conditioning all judgment of human values whether physical, mental, or social. Race experience sifted, interpreted, and completed by divine revelation is the substance of the moral order as she sees it. The position of the church in respect of modern measures advocated in the biological interests of the race may help the reader to understand these principles. The church looks upon the continuity of the race as axiomatic. Sex is regarded as a race function to serve race continuity. The natural and divine law which governs the exercise of the sex faculty is indicated by monogamic indissoluble sacramental union of one man and one woman. She regards marriage thus conceived as an instrument serving the biological welfare of the race. Her moral interpretations of sex relations forbid all sexual enjoyment outside of marriage and forbid within marriage all practices which defeat the race purpose of sex. Birth control is advocated as a measure which serves the alleged biological welfare of the race. The Catholic church maintains that birth control is arbitrary interference with the race function of sex and is therefore wrong. She holds that, broadly speaking, individual pleasure is sought in an isolated way at the expense of the moral welfare of the race. She interferes in no way with marital continence. In as far as it might serve biological welfare no problem is presented. But the exercise of marital relations intended to defeat the purposes of nature is looked upon as morally reprehensible and therefore as a menace to race welfare.

Surgical procedure to prevent the propagation of the so-called physically, mentally, and morally unfit is advocated in the interests of the biological welfare of the race. In as far as it may be demonstrably advisable and it does not violate the natural rights of individuals, the church takes no doctrinal attitude against it. She may fear short-sighted views, unfounded assumptions, and disregard of implications in such procedure. But these are questions of practical wisdom and not of doctrine. Thus, for instance, her representatives technically qualified to judge would favor the segregation of definitely feeble-minded women rather than surgical procedure in dealing with hereditary feeble-mindedness. But the amount of feeble-mindedness that is not hereditary still leaves a problem for which no solution is now in sight. Sometimes offenses against Christian standards of the moral order are advocated in the interests of health and therefore of biological welfare. The Catholic church offers determined opposition to the assumptions and directions that arise in this way because of the totally false philosophy upon which they rest and the moral evil that is directly involved.

As I understand Catholic philosophy, no measures intended to serve the biological welfare of the race are opposed provided their advocacy is well grounded and respect for moral law is preserved. All health measures, everything that can help to conquer disease and lengthen life, are looked upon with approval when not in conflict with moral values.

If we may assume that human inequality is, at our stage of civilization, a fact of experience, every degree of social strength and social weakness will be found and must be dealt with. The actual forms of strength and weakness will be related to social organization and social arrangements. We must deal with idiots, imbeciles, low-grade morons, cripples, epileptics, and the victims of incurable disease. To whatsoever degree we may attain in preventing these pitiable types of human affliction we may not now hope for their disappearance. They are no doubt biological handicaps. The Christian theory of life invests each type with the sanctity of personality and forbids any intended destruction of them as a violation of the moral law. While we should do everything morally sanctioned to prevent their recurrence, such victims should be dealt with tenderly in the interests of the moral welfare of the race. The strength that comes to their service is idealized and ennobled, and such idealized strength promotes even the biological welfare of the race by its idealized service. Such service grows out of the fundamental principles of Christian philosophy already set forth.

It seems to be a lesson of human experience that suffering has a ministry to the race. As far as we now understand race conditions it is inevitable. Perhaps it is a race necessity in developing personal and social wisdom and in driving man to God to seek the strength to deal with its mystery. The man who has suffered has probably gained in wisdom, sympathy, and impulses of service in a way that had otherwise been closed to him. Perhaps it is the counterweight upon strength and selfishness that is a condition to ideal character. Taking the facts of life as we know them and the principles of Catholic philosophy as they have been explained, the relief of suffering when prompted by a spiritual motive and rightly done is necessarily good. Even from a natural standpoint the relief of suffering is culturally good. In view of what has already been said, the relief of suffering is a spiritual obligation shaped always by capacity and circumstances. The relief of the poor by the well-to-do is specifically commanded by Christ as an organic part of the Christian life.

While science and philosophy may undertake to explain the uses of suffering and may have some success in doing so, the Christian is driven back to Jesus Christ to find his attitude toward it. White, for instance, holds that we should welcome suffering "because only through trials that tax us to our limits can the full of our powers come to function." So long as the Man of Sorrows remains the object of loving worship by the believer, the latter will know suffering as a mystery that must be accepted, and that any explanation sought apart from the teaching of Christ will fall short of being adequate. The *via dolorosa* upon which Christ entered shows the footsteps that we must follow as we seek him. The instinct of recoil against suffering is natural and wholesome. After the utmost has been done to prevent it, much of it will still remain to baffle us and lead us to find the strength to bear with it in his example.

9. Is there any body of religious experience which can serve as authoritative guidance in charitable practice? Has religion contributed anything to philanthropic methods?

Methods in social work spring out of its aims, and these in turn are controlled by principles and by circumstances. The Catholic church has insisted throughout her history and insists now upon the spiritual quality of charity, the sanctity of personal rights, the integrity of the home, the guidance of the moral law in all policies of service, personal relations between the well-to-do and the poor when these are possible, interest in the life of the poor as a whole beyond mere economic need, the dignity of service whether of the volunteer or the professional social worker. These fundamental principles are constant in Catholic charity in all conditions. The application of them depends upon circumstances. Historically two results have appeared. On the one hand, the church created great bodies of volunteers in religious communities who consecrated themselves to the service of the poor in obedience to the divine command. On the other hand, these communities in turn created institutions that enabled them to deal with large numbers of the helpless poor systematically. In this way foundling homes, orphan asylums, hospitals for the sick and insane, homes for erring women which invite them to repentance and clothe them with spiritual dignity, homes for the aged and for victims of incurable disease, and schools for vocational training arose and enabled the church to render immense service to these otherwise helpless classes. In addition, nursing sisterhoods and organizations of the laity without number have been created and are now maintained in order to render many kinds of service to the poor either in their own homes or through accessible agencies of service. These religious and lay activities have contributed greatly to the work of keeping the poor before the Christian conscience of the world and in asserting concretely the spiritual and social obligations of service. That this Catholic tradition has served as the background of modern social service is hardly to be questioned.

Technique arises out of circumstances. It depends upon deeper knowledge of poverty and our understanding of the social factors which produce it. When there are very few poor technique may remain relatively simple. When there are very large numbers of poor it becomes complex. Today it is complex. A dozen sciences are placing the magnificent results of their research at the service of the social worker. Emphasis has been extended beyond the individual poor into the field of social factors that produce poverty. Action upon the individual poor remains always. But action upon society resulting from larger views of poverty and the directing of social resources toward its prevention has taken on a new significance. Industry, the state, high school, college, and university have become conscious of their power to contribute effectively to the enlightenment of the strong and to the prevention of poverty. Hence the technique of the care of the poor has become highly complex and larger aims in service have been established. From the Christian standpoint this development is cordially welcomed. Everything in it that is consistent with the fundamental principles of the Gospel is gradually taken over in the belief that more effective service is thereby rendered to society as a whole and to the poor themselves. Unless these principles are maintained throughout all social work, the latter will drift toward a purely natural basis and it will lose the spiritual quality given by Christ to the service of the poor. The Catholic church believes that her distinctive service to society rests in the unyielding maintenance of a spiritual outlook upon life and in insistence upon the full social significance of the charity of Christ in social life.

Professor Todd tells us in his *Scientific Spirit and Social Work* that "not a little of the best in so called organized philanthropy (both spirit and methods) is traceable to the work of St. Vincent de Paul."[1] He aimed "to make the benevolent impulse effective through vision and organization. This was the scientific spirit." His insistence upon investigation and the adaptation of service to need anticipated a marked feature of modern social work. Family rehabilitation as it is now aimed at rests upon the sanctity of the family as the Catholic church has always maintained it. The church's insistence upon the moral obligation of a father to support his family anticipates the larger efforts of modern social work to find employment for those who are involuntarily idle.

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[1] *Op: cit.*, p. 68.

Many mistakes in social service are perhaps errors of persons rather than faults of system. In spite of the criticism to which modern social work is subjected we must recognize its superb contribution to social progress. It is the constant hope of the Catholic church to bring together the best in modern methods and the best in Christian teaching in the hope of hurrying the day when we shall realize the ideal that the Christian law of life is "away from poverty as a social condition and toward poverty as a spiritual condition."

THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES AND CHARITY

SHAILER MATHEWS

To appreciate the Protestant position as to charity, it is necessary to consider its theological origins. The Protestant movement is a variation of the Christian. It did not originate new doctrines, nor did it claim to do more than restore the power of Christianity as determined by the Bible. As a matter of fact, the various Protestant state churches continued doctrines of the Catholic Christianity dealing with the triune God, the person and work of Jesus Christ, original sin, two sacraments, postmortem rewards and punishments as determined at the Judgment Day. The point of difference was really in the technique of salvation. The Protestant movement insisted that justification—that is to say, the acquittal at the Judgment Day—was through faith alone, while the Catholic church in the Council of Trent just as emphatically declared that justification involved good works. According to Thomas Aquinas, "almsgiving may be made meritorious of eternal rewards and expiatory of the temporal punishment due to sin."[1] Because of this difference, the Protestant theologians developed the teaching as to sanctification, that is to say, those moral processes and actions in which good works would appear.

From one point of view the difference between the two doctrinal systems seems one of mere theological analysis. What Protestants omitted in their doctrine of justification they apparently replaced in their doctrine of sanctification. But really the difference is significant for the consideration of the Protestant attitude toward charity. The Roman Catholic position makes the performance of good works, such as, for example, almsgiving, an element in justification, i.e., the process of gaining acquittal at the Judgment Day. The Protestant regards that acquittal as wholly unaffected by anything that a man does and wholly determined by his attitude toward Jesus, that is, his faith. For the Protestant, therefore, justification is exclusively by faith, wholly independent of morality.

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[1] *Catholic Encyclopedia*, III, 599.

The Protestant theologians naturally saw the difficulty in such a position, and discussions of the seventeenth-century Protestant Schoolmen sometimes grew very heated over the relation of good works to faith. It is not necessary for our purpose to consider these discussions in detail, and in fact they seem very remote from our modern interests. But it cannot be overlooked that they resulted in what is the general Protestant position, viz., that while justification is by faith, a genuine faith will be proved by good works; that is to say, instead of making good works meritorious, the Protestant teachers have consistently taught that a man, while not saved because he was good, ought to be good because he was saved. That is to say, any strict interpretation of the Protestant confessions, whether Lutheran or Reformed, shows a distinct refusal to find any motive for good works in a desire for merit. For a consistent philosophy of charity the Protestant looks, therefore, to something other than theological or ecclesiastical authority. Any justification of charity must discover motives of quite another sort. It is necessary, therefore, to examine briefly the history of the Protestant movement with this in mind.

I

Protestantism broke only slowly with the ethical philosophy of the Catholic church. Their theological differences from Catholicism did not lead Protestants to abandon the Catholic appeal to other and more essentially moral motives than the desire to gain spiritual reward. The Catholic church has always insisted on the necessity of fraternal attitude, and has been meticulous as to the motives which intelligent charity involves. But the Reformation resulted in the disestablishment or disarrangement of the agencies of the older charity like the monasteries, fraternities, and asylums, and their place was never filled by Protestant institutions. The prevailing tendency in Protestant countries has been to transfer much of the responsibility for the relief of all forms of suffering to the state. The early reformers were not primarily interested in ethics and gave charity little formal attention. The new emphasis in theology made this inevitable. Protestant teaching started with the Augustinian conception of a corrupt and depraved human nature which was incapable of doing anything that was good. Even acts of kindliness on the part of a man who had no faith in Jesus were deceptive if not dangerous. Thus Protestants were by their very logic forced to the position that only Christians could have a valid goodness, and that good works, even when the outcome of the regenerate life, could never be of the nature of penance or an aid to acquiring merit. Salvation was a matter of divine election with which mankind had nothing to do except to accept the gracious gift.

The difficulty of such a position for any ethical theory is of course evident. What was depraved human nature to do as it regarded suffering and poverty? Protestantism in its strict form could naturally make only one reply! A corrupt and depraved humanity that had rebelled from its God could do nothing to mitigate its own position in the sight of God, and therefore was not to be expected to respond to any appeal for helpfulness to others. The sermons of the strictly orthodox preachers of the seventeenth century, and, in fact, the nineteenth century, seemed almost to imply that morality on the part of the unregenerate life is really more dangerous than sin because it may tend to produce a pride and blindness which will prevent their possessor's interest in the saving faith.

So far as the elect or regenerate themselves were concerned, the Protestant ethical philosophy differed very little from that of the Roman Catholic teachers. They all chose to separate the secular and the spiritual spheres of life, even, in the case of Calvin, to reproduce in their own way the medieval conception of the two swords. As citizens Christians must be subject to the political power, but as Christians they are subject only to Christ. Christian morality therefore depended on the acceptance of the authority of God, especially as expressed in the Old Testament. The Christian was to love his neighbor because it was commanded, and he was to keep the Sabbath and observe other regulations for the same reason. Thus any questions of ameliorating the conditions of the poor were likely to be settled in the spirit of a strict legalism rather than as a way of expressing the new life which the Christian was believed to possess. The Protestant movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was far enough from any interest in social transformation beyond those political situations which were involved in the break with the Roman church and the building-up of monarchy in the place of the feudal order. It would hardly be accurate to say that the early Protestants were indifferent to social evils, but they did not undertake any such general service to the poor and the unfortunate as had been organized by the Roman church in the religious houses, hospitals, religious orders, and almsgiving. Charitable institutions in many cases were continued, but there is no evidence of any widespread interest in mitigating human sufferings or ministering to human needs. The Protestants were too deeply involved in the political and theological struggle for existence to devote much time to anything more than conventional charity. They were not indifferent to the seven classes of works of mercy mentioned by Thomas Aquinas (feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, clothing the naked, ransoming the captive, sheltering the homeless, visiting the sick, burying the dead), but in the first period of their history they lacked means of corporate action in these matters.

Luther accepted serfdom just as the southern Presbyterians in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century accepted slavery. Calvin developed an ethic which was thoroughly based on the authority of the Ten Commandments as set forth by an authoritative church.

Calvin further developed an ethical teaching which urged the Christians to avoid excessive longing for wealth and emphasized the necessity of sobriety, chastity, and temperance in the use of wealth, patient endurance of poverty. But he held that only those who had the divine grace given them could overcome the temptation to contentiousness and selfishness. To him it was of the highest importance that men should bear constantly in mind the approach of death and the life beyond, and the Christian was to fix his hopes constantly on those blessings which were to be his in heaven. The world was thus of secondary importance.

Yet over against Calvin's scholastic and legalistic view of ethics should be set the teaching of Luther, especially that of his earlier period. Like both his Roman Catholic predecessors and his Calvinistic successors, Luther is sensitive to the approach of death and the judgment, but, at least in his earlier writings, heaven and hell are discussed less as places than as moral stages, and he develops an ethical thought which is less concerned with the commandments of the Old Testament than with the expression of the Christian spirit. "I will give myself," he somewhere says, "as a sort of Christ to my neighbor as Christ has given himself to me, and will do nothing in this life except what I see will be needful, advantageous and wholesome for my neighbor."

Calvinism became more of a political and economic ferment than Lutheranism. Practically all of the democracies of North America were organized by Calvinists, and the capitalistic system was also very largely the outcome of nations under the influence of Calvinistic teaching. These facts seem almost paradoxical because of their apparent logical inconsistency with some of the basic possessions of the Calvinist movement. But such a view fails to estimate aright the spirit of a Calvinist, and the influence of the situation in which he found himself. On the one side, the Calvinist's unwillingness to enjoy the world and his emphasis upon self-control gave rise to a thrift which made the accumulation of capital inevitable. On the other hand, the development of the arts, especially of the manufacture of cloth in France and England, and the enormous natural resources of the new world put at his disposal wealth which in turn enabled him to benefit by the rise in prices which resulted from the increase of the precious metals in Europe after the discovery of the mines of America.

While it is true that the same conditions did not operate among Lutheran Protestants, among them is to be discovered the tendency similar to that developed in Calvinism toward thrift and avoidance of many types of excesses. But while the Calvinist religious life tended toward Puritanism, the Lutheran tended toward pietism. While both were moved by thoughts of salvation in which good works did not play any rôle, the development of the economic life put larger wealth at the disposition of Protestants, and there resulted a slow but steady development of charity. Undoubtedly, however, the pressure of poverty and misery was not felt so keenly because of the inherited social stratification. Beggars existed in enormous numbers in England during the Reformation, because of the disruption of the religious houses. In 1536 individuals were protected against ill-judged private charity by an act which decreed that "no person shall make any command or shall give any ready money in alms otherwise than to the common gatherings." In the course of time, however, the building of hospitals began again on the part of private individuals.

The early Protestant preachers spoke often of charity, some of their advice being rather crude, to the effect that alms would be recompensed by God's gift of prosperity. But, on the other hand, the more thoughtful preachers emphasized sympathy with those who were in need. This in turn would naturally lead to an attempt to estimate the worthiness of the recipients of charity. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, were not much interested in social studies, and many of the English Protestants frankly refused to make any distinction between those who were in need. Apparently misery was in itself the final reason for assistance.

Certain bodies like the Moravians undertook in more systematic fashion the ordering of their philanthropies. Yet in their case the primary motive was not so much philanthropy as a desire to preach the gospel and so accomplish the salvation of the heathen. Wherever the Moravian missionaries went, however, instruction in better social institutions came, whether among the Indians of North America or Eskimos of Labrador. They and other religious bodies also established orphanages and various institutions for helping different classes of the less fortunate.

II

In this sketch of Protestant charity at the beginning of the religious variation that gave rise to modern conditions we meet one of its chief characteristics—the transfer of much philanthropic work from ecclesiastical to state control. There were several reasons for this, but doubtless as influential as any was the fact that Protestantism had no central organization comparable with the Roman church. Furthermore, when the religious establishments of Europe were confiscated by the state, it was natural that the state should assume some of their functions. The development of the modern conception of taxation accustomed the various communities to community activity through the agency of the state rather than of the church. Thus poorhouses, hospitals, and asylums became increasingly under political control. Protestant churches were not indifferent to the individual charity, and no small part of the duty of the clergy was the performance of tasks that involved charity, but whereas the Roman Catholic church has kept charitable institutions under the control of the church organization, Protestantism has tended to remove religious influences from such institutions.

This is not to forget that Protestant bodies have established various agencies of charity such as hospitals, or to overlook the work carried on by Protestants, in the Salvation Army and the Christian Associations, which, although not strictly ecclesiastical, are agencies of non-Catholic interests. The policy of Protestants of laying upon the state responsibility for the care of the defective and maladjusted citizens is, however, important. A comparison of the church-controlled with the state-controlled institutions will make this evident, and will show the effect of the Protestant conception of the church upon the operation of charity. Chief among these effects are:

1. To repeat: The Protestant attitude toward charity tends to emphasize the duty of the state to care for its citizens. Since they belong to the body politic they may be said to have a just claim upon some of the products of that body politic. While this may be regarded as a step in the direction of socialism, it is by no means a consent to the major premise of the socialist philosophy. It is rather the conclusion that if in the total body of inhabitants of a state there are those who, because of their physical misfortune, find it impossible to get employment, the other members of the political unity will care for them. The means for providing for such care will be found in taxation rather than in charity. The fact that funds thus raised by taxation may be used to support institutions controlled by the churches—a situation very common in American cities—may modify but it does not negate this

tendency to make the care of the poor and unfortunate less strictly a matter of charity and more a matter of civic justice.

2. The second result of this attitude of the Protestant churches has been the development of charity organizations supported by voluntary contributions but quite apart from ecclesiastical control. The list of such organizations in any city is astonishing. Some of them, like the United Charities, expend large sums of money and care for large numbers of men, women, and children. Doubtless many among the contributors to these organizations are Roman Catholics, but it is probably true that the chief dependence of these organizations is upon those whose interests are not largely expressed through ecclesiastical channels. In charity as in education there have thus grown up in a country like America two main types of charity organizations—those under the control of the Roman Catholic church and those under the control of some political unit.

3. Removal of charities from ecclesiastical control has given opportunity for the appearance of scientifically trained workers, as professional social service agents. This is in effect the rise of a new vocation. Such administrators of the social service are the counterpart of the brotherhoods and sisterhoods of the Roman Catholic organizations. The difference between the social service worker, and, for example, the Sisters of Charity, is an index of the difference in organization, training, and independence of the individual charity workers. The effect of the Protestant attitude has been to stimulate the growth of this new vocation which has reversed the medieval program of charity. Protestant churches now help finance and other organizations administer, while, according to the general policy of non-Protestant groups, the community contributes and the churches administer charity. The motives to which the Protestant churches would appeal in the interest of charity have themselves been subject to social criticism. Such a statement should not be interpreted as implying an

indifference to motives on the part of Roman Catholic sociologists. Quite the contrary is true. Nor should it be interpreted as implying that the charges frequently made against medieval charities by modern sociologists are fully warranted. The Roman Catholic moralists have always insisted that need should be genuine, and intelligently met, but the development of Protestantism as a religious attitude has been accompanied by a special interest in the scientific study of disorganized lives and an objective, technical examination of methods of amelioration.

III

The importance of this fact can hardly be overlooked, for after all due credit has been given to the ecclesiastical management of charity, the fact remains that it has not been primarily interested in social diagnosis. True, ethical discussions of the church leaders of the past have recognized the danger that lies in promiscuous charity and have advised the refusal to give aid when such assistance would tend to pauperize those whom it sought to help, but only after charity passed into non-ecclesiastical hands did scientific interest in its administration develop. The reason for this is obvious. So long as any practice or institution is regarded as primarily within the limits of a body possessed of supernatural power will it be controlled by the interest of the institution concerned. This is apparent in the Catholic attitude toward attempted eugenic reforms, especially legislation which affects marriage and the home. Support of such legislation by Protestants is an expression of freedom, more or less consciously due to their unwillingness to have charity in any way under the control of ecclesiastical organization. In consequence, experimentation and reorganization within the field of charity are made possible. The Protestant looks to charity as an independent social activity capable of reduction to scientific procedure unrestrained by its relations to any body other than the state. Similar freedom has, in the nature of the case, not been possible under ecclesiastically controlled charity, useful as it has been.

Indeed, scientific administration of charity must appear to be particularly applicable in the new situation. If it is to be scientifically administered by non-ecclesiastics, its motivation must be within the sphere of its own activity. True, thoughtless persons may continue to give indiscriminate aid to individuals and existing agencies with the conviction that they acquire merit in the courts of heaven or in some way place Providence under obligation to make them prosperous. But an examination of the recent literature as well as the formal expressions of Protestant organizations will show how extensively the Protestant churches are giving support to the type of charitable operations which are becoming so important in our social life.

Most of the leading Protestant churches have social service commissions that not only pass resolutions and make appeals to churches but are endeavoring to a greater or less degree to co-operate in certain definite undertakings which express their basic policy. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America has been effective in this regard and has issued what is known as the "Social Creed" of the churches. This has been in a measure reissued by various denominations represented in the Council. This creed was first adopted in 1908, but has been repeatedly revised so that at the present time it represents, as far as is possible for any single document, the attitude of Protestantism toward social reform.

IV

A study of these utterances of the Protestant bodies, as well as the literature which Protestants have produced in this field, will show an increasing tendency to regard situations to which charity ministers as due to faulty organization of society, and therefore to a constant insistence that the *status quo* itself must be changed. One of the fundamental positions of the social philosophy of Protestantism is that poverty can and must be removed. This of course sounds utopian if not impracticable to many, and has been severely criticized, yet it is hard to see how any intelligent effort to benefit humanity, unrestrained by ecclesiastical, governmental, economic, or similar considerations, could avoid such a conclusion. In the treatment of disease physicians have learned to look for something more than symptoms.

This attitude of Protestant churches has aroused opposition on the part of those who are liable to lose privilege by any change in the social order. Furthermore, there is a vast amount of more or less conscious aristocracy in the minds of those who have shared in the surplus of economic progress. Almost instinctively they have the conviction that their duty is one of amelioration rather than of change of social conditions. They are not democrats in the sense that they trust individuals as such.

But this interest in reconstruction in Protestantism has not been identified with any particular economic or social theory. While some writers have moved toward socialism, others have definitely undertaken to modify the existing social conditions without depending upon any general philosophy of society. Such opportunism is, in fact, thoroughly characteristic of the Protestant attitude toward social reconstruction. Without having to combat the ecclesiastical condemnation of socialism, they are not driven into the ranks of the anti-religionists. Men in revolt against the existing social order are naturally opposed to agencies that they believe support it. Only thus could one account for the virulence of the atheistic revolt among the bolshevists of Russia. It is unfortunate, however, that antagonism born of the political status of churches on the continent of Europe should be transferred to a country where separation of church and state is recognized and church organizations have no power to oppose reform. In such a society it is increasingly possible for men to hold the same church connection and at the same time be radicals in the field of economic reconstruction. Doubtless such radicals will always be in a minority in Protestant churches, if, indeed, they do not separate themselves from bodies whose chief interest is not economic. But if they do thus withdraw from Protestant churches, it will not be because of ecclesiastical discipline. Protestant churches may be composed of either conservatives or radicals or both, but as churches they recognize no such differences.

It will be noticed that this liberty is really based upon an at least assumed scientific knowledge of the sources from which social maladjustment comes and that its emphasis is only incidentally upon amelioration of existing conditions. Society obviously recognizes the legitimation of the scientific treatment of diseases. The same position is to be seen in a large literature which has been produced during the past generation by Protestant writers dealing with social problems. Without exception this literature treats the questions of charity and social reform from the point of view of the social sciences. In some cases, it is true, the writers believe that the Bible furnishes specific direction for reshaping the social order, especially in the matter of the use of wealth, but charity and social service are dissociated from any connection with future life. Just as Protestants have brought about the separation of church and state are they bringing about the separation of church and the administration of charity. Therein lies a perfectly distinct philosophy as well as an attitude toward ecclesiastical activities.

V

It would be a mistake, therefore, to think that the Protestant churches are less interested in charity than before the rise of scientific social service. Such interest, on the contrary, has increased in more specific fields. If the administration of charity is not to be principally in the hands of church officials, Protestant churches argue the importance of co-operation in and support of such charities as are not directly supported by taxes. And it must be said that, measured by any standard which is available, the interest of Protestant churches in all forms of altruistic service from United Charities to Near East Relief has never been equaled. One might almost say that in the same proportion as charities of all sorts have been freed from the control of the Protestant churches have the Protestant churches supported them.

Their interest involves a number of elements.

1. Protestant churches are raising enormous sums of money for the support of various forms of social service and charitable operations. It is a rare church that does not have its benevolent fund, or collect money for the support of those in need. Innumerable good causes are brought to the attention of Protestant congregations even in remote points. In this matter of raising money for benevolences the Protestant policy with its abandonment of ecclesiastical motives has certainly proved amazingly successful and unrestrained by any sort of religious exclusiveness.

2. Protestant denominations both locally and state wide have undertaken to establish charitable institutions supplementing those provided by public funds and non-denominational support.

3. Protestant churches are supplying a large number of workers in organized charity. This, of course, is true also of non-Protestant churches, but municipal and privately supported charities and social settlements are administered by men and women who either are or have been at some time associated with the Protestant churches. The fact that the Protestant churches do not immediately control the administration of such organizations nor the natural sympathy of the workers for those whom they would aid undoubtedly tends to separate these workers from any ecclesiastical con-

nections, but they constitute a contribution of Protestantism considered as a social movement.

4. The Protestant churches co-operate with non-ecclesiastical charitable organizations. This is true even on the part of religious groups that are maintaining denominational institutions of charity such as hospitals, orphan asylums, old people's homes. This co-operation is not only that of the individual members of the churches, but it also characterizes the religious organizations themselves; indeed, there is a marked tendency in Protestantism to abandon the establishment of church institutions of charity requiring highly developed technical skill like hospitals.

5. The Protestant churches are constantly aiding individuals in need. Not only do pastors and other church officials regard such service as a part of their duties, but many churches, especially in large cities, maintain various agencies for helping the sick and poor, such as dispensaries, nursing services, employment bureaus. It is a basic characteristic of all Christian churches to minister to the poor, not only of their own members, but to those of the community within which the church is located.

6. The Protestant churches are educating their members in social attitudes. Nothing is more characteristic of the recent developments in Protestant church life. One has only to compare the sermons of today with those of two generations ago to realize how much more insistence is laid upon the giving of justice in economic life. This spirit is sharply distinguished from any effort to seek salvation from hell, for it is regarded as having worth in itself. Both in the Sunday schools and in the pulpits of Protestant churches there has been marked advance in the recognition of the obligations of the Christian to the world at large. The development of foreign missions has contributed to the same result, although oftentimes indirectly. Whatever may be the theological interpretation of interest in the welfare of the non-Christian world, the mis-

sionary has become the center of influence in his community. The social results of foreign missions when once studied are very impressive. The fact that in Protestant churches these missions are sustained by appeal to individual church members has resulted in a continuous education which has increasingly emphasized the sense of trusteeship of cultural as well as religious blessings as a basis of obligation to those who are regarded as lacking such advantages.

VI

This moral education leads naturally to a consideration not only of the motives but of the legitimacy of the entire effort of charity. In approaching this subject it is difficult to dissociate altogether the position of Protestantism from that of other forms of the Christian religion on the one side, and from non-ecclesiastical ethics on the other. In the light of what has been said, it is apparent, however, that Protestantism is a phase of a total social movement away from ecclesiastical authority toward democracy. It therefore cannot make use of some of the motives to which other religious groups can appeal. It does not expect meritorious reward from almsgiving as a compensation for other forms of penance, nor can it appeal to ethnic pride and loyalty. Its success is wholly dependent upon its capacity to inspire and organize the generosity and social feeling of individuals. Many of the motives to which it appeals are identical with many of those which Roman Catholic and Jewish leaders can utilize, but they do not include some of the most influential to which the others can and do appeal. Furthermore, the political philosophy in accordance with which Protestant states have been organized is based on the recognition of the free individual rather than of the mass, class, or institutional solidarity. This has led to a very high degree of differentiation in religious organizations on the one side, and to the separation not only between church and state, but between the church and various forms of community action. Thus inevitably the appeal which the Protestants make for charity, as in political democracy as well, cannot ignore a certain skepticism as to the wisdom of charity itself. In this, of course, it is not unique, for such questions have always been discussed by moralists. But the questions involved are more to the point, since Protestantism has, so to speak, no theological, ethnic, or other reserves it can bring up to support its action. It must justify charity on its own merits.

Free, therefore, from economic and social theory as well as from the theological considerations already mentioned, the Protestants have been forced to develop their conception of charity *as something to be outgrown in the same proportion as society is more intelligently organized.* This recognition of charity as a way of facing needs which are themselves born of unjustifiable conditions may be said to be the point at which Protestantism joins hands with a frankly scientific social service. Both alike have to face the question whether charity is not a form of social suicide. Is not the unsentimental method of nature, after all, preferable? Those unfitted to survive perish, and those who are strong and vigorous persist. Nature has no hospitals for the feeble-minded, no homes for the hopelessly defective. May it not be that our modern charity methods are thus increasing that which they seek to end?

It must be admitted that there is weight in such questions. The answer, however, will vary as men recognize the necessity of preventive social action as well as amelioration. If the care for the mentally defective and degenerate is not balanced by some eugenic policy the danger to the social order, as pointed out by students of the subject, is genuine. The same thing would be true of other types of charity. But the argument may be overstressed. There are certain forms of charity which give rise to no such question. Sanitary reforms, for instance, will put an end to some diseases, but so long as humanity is mortal it will be subject to some form of physical disintegration. The sick must be cared for. So, too, in the matter of giving support to able-bodied unemployed. Such practice by no means prevents the undertaking of operations which will give employment and better readjustment of business so as to reduce the possibility of unemployment. But within the range of sane imagination it is not possible to see a human society in which every individual is constantly employed. One cannot assume ready-made utopians for one's utopia. Sooner or later in any social reconstruction one strikes human nature. However much the opportunity for productive employment is spread, there will always be those who fall behind in efficiency because of circumstances or lack of ability. Society will always have the poor with it because it will always have this type of persons who will have to be supported by society in some way or other. The only alternative would be to kill them off or let them die. And if sometimes when our best efforts of charity and social betterment are often frustrated we are tempted to the cynical view that it would be better that some such policy were adopted, we know better. In this conviction we see the justification of charity.

VII

This justification is by no means the exclusive property of the Protestant. More or less organized, it lies beneath charity wherever found. In the case of the Protestants, however, as has been pointed out, it is not entangled by considerations drawn from other sources. It is not in the spirit of a controversialist, however, that one proceeds to analyze this attitude of certainty as to the justification of charity, but rather to point out positively some of the motives it involves as they are discoverable, particularly within the Protestant's attitude as already described. Whether the agencies of charity are those of his own individual action, supported by his religious group, or the action of the state is here of secondary importance. A study of the utterances and discussions of Protestant bodies and writers will disclose that the altruistic attitude and practice involved among others the following elements:

1. A human individual has intrinsic worth. This worth, however, is to be measured not by what the individual is but by what he may become. For this conviction Christianity in all its forms has stood. In Protestantism it is markedly in evidence because of its refusal to classify human beings according to birth or circumstances. The very insistence upon the worth of the individual is a natural result. It is this which gives direction and dignity to the desire to help. It is not merely that we instinctively turn against suffering; this feeling of pity is controlled by a sense of the worthful possibilities of the one pitied.

2. Ministration to the needy is the inevitable and irrepressible expression of an attitude of love which Jesus made central in himself and by his teaching in the life of his followers. This attitude is itself basic. It seeks expression in conduct for its own satisfaction. One may rationalize and legitimatize such conduct, but the self-expression of a loving spirit is its own ultimate authority. A good tree must bring forth good fruit.

Such love is not sentimentality or even affection. Men can love those whom they do not like. "Good will" expresses more accurately this attitude than any other term. Such an attitude is the expression in the range of personality of that great force called "co-ordination" which characterizes the universe. One loves his fellow-men only as one takes into account the welfare of the entire group to which one belongs and which is concerned in a given act. The selfish man undertakes to further his own advantages at the expense of others of the group to which he belongs. A man with good will undertakes so to act that what he regards as just for himself is also just for others of his group. When he sees in society those who are unfortunate he naturally feels that they have some claim upon those privileges and advantages which he has obtained because of his membership in a group to which the less fortunate persons likewise belong. While this attitude of love, even though thus legitimatized, does not in itself determine the technique by which it shall express itself, it is none the less dynamic in the Christian attitude toward the world. "Behold how these Christians love each other" was one of the earliest comments of an unfriendly world upon the new Christian movement.

3. The Protestant movement has increasingly, particularly of late, endeavored to develop what is known as the Kingdom of God. As generally described, this is both reconstructive and ameliorative fraternity. Each characteristic is an expression of the basic Christian attitude of regard for the rights of others. The unfortunate are to be helped not because of any command of church or Bible or even of the divine Lawgiver, but because the Christian spirit cannot disregard the appeal of need. To see another suffer and not to be desirous of rendering assistance is a denial of the very attitude which led Jesus to the cross. It goes without saying that this attitude must express itself intelligently and as far as possible with a determination to correct the causes of suffering as well as itself. But while love does not itself furnish a technique, it necessitates the choice of the best technique at one's disposal. But technique, on the other hand, is not a substitute for good will, however much it may occupy the forefront of attention. Ministration to the human needs, the freeing of men from suffering, must depend ultimately upon the determination so emphasized by the Protestant churches to bring in the Kingdom of God.

4. Thus at its very foundation lies the Protestant conception of God as love. It is this which really separates Christian motivation from mechanistic or Nietzschean world-views. The Christian in expressing love, the Protestant church in-

sists, can count upon divine co-operation. The agencies through which divine good will can operate, according to the Protestant, will be human action and scientific intelligent methods. Whatever may be inherited from belief in the church or a doctrine of the Scriptures will be ultimately submitted to the test of practicality. As has already appeared, there has been in Protestantism a steady moving-away from these extraneous motives toward a reliance upon social and ethical as well as toward non-ecclesiastical agencies. That in this process Protestant charity has decreasingly rested upon authority and increasingly upon experiment must be apparent to any student of recent history. Therefore it is that Protestant charity has become more self-directive and less concerned with motives. In the process of ethical education which Protestant churches have pursued, the attitude of love for man and belief that brotherliness is practicable because of divine fatherliness has grown decreasingly theological. The Protestant churches have become schools of social attitudes which their possessors trust without further justification than their actual existence.

VIII

To sum the matter up, therefore, Protestant charity may be described as a variety of Christian charity. It is marked by an increasing tendency to transfer eleemosynary activity from the churches to the state, retaining only such of its elements as are individual or decreasingly ecclesiastical. It regards charity as secondary to the removal of the causes of suffering and so is not content with the existing social status. It finds its motives in the universally recognized Christian attitude of love and leaves questions of technique to the social sciences. In these qualities are to be seen elements of identity with and of difference from the theory and practice of charity among other religious and non-religious groups.

PHILANTHROPY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ETHICS

GEORGE H. MEAD

In its current use charity implies both an attitude and a type of conduct which may not be demanded of him who exercises it. Whatever the donor's inner obligation may be, the recipient on his side can make no claim upon it. Yet the inner obligation exists and in part limits the charity itself, for the donor cannot fail in his other commitments because he has answered the appeals of charity with too great a generosity. Within the appeal itself, however, lies a positive claim upon the donor which he recognizes, though he may be at a loss to estimate its force or to establish a criterion by which to judge between rival claims upon his bounty.

Back of the obligation of the donor lies the human impulse to help those in distress. It is an impulse which we can trace back to animals lower than man. There it is most evident in the parental care of the young, but the impulse may be called out by other relations. It may extend to adult members of the herd or pack to which the animal belongs. It is nicely interwoven with the hostile impulses in animal play. Its strength in humankind is at times deprecated by charity organizations, which desire to bring the impulse under rational control. The kindliness that expresses itself in charity is as fundamental an element in human nature as are any in our original endowment. The man without a generous impulse is abnormal and abhorrent.

Obligation arises only with choice: not only when impulses are in conflict with each other, but when within this conflict they are valued in terms of their anticipated results. We act impulsively when the mere strength of the impulse decides; when the anticipated results of action either are not present in the volitional experience or do not affect the onward march of the impulse to its expression. We may condemn such impulsive action, but the condemnation is based upon the fact that a sense of values, with the consequent possibility of reasoned choice, did not play its proper part in the action.

It is evident that here is a field within which there may be no clear-cut moral judgments. How much influence should I allow to a dislike which I find that I have for an acquaintance? In certain situations this may be quite clear. I must pay what is due him. If the dislike is not justified by defects in character or ability, it should not influence my voting for him at an election. But I will not make him a companion on a journey or an associate in social undertakings in which temperamental agreement is of importance. Between these extremes there may lie a multitude of situations in which the impulsive attitude plays a questionable part in our decisions. Falling in love, and the conduct that grows out of it, are shot through with actions which are determined by impulses that are not and perhaps cannot be estimated in terms of consequences.

The kindly impulses that lead us to help those in distress lie within this field—so much so that they may breed beggars—while organized charity has arisen to bring reason into their exercise. Bringing reason into charity consists, on the one hand, in definitely tracing out the consequences of impulsive giving, and, on the other hand, of so marking out the distress and misery of the community that constructive remedial work may take the place of haphazard giving. Organized charity, however, covers but a small part of the field within which these kindly impulses express themselves. Among our own kith and kin, among our friends, in those undertakings that seek to advance human welfare and lessen its suffering in numberless ways, in "the little nameless unremembered acts of kindness and of love," these impulses are called out, and in few of them could we justify their exercise by a reasoned statement of consequences. Indeed, in many of them, such a rationalization of the impulse would diminish if not extinguish its worth and beauty. In kindness, the genuineness and strength of the impulse weigh heavily in our estimate of its worth and that of its author.

So far I have regarded these kindly impulses as if they stood upon the same moral level as hostility, sex, or hunger. And yet, in common parlance, kindness is nearly synonymous with goodness. That this is not merely a eulogistic approval of kindness by those that profit by it is evidenced by that sense of inner obligation which, as I have above indicated, is a part of our charitable attitudes. It is, of course, difficult if not impossible to isolate the fundamental impulses of our natures. Those which I have referred to as the kindly impulses are normally present to some degree however slight in our attitudes to all those about us; but the hostile impulse may quite completely banish them when it seeks the suffering and death of an enemy, and when our dislikes and resentments render us unsympathetic with their objects. In these situations we experience little or no impulse to assist them in their misfortunes, nor do our attitudes carry with them a sense of obligation to act as Good Samaritans. Nevertheless, the sense of obligation which is entailed by our social relations is present: economic relations obtain and persist; we must pay our debts and meet other obligations. In these economic and other social situations we do not simply respond to the stimuli which others embody—paying debts is not merely succumbing to pressure. We speak to ourselves, however unwillingly, with the voice of the creditor and of the community, assessing ourselves with the obligation. Our moral self-consciousness implies our own action as stimulus to our own response, and this action as stimulus appears in a comprehending assumption of the rôle of those who exact payment from us.

That the recognition of an obligation is at the same time the assertion of a right is tantamount to the individual's identifying himself with those who make the claim upon him. For an obligation is always a demand made by another or by others. When the obligation seems to involve only one's self or an impersonal landscape, the impulse to action assumes obligatory form only when the individual speaks to himself in the rôle of another. In obligation the values involved always assume a personal form. Thus in the expression of impulses in which those of kindliness are not dominant or from which they may seem to be entirely absent a man identifies himself sufficiently with the community to lay upon himself those obligations which he in turn exacts from others toward himself. In these situations, as I have said, the obligation does not attach to the impulse. The obligation lies in that response of the community to the individual's action with which he identifies himself. And it is these demands of others upon him with which he identifies himself that are the carriers of the values involved in the act. The impulse to strike or to help, for instance, is as yet unvalued. It is in the result that the value appears. When the impulses come into conflict with each other, the conflict announces itself in the incongruence of the ends which the impulses reach. One may not strike a man when he is down. And it is not the mere incongruence of the ends that carries with it the moral judgment. It is that voice of others in which we join that conveys the moral import of the conflicting values. Both must be there: the voice of the community and our own; the ordered community that endows us with its rights and its obligations, and ourselves that approve or dissent.

There is a definite movement within the field of organized charity toward the assessment of wealth for those purposes which organized charity seeks to fulfil. There is a certain amount of misery which the community should meet in its own interests as well as in the interests of those who are succored. A community chest presents a budget that appeals not simply to the charitable impulses, but to the sense of justice as well. In a word, charity carries a certain burden that ought in any case to be met. Those whose incomes include a surplus above the necessities, whether their souls are stirred by the suffering or not, may well recognize a responsibility to bear their part in meeting this community obligation. When this point has been reached there arises a logical demand that this should be met by the community in the same manner in which it meets its other obligations, through taxation.

Illustrations of this are found in compulsory insurance of employees against the disabilities of old age, sickness, and unemployment. In these situations the responsibility of the community for the disabilities, and the loss which the community suffers through them, takes them out of the field of charity. The appeal is no longer made to charity, but to the sense of justice. The obligation comes from the social values involved upon the individual as an integral part of the community. The morality of paying taxes for these purposes is in no sense lodged in a kindly impulse to relieve the misery which such systems of insurance undertake to meet. What I desire to maintain is that, when the charitable impulse does carry a sense of obligation with it, we always imply a desirable social order within which the goods which our charity confers would come to the recipients as their due or as part of their proper equipment for life in the community. It may be regarded as an unimportant truism to state that the moral standard of charity is to be found in the social value of the benefit to the recipient. In its commonest definition charity is doing good to others—especially to those who are most in need of it. But the ethics of charity is not exhausted by the recognition of the good that accrues to those who receive it. There is first of all the problem which I have already presented, the sense of obligation of the charitable person, even though that obligation cannot be enforced against him by society. The second problem is the standard which is implied in the appeals of different objects of charity.

The position stated above comes to this: that when a man feels not simply an impulse to assist another in distress, but also an obligation, he always implies a social order in which this distress would make a claim upon the community that could be morally enforced, as, for example, in a community where employees in industry are insured, the distresses incident to old age, sickness, and unemployment must be relieved. In contrast with this may be placed a conception that has obtained and still obtains in some circles, namely, that suffering and misery are part of the divine order, where they serve the purposes of punishment and discipline. Under this doctrine charity is a duty laid by God upon man for his own good, and which may accrue to him as a merit. I would still maintain that back of these legalistic conceptions has lain the assumption of the parable of the Good Samaritan that we are neighbors of those in distress; back of the eschatology of the church has always lain the thesis of the Sermon on the Mount that men are all brethren in one family. In immediate sympathy with distress we have already identified ourselves with its victims. In this the human kindly impulse stands above the impulse in lower animals from which it developed. In man even the immediate impulse that lies above the automatisms is the response of a self, and a self-experience is possible only in so far as the individual has already taken the attitude of the other. The very word "sympathy" announced this, as does the plea to "put yourself in his place," made in the effort to stimulate charity.

We characterize this sympathetic attitude of man as humane, as being human, thus distinguishing it from the impulse of the lower animal, for it involves participation in some sense in the suffering of the other. The participation exhibits itself in the experience of him who sympathizes, not so much in the sharing of the suffering as in the incipient attitudes of reaction against and withdrawal from the suffering object. We feel ourselves shrinking from or tending to push away the evil, and these attitudes stimulate our kindly impulse to relieve the sufferer. This is all, however, on the impulsive level. A sense of obligation has not yet arisen, for obligation arises only in the conflict of values. Even the immediate identification of the self with the other does not in itself take us beyond the impulsive attitude of relieving suffering. When, however, these values in terms of sympathetic identification with the others in distress are presented, they have a peculiar immediacy and poignancy; while, on the other hand, their very immediacy and poignancy militate against their statement in terms of rational means. It is difficult to carry over the interest in helping the immediate sufferer into long-distant plans for removing the social causes of the suffering. A man who is ready enough to put his hand into his pocket to assist a starving man who is out of work will hardly identify this impulse with a political campaign for insurance against unemployment.

These two situations present the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of reflective judgment in a certain field of charity. At first the act is hardly above the impulsive level—an almost unreflective push to relieve distress, the strength of which is largely dependent on the degree to which one "puts himself in the other man's place," or the completeness of the sympathy aroused. This very attitude, however, of putting one's self in the other man's shoes brings with it not only the stimulus to assist him, but also a judgment upon that situation. Distress is conceivably remediable, or at the worst can be alleviated. The charitable response which we find in ourselves is one which can and should be called out in others, or more logically still the evil should so far as possible have been obviated. One cannot assume the rôle of the wretched without considering under what conditions the wretchedness can or may be avoided. As I have already indicated, the immediate effect of sympathetic identification with the other is to call out the other's response in attempting to ward off or alleviate suffering, and this calls out at once resentment or criticism against the individuals or institutions which may seem to be responsible for it. The step from this attitude to the idea of social conditions under which this evil would not exist is inevitable. Out of these ideas arise plans, possibly practical, for remedying at the source the misfortunes of those in distress.

This highly schematized path from impulsive charity to social reconstruction serves to indicate, on the one hand, a definite development which has taken place in many instances, and, on the other hand, that structural background of attitude and behavior which lies behind our humane impulses and out of which their ethics and philosophy arise. The very sympathetic identification with those we want to assist is in the logic of our nature the espousal of a cause. Universal religions have issued from their frustration—new Jerusalems where all tears are wiped away, Nirvanas where all wants have ceased. In any case it must be in our reactions against evils, and with its victims with whom we sympathize, that the ethics of charity must lie. The bare impulse to help is on the same level with that of the dogs that licked the sores on Lazarus' body. The identification of ourselves with Lazarus puts in motion those immediate defensive reactions which give rise not only to efforts of amelioration but also to judgments of value and plans for social reform.

It is a mistake, however, to assume that putting one's self in the place of the other is confined to the kindly or charitable attitude. Even in a hostile attack one feels in his own muscles the response of the other, but this only arouses still further one's own attack and directs the response to the attack of the opponent; and in the consciousness of one's rights one places himself in the attitude of others who acknowledge that right in so far as he recognizes this right as inhering in them.

These identifications with others lead to self-assertion and a sense of individuality, which eventuate in the maintenance of self-interest and, at a further remove, in a sense of justice. They do not involve that sympathetic identification with the other which belongs to the kindly impulses. In the latter, one expresses himself in assistance and protection. In so far as the impulse is dominant, the interest of the other has become his own, which he now champions. That one champions the interests of others, with which he has identified himself, implies a social order within which the removal of these evils would make the same claim upon all that they make upon the charitable individual. It is in the feel of this implication that there inheres the sense of obligation which we experience in the presence of distress and disability, though the social order in which we find ourselves may make no explicit claim upon us to alleviate it. The feel of this obligation may be very vague, a mere affirmation that such misery ought not to be. It may be formulated in the belief in another world, a world to come, or in another golden age that lies behind.

In taking the attitude of the other who appeals to our sympathy, the conduct called out tends to maintain the other rather than the self. There is, then, a fundamental difference in the organization of this behavior from that which characterizes behavior either in the attitude of hostility or in the co-operative acts in which the responses of others determine our own. In the latter the interest may be said to lie in the structure and maintenance of the self through his comprehending participation in the other or others. The sympathetic identification with the individual in distress, however, calls out in us the incipient reactions of warding off, of defense, which the distress arouses in the sufferer, and these reactions become dominant in the response of the one who assists. He places himself in the service of the other. We speak of this attitude as that of the unselfishness or self-effacement of the charitable individual. But even this attitude of devotion to the interest of the other is not that of obligation, though it is likely to be so considered in an ethical doctrine which makes morality synonymous with self-sacrifice. The earliest appearance of the feel of obligation is found in the appraisal of the relief to the distressed person in terms of the donor's effort and expenditure. The good of the man with whom we sympathetically identify ourselves is greater than that which would arise if we expended the effort and means on the ends of a self that refused to respond to his extremity. What I give up is slight in comparison with his need. This is but an early stage in the development of the moral judgment, and in the case of the generous individual may appear rather as a defense of an act under strong impulsion than as a motive so the act. But even in the immediacy of the situation that seemingly involves only the giver and the recipient, there it the implication of a community in which the good has a universal value—"which of them was neighbor to him that fell among thieves?" It is, however, an implication that can become explicit only when the social structure and the ideas behind it make it possible to regard the others as neighbors. The generalization of the prophetic message, its conception of the community as the children of Jehovah, made this possible. In the Greek city-state it was only in political and economic relations that the citizen could realize himself over against the others in the community. The generalization of these relations was indeed possible, but only in terms of a reason which could be the experience of a few, and a reason which defined and fixed existing relationships rather than obliterated them. With the decadence of the city-state and under the empire the philosopher, whether slave or emperor, could regard himself as a citizen of the world only so far as he had thought his way out of the structure of social relations, rather than by feeling his way into them.

The moralizing of the impulse to identify one's own interest with that of the other evidently depends upon making this attitude functional in the society in which the individual has reached his self-consciousness and whose structure is essential to the maintenance of his own self. Religion in its ecclesiastical organization may make a place for a particular group who have sold all that they had and have given it to the poor. Such ascetic groups are in a sense samples of the social order that should exist. On the other hand, their restriction to cloistered groups is a confession that the attitude cannot be made the principle of society in this world. And this fixation of the attitude leaves the charity of the layman outside of any program of social reconstruction. Its value is a personal one, an act of piety, an expression of otherworldliness, and the acquirement of merit; or it may be regarded as engendering and cultivating worthy traits of character, consideration for others, kindliness—in a word, humaneness. Over against a too legalistic or vengeful justice it appears as mercy. Then there remain the countless instances in which a sympathetic charity informed with wisdom may rescue others from social shipwreck, from suffering and distress, and help them to better social and physical conditions of life. It is in these instances that charity shines by its own light and becomes almost synonymous with goodness. Here are values which can be intelligently weighed against each other when they come into conflict, and within the social order as it exists reconstruction of the lives and fortunes of individuals can be accomplished. It is indeed in this remedial activity, this salvaging of otherwise unavoidable losses in the community as it is, this amelioration of the existence of the "poor whom ye have always with you," that we generally conceive of charity. It found its place in feudal conditions which have obtained socially long after feudalism was politically defunct. *Noblesse oblige* was a sense of some sort of responsibility for dependents. It was, in a way, institutionalized in chivalry. Because of the close genetic relation between the kindly impulses and the parental impulses it has always been peculiarly vivid in its response to the misfortunes of children.

And still the evils which charity has thus corrected or assuaged have been part of the order of society, and the obligation felt by the charitable did not arise from the duties which were inherent in that order. We return again to the implication of an order within this sense of obligation. The close relation which has existed between religion and charity, as we have seen, has given form to this implication; but human experience, especially in recent times, has abundantly proved that the implication lies in social attitudes, which religious doctrines have formulated but for which they are not responsible. If we undertake to give it its simplest and most immediate expression, it would take this form: that the need to which we respond is one which would be met if the intelligence which informs our social order and its institutions could reach the development which is implicit within them. That is, the moral appeal lying behind the obligation to charity is drawn not from the distress that is to be alleviated or the deficient goods which are to be supplied, but from the sort of conduct and experience and the sort of selves which society implies though it does not make them possible. For example, the moral appeal to charitable endowment of education lies not in the darkened minds of the uneducated but in the fact that there is a wealth of meaning in life and profound values which would interpret it to all members of the community if our social order gave to all the cultural background and the training which would bring out these hidden implications.

The compulsion of the appeal lies first in the location of these values in the relations of men to one another and to the nature that forms the environment of human society. Science, art, religion, and the techniques of living simply bring out, render serviceable and effective, these meanings and values. They are the realization of the wealth which belongs implicitly to all members of society. Cultured classes in some sense have an access to this wealth, which is denied to masses in the community whose social experiences and relationships, nevertheless, constitute this wealth. And, second, the means of furnishing this access to continuously wider groups is not found in simply enlarging the capacity and functions of institutions which already belong to social intercourse and control. The present order of society does not make enlargement of cultural means possible, and our immediate duties are formulated in terms of the order within which we live. Those who have advantages cannot share them with the rest of the community. This could only be possible in a community more highly organized, otherwise bred and trained. So far as this community is concerned, we can morally enjoy what from one standpoint is an exploitation of those whose submerged life has given us economic and spiritual wealth which our peculiar situations have enabled us to inherit. To sell all we have and give to the poor would not change this situation. But we feel the adventitious nature of our advantages, and still more do we feel that the intelligence which makes society possible carries within itself the demand for further development in order that the implications of life may be realized.

It is this feel for a social structure which is implicit in what is present that haunts the generous nature, and carries a sense of obligation which transcends any claim that his actual social order fastens upon him. It is an ideal world that lays the claim upon him, but it is an ideal world which grows out of this world and its undeniable implications.

It is possible to specify the claims of this ideal world in certain respects. A human being is a member of a community and is thereby an expression of its customs and the carrier of its values. These customs appear in the individual as habits, and the values appear as his goods, and these habits and goods come into conflict with each other. Out of the conflict arise in human social experience the meanings of things and the rational solution of the conflicts. The rational solution of the conflicts, however, calls for the reconstruction of both habits and values, and this involves transcending the order of the community. A hypothetically different order suggests itself and becomes the end in conduct. It is a social end and must appeal to others in the community. In logical terms there is established a universe of discourse which transcends the specific order within which the members of the community may, in a specific conflict, place themselves outside of the community order as it exists, and agree upon changed habits of action and a restatement of values. Rational procedure, therefore, sets up an order within which thought operates; that abstracts in varying degrees from the actual structure of society. It is a social order, for its function is a common action on the basis of commonly recognized conditions of conduct and common ends. Its claims are the claims of reason. It is a social order that includes any rational being who is or may be in any way implicated in the situation with which thought deals. It sets up an ideal world, not of substantive things but of proper method. Its claim is that all the conditions of conduct and all the values which are involved in the conflict must be taken into account in abstraction from the fixed forms of habits and goods which have clashed with each other. It is evident that a man cannot act as a rational member of society, except as he constitutes himself a member of this wider commonwealth of rational beings. But the ethical problem is always a specific one, and belongs only to those habits and values which have come into conflict with each other. About this problem lies the ordered community with its other standards and customs unimpaired, and the duties it prescribes unquestioned.

The claims of the ideal world are that the individual shall take into account all of the values which have been abstracted from their customary settings by the conflict and fashion his reconstruction in recognition of them all. Thus, the otherwise-unquestioned right of a man to expend his own wealth in his business, family, and personal interests comes into conflict with the needs of youths in impoverished classes for enlightened and adequate training. The claims of reason are that these values shall be regarded apart from their character as private property and the social restrictions which limit the development of children of poorer classes. Whatever he ultimately does, the charitable man feels it incumbent upon him to consider what could be accomplished with a portion of his wealth if it were devoted intelligently to increasing opportunities for education. So much money, in abstraction from the interests that seek it, would spell the enlightenment of many and a raised standard of public education. It is only by stepping into this field in which the possible accomplishments of this wealth can be impartially contemplated that the owner of the wealth feels himself able to decide to give or not to give.

It is clear, however, that reason would operate in a vacuum, unless these values of enlightenment—of science, aesthetic appreciation, and human associations—can take on forms which are freed from the social restrictions placed upon them by the groups which have possessed them. The phrase "republic of letters" has signified this freeing of culture from its class connotation. In a sense it constitutes an ideal world, which does not mean that these values exist in a world by themselves, but that the products of science, art, and human association can and should take on forms which would bring them within the province of any mind and nature able to respond to them. Now the claims of such ideal values lie not simply or primarily in the widening of the community that enjoys them, but in the superiority and efficiency of the science, art, and human relations which are so freed. It is not until science has become a discipline to which the research ability of any mind from any class in society can be attracted that it can become rigorously scientific, and it is not until its results can be so formulated that they must appeal to any enlightened mind that they can have universal value. Artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation must attain forms which have the same universality of objectivity; human relations should become such that their full social import interprets them. Reason is then a medium within which values may be brought into comparisons with each other, in abstraction from the situations within which they have come into conflict with each other; and within this impartial medium it becomes possible to reconstruct values and our conduct growing out of them.

Furthermore, certain of these values, such as those of science and art, have been given a form in which they become accessible to all minds with adequate training and social background. That is, they have been given a form which abstracts them from the restrictions which economic, feudal, and cultural class distinctions lay upon great numbers in the community. This sets up what may be called the "democratic ideal" of removing such restrictions. Now it is within this field that charity is so largely active, not in setting in motion great schemes of social reconstruction, but in bringing about or helping to bring about in specific cases just such a removal of restrictions; and, I take it, the obligation which the charitable individual feels is the demand that these restrictions should be removed. It is not a demand which society as it is now organized can enforce against him. It is a part of the growing consciousness that society is responsible for the ordering of its own processes and structure so that what are common goods in their very nature should be accessible to common enjoyment. We vaguely call it "progress." The charitable man sees and feels in an immediate situation the opportunity of an advance in this direction, and the opportunity may become a duty which he lays upon himself.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF PHILANTHROPY

ERNST FREUND

I. PRIVATE PROVISION

The objectives of the exercise of the right of ownership, with which the law most commonly comes in contact, are use and profit; the disposition of property by way of liberality constitutes a third objective which assumes major legal importance only under special circumstances. The line between use and liberality is not always sharply drawn: spending on wife and children is perhaps biologically one of the earliest and most significant forms of altruism, but is not now so regarded; neither is spending for hospitality, although bounty to dependents also in other periods of cultural development was a factor in the economy of support not controlled by ordinary business considerations. At the present time expenditure on literature and art may minister to the gratification of personal taste and at the same time constitute patronage which is vital to cultural progress: a wealthy man who collects valuable pictures is under present-day conditions of family impermanence and inheritance taxation almost certain to lay the foundation of what in time to come will become a public possession. But in all these cases we do not speak of liberality; in law there is simply a self-regarding expenditure. And so as to rewards for personal services taking the form of gratuities; here, indeed, we have the legal form though not the economic substance of a gift, and we have not yet crossed the border line into the province of liberality.

The law regards an expenditure by way of liberality as a transaction *sui generis*, but does not necessarily discriminate between purposes of the transaction according to the social motivation. As a matter of private law a gift of a thousand dollars is the same, whether it is a wedding gift, or a campaign contribution, or a donation to a person in distress. In all these cases alike the mere promise of a gift is in our law not binding, since it lacks consideration, and under foreign codes is binding only if a special form (such as a notarial act) is observed. In America there is a tendency to hold promises to be binding if they take the form of subscriptions by a number of persons, but that is not the rule either in England or under Continental codes. It is generally understood that a person who holds property as trustee for others may not dispose of such property by way of gift. The German code makes an exception in favor of gifts dictated by social convention, and there is perhaps a similar extra-legal practice in this country, especially so far as corporations are concerned. Contributions to charities would ordinarily fall under this head.

So long as the purpose of the gift is lawful, the law does not take cognizance of degrees of worthiness, and it does not make any difference whether the recipient is rich or poor, or whether the impulse is social in the conventional or in the altruistic sense. While there may be a public policy in encouraging altruistic gifts, the criteria of distinction are too elusive to be legally practicable. The federal income-tax law seeks to favor public-spirited gifts, but the exemption it creates is only in favor of contributions or gifts to government organizations for exclusively public purposes, or to corporations or trusts organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes; and exemptions from inheritance taxation are in general similarly limited. It is evidently felt that to draw the line more widely so as to include private charity would have presented insuperable difficulties of administration.

Liberality assumes a new aspect when the gift becomes in form or substance one *mortis causa;* partly because generosity is now at the expense of the claims of blood; partly, and mainly, because the contemplation of death naturally evokes the idea of permanent provision or perpetuity.

The law concerning perpetuities constitutes an interesting chapter in every system of jurisprudence including our own. In our law technical rules appear as the result of conflicting tendencies. The natural desire for anticipatory control to be used for the protection of future generations from the vicissitudes of fortune is met by the policy that the freedom of each generation is a vital interest of the community.

The so-called rule against perpetuities is a compromise evolved by the courts, which permits a tying-up of property for a limited period only. That period was intended to cover the life of a generation and the age of minority; in form, it is expressed to cover lives in being at the taking effect of the gift plus twenty-one years thereafter. Given a still more technical operation, it prohibits gifts that may possibly vest at a time later than the expiration of the period indicated. It is contended by eminent jurists that the rule, properly understood, applies to charitable as well as to other gifts, forbidding them if the vesting is possibly deferred beyond the permissible period, and having nothing to do with those that vest within the period, leaving the latter to such rules of law as may apply to them otherwise; that, in other words, the rule against perpetuities and the law of charities are distinct parts of the law. If this very technical view is accepted, it raises of course the question what other rules of law apply to charities, which take the form of perpetual endowments.

The law of endowments is not, like the rule against perpetuities, a compromise, but a composite of conflicting policies. There is on the one side the law of charitable trusts, on the other side the law of mortmain; the former a strong though somewhat devious current of doctrine, the latter a medley of heterogeneous and halting statutory provisions.

The law of mortmain is statutory in origin and represents four different types of restrictions: a limited capacity of corporations to take and hold land; corporate incapacity to take by devise; a prohibition or restriction of charitable deathbed gifts (i.e., gifts made within a stated brief period before death); and the inability of a testator who leaves surviving spouse, parent, or child to give to charity more than a certain portion of his estate. The first two restrictions apply only to land, the last two to any kind of property. They are so framed as to be subject to exceptions or to dispensation, uncertain in their operation, or capable of evasion; some of them appear only in a few jurisdictions; and the only one having strong vitality is the one directed against the accumulation of extensive landholdings in the hands of eleemosynary corporations—a danger which is no longer acute in most modern countries.

The law of charitable trusts is associated with an act of 1601, the Statute of Charitable Uses,[1] which recites about twenty different objects of charity (including poor-relief, education, repair of churches, and municipal works or improvements) and provides for their protection. On its face the statute appears, not as an innovation, but as confirmatory of existing law, although English courts have held that it controls the concept of charity. In America, with the exception of a few states, the underlying law is either recognized as in force irrespective of the statute, or, as in Illinois, the statute is held to have been adopted as part of the law of England in force at the time of the settlement of the American colonies.

The special favor shown to a charitable trust is threefold: The law recognizes as valid a perpetuity, it does so irrespective of lack of incorporation, and judicial aid is granted to effectuate an intent imperfectly expressed as to objects or means.

To enjoy this favor the trust must be non-individualized, i.e., the benefit must be such as not to amount to a vested right in either an individual or a closed group. Thus a gift to a society is not charitable, if upon its dissolution its property will be divided among its members, although the immediate purpose of the gift is one that might otherwise have been the object of charity.

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[1] 43 Eliz., c. 4.

And even apart from this test, the circle of possible beneficiaries must not be so circumscribed that the trust appears as one of private rather than of public benefit; and the German institution of a perpetual (or perhaps even non-perpetual) endowment for the support or education of members of a family (*Familienstiftung*) is unknown to English or American law.

There has been considerable discussion as to whether the character of "charitable" can be attributed to bequests for masses (invalid in England), or for the care of a burial lot (invalid in Illinois), or for the benefit of animals (valid in England, if there is some relation to the elevation of humanity, such as is implied in the prevention of cruelty). Perhaps the American is more liberal than the English law.

In England the reading of masses formerly also fell under the ban of superstitious uses, a concept contrary to the American principle of freedom of religion, and now discarded also in England. And while at present there is in England no longer any difference between the Christian faith and others, still it has been said that the object must not be subversive of all religion.[1] Perhaps even this position has been overcome, although it may be a legitimate question whether if the law specially favors religious societies or trusts, the cultivation of agnosticism can come under that test.

Since a charity must be lawful, it may be asked whether all tenets and doctrines have an equal status, or whether there are not some that are still proscribed as contrary to public policy. The decision of the Supreme Court that unwillingness to bear arms shows lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution may be contrasted with the enthusiastic commendation by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts of Mr. Ginn's World Peace Foundation, one of the purposes of which is "to educate the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of all war and of preparation for war."[1] In 1852, when a trust was sought to be established in England for the teaching of socialist doctrines, the Court of Chancery directed a reference to a master for an inquiry into the nature of these doctrines;[2] a chancellor selected by a socialist prime minister would not be likely to question their legality. But communism has a semi-outlaw status in some of our states, so far as it believes in forcible revolution; and Congress excludes anarchist aliens. Does this express a public policy against anarchy, and would such a policy declared by Congress make law for the states? Could polygamy be advocated, if not practiced? Is it unlawful to teach the desirability of free divorce? And what of propaganda for birth control? The bearing of public policy upon educational endowments offers quite a field for speculation, which it is not necessary to pursue. All that needs to be noted is past development in the direction of liberality and tolerance.

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[1] See Tudor on *Charities*, p. 54.

In England a peculiar view has been taken as to the possible scope of a charitable trust. Ignoring the specification of municipal purposes (repair of highways, etc.) in the statute of Elizabeth, it seems to be held that the benefit of analogous extension of the enumerated items can be given only to objects which can be brought under one of the three heads of relief, education, and religion. A trust for education for peace would be saved by the reference to education, but unless peace can be said to be a part of religion, it might be contended that it is not a valid object if disconnected from education. A gift for the advancement of learning has been upheld because learning may be interpreted as the counter part of teaching,[1] so that a gift for pure research might be invalid. Gifts to promote undertakings of general utility[2] for purposes charitable or philanthropic,[3] for patriotic purposes or objects,[4] for charitable and public purposes,[5] have thus been held to be unenforceable. All these were cases in which the objects were stated in general terms without further specification; but there is enough in the cases to leave a doubt whether closer specification of the object would save the trust, and very little, if anything, to remove the doubt. Where specific objects have been sustained, the court has taken pains to establish some relation to relief, education, or religion: a village club and reading-room for the furtherance of conservative principles and religious and mental improvement;[6] a home of rest for lady teachers;[7] to the National Rifle Association for teaching shooting at movable objects.[8] When a Vice-Chancellor sustained a gift to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being, to be by him appropriated to the benefit and advantage of "my beloved country, Great Britain," he added, "the case is certainly open to doubt."[9] And a gift to be expended upon a building that was to stand and be perpetual in memory of Shakespeare was held to be a perpetuity, and, not being a charity, void.[10]

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[1] 228 Mass. 196.

[2] *Russell* v. *Jackson*, 10 Hare 204.

If it is difficult to obtain an entirely clear and harmonious view of the English concept of charity, a simple statement that would apply alike to all the American states is quite impossible. We have to lay on one side the half-dozen jurisdictions which repudiated the entire doctrine of charitable trusts, either on the erroneous assumption that it was based on the statute of Elizabeth, which they regarded as not adopted, or as inconsistent with the local legislation concerning trusts. Conspicuous for a long time among these jurisdictions was New York, which, however, in 1893, by the so-called Tilden Act, restored the validity of charitable trusts in favor of indefinite beneficiaries. When charitable trusts are recognized, the English doctrine that objects merely socially beneficial without any relation to relief, education, or religion are not within the law seems to be recognized in New Jersey, if the ruling that a mere reference to "social welfare" is too indefinite can be understood in that way;[1] but while there is much difference of opinion as to the degree of definiteness required, the trend of judicial doctrine is liberal, and, in particular, there are no decisions that throw any doubt on gifts for sufficiently specific objects, merely because they cannot be associated with relief, religion, or education. It may be confidently asserted that no American court would think it necessary to justify the admission of a gift for the promotion of learning on the ground that learning must be understood as a by-product of education.

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[1] *Whicker* v. *Hume*, 7 H.L.C. 124 (1358): "No portion of this trust can be devoted by the trustees for the purpose of rewarding learned men unconnected with education."

[2] *Kendall* v. *Granger*, 5 Beav. 300.

[3] *Re MacDuff* (1896), 2 Ch. 451.

[4] *Re Tetley*, 92 L.J.Ch. 123.

[5] *Houston* v. *Burns* (1918), A.C. 337.

[6] *Re Scowcroft* (1898), 2 Ch. 638.

[7] *Re Estlin*, 89 L.T. 89.

[8] *Re Stephens* (1892), 8 T.L.R., 792.

[9] *Nightingale* v. *Goulburn*, 5 Hare 484.

[10] *Thomson* v. *Shakespeare*, 1 De G. F. and J. 399, by Lord Campbell.

It is quite conformable to the general character of English and American law that in recognizing the perpetual charitable trust there should not have been any extended speculation as to the location of the equitable right to the charity fund. Continental jurists generally agree that the endowment or foundation (*Stiftung*) should be looked upon as a juristic person, with a resulting controversy as to the necessity of sovereign creation or recognition for each distinct foundation, as for any other corporation. In our law the recognition and enforcement of a charitable trust by a court of equity does not depend upon its being vested with corporate capacity or personality by a charter or equivalent act of sovereign authority.

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[1] *Livesey* v. *Jones*, 55 N.J.Eq. 204.

In England it appears still to be the common thing for charitable foundations and societies to be unincorporated. Since 1867 the Companies Acts, under which joint-stock companies are organized for business purposes, have also afforded the widest facilities for the incorporation of associations for non-pecuniary ends, i.e., "for promoting commerce, art, science, religion, charity, or any other useful object"; but it does not appear to be an ordinary practice to organize under this provision. The Charity Commissioners are given power by an act of 1872 to incorporate for religious, educational, literary, scientific, and public charitable purposes; but we are told that the powers under the act are in practice never used.[1] There is the further possibility of incorporation by royal charter or by private act of Parliament, and there are great historical foundations thus specially created; but at the present time a recourse to either must in the nature of things be even less common than incorporation under the Companies Acts.

The failure to incorporate is all the more remarkable in view of the doubtful status of endowments under the restricted concept of charity in the law of charitable trusts to which attention has been called; but the difficulty seems to be confined to contested wills; and voluntary societies and institutions operate under deeds of trust or statutory schemes without apparent inconvenience. Leaving aside the doubtful question whether in England incorporation under the Companies Act gives an advantage over a charitable trust in possibly permitting a wider scope of objects (it has been said that the main advantage is the capacity to take land without the interposition of trustees), the choice between corporate and trust form in organizing charities appears to be determined by custom rather than by abstract considerations. In the absence of incorporation, the vesting of rights in trustees, and the assumption of obligations by them, not only entails personal inconvenience and financial risk, but may present difficulties and complications in maintaining succession; the English Charity Commission Reports comment upon the former great expense of procuring the appointment of new trustees as the cause of the lapse of many trusts, before legislation afforded better facilities. However, if trusts fell into decay and obsolescence, there were also rotten corporations, and corporate charities received Parliamentary attention even earlier than charitable trusts.

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[1] Tudor, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

In America the corporate form—either so that a foundation is separately incorporated or so that a gift is made to an already existing corporation—is preferred and in many states adopted almost as a matter of course. The possibility of incorporation depends upon the statutes of the particular state in which the charity proposes to operate, and upon constitutional provisions relating to corporate charters; it is only in very exceptional cases that a national organization through special act of Congress is obtained; the Red Cross is an instance in point. State statutes often exist for the incorporation of definite classes of organizations, as e.g., religious societies; on the other hand there are statutes covering by the same corporate form a wide range of non-pecuniary or non-profit purposes without further specification, and the statutes must then be examined with a view to determining whether the general form is available for the class covered by a separate law or not. It is not always possible to discover a reason for the separate statute for a separate class; experience seems to show that very simple and general forms may be made available alike for purely social, for interest group, and for philanthropic organizations; in Illinois a club, a trade-union, a chamber of commerce, a hospital, and a relief society may incorporate under the same law, while separate statutes exist for the organization of religious societies and of universities. As a general proposition it is probably true that in most states a corporate form is available for practically every kind of philanthropic object.

The medieval university was either a community (*universitas*) of teachers or of students, while today the technical university corporation may consist only of the governing body; the corporate organization for a philanthropic object may constitute as members of the corporation either all those associated in the common object (except as recipients of relief without having made contributions), or those in whom the resources serving the object are to be vested, with possible corresponding differences in ultimate control and voting powers. The former organization may be more appropriate when the corporate fund is largely or mainly made up of periodical contributions; the latter, when it mainly rests upon the foundation of an endowment, supplemented by occasional capital gifts. The corporate form is equally adapted to capital expenditure, application of income, and the appropriation in specie of lands, buildings, or other equipment; to perpetual and to terminable schemes; and to holding for general corporate purposes or for designated uses falling within these purposes—modalities which may be controlled by charter and by-laws, or by terms of gifts. There may be a question whether statutory managing powers may be permanently delegated or surrendered by the governing body to another body in conformity with the terms of a specific trust; but that point does not appear to have become one of legal controversy.[1] It may be a declared object of an organization to supervise, assist, or co-ordinate other organizations. Whether the object must be single in the sense that it falls under one recognized head of philanthropy (an almost impossible criterion), or whether it may combine a variety of diverse objects, or whether it may comprehend an unspecified universality of objects, locally circumscribed or nation- or world-wide, may be a question of statutory interpretation;

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[1] See *State* v. *St. Louis*, 216 Mo. 47.

the statutory term "particular" in requiring a statement of object or business may present some doubt in this respect. Deliberate universality of description in a charter differs somewhat from a testamentary purpose which is left in indefinite form and thus possibly indicates lack of clear intent. Corporate management also perhaps offers a better guidance than a trustee's discretion possibly dependent upon the direction of a court of equity. The difficulty of defining what is a single object is also an argument against a restrictive construction. It has been found possible to incorporate under the laws of Illinois a foundation the charter purpose of which is simply described as "the well-being of mankind" (Julius Rosenwald Foundation). On the other hand, a special charter was sought and obtained in New York for the Rockefeller Foundation with the similar purpose of "promoting the well-being of mankind throughout the world." This method of settling the doubt would have been impossible in Illinois and in many other states, where the constitutions forbid the granting of special corporate charters.

A combination of trust and corporate form is found in the arrangement under which a trust company, vested by law with the requisite capacity, receives funds in trust for civic, charitable, or educational purposes, the purpose being either specified in detail or expressed in general terms, with varying latitude of application or disposition, according as the testator or donor gives instructions or leaves room for a wide managing or disposing discretion. If there is a further arrangement for supervision of the trust by representative citizens, we get the form of the community trust or chest, which is to be found in a number of American cities.

Altogether, incorporation under the law generally prevailing in this country is in the nature of a facility rather than of a check. Statutory requirements are generally few and simple. Occasionally there are prescribed formalities for the alienation or mortgaging of land. If there are general restrictions upon the investment of trust funds, they may be found inapplicable to corporations, or subject to be relieved from by charter or by-laws. The ways and means by which the philanthropic object is to be carried into effect, and limitations in that respect, are probably never made the subject of statutory provision, and, in particular, there is no prohibition against discrimination in selecting beneficiaries. Corporations may be generally organized for perpetual duration, thus eliminating questions as to reversion at the end of the corporate life. Liberality is the keynote of the entire law.

It is interesting to compare the development of the law of business corporations and of eleemosynary corporations. In the former there has been liberalization as to purposes, but an increase of checks in other directions. The latter tendency is not as yet discoverable in the case of eleemosynary corporations. The extent to which statutory provisions are available as checks will be discussed in connection with the subject of public control; and it will then appear that the possibilities in that direction have hardly been adumbrated or considered.

2. PUBLIC PROVISION

The same year that saw the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses also gave final form to the poor-law of Elizabeth, the first provision anywhere for public relief on a national scale and by national authority. Temporal power was called into play by the suppression of monasteries, among other causes. In the Middle Ages the organization of religion had also served to relieve destitution and to care for education. In addition, it had offered aid to the sick, had represented what there was of learning outside of law and medicine, and had given opportunity for the development of architecture and other arts. If in later times, as has been shown, the English Court of Chancery identified charity with religion, relief, and education, this is clearly reminiscent of the principal church activities, although the hesitant attitude toward learning detached from education becomes doubly inexplicable. While poor-relief in England become secularized, education continued to belong to the church,[1] and to the present day the voluntary schools on a denominational basis form an important part of the publicly regulated school system of England. Superior education was, and is, left to the care of great corporations like the universities, resting upon royal charter but private endowment, with a peculiar status of mingled private and public character. The old municipal corporations came to treat the "unappropriated surplus" of the corporate emoluments as funds for the benefit of the inhabitants, and the reform legislation of 1835 made of this application a legal trust;[2] this accounts for a number of benevolent institutions associated with cities and boroughs. Of municipal origin in the wider sense are the Commons, which were saved for public recreational use by the efforts of the Commons Preservation Society.[3] In London a number of the public parks grew out of royal gardens. This calls attention to the part played in England, as in other monarchical countries, by the munificence and liberality of princes, who gave license for the public enjoyment of amenities that had been originally provided for the use of the court, thus laying the foundation, not only of parks, but of museums, libraries, and theaters. By relatively recent legislation Parliament has enabled local authorities to use the taxing power for the provision of recreational facilities.

Poor-relief gradually changed its character by being associated with sanitation,[4] and entirely new forms were provided, when legislation was enacted for workmen's accident compensation, for old-age pensions, and for health and unemployment insurance. These laws must be regarded as great organic measures like the older poor-laws, though not entirely displacing them, while the other forms of public provision of a benevolent or humanitarian character remain in England quite unsystematized.

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[1] *Lives of Lord Chancellors*, IX, 3: "In 1807 Lord Eldon opposed Lord Holland's [same as Whitbread's] bill for the establishment of parochial schools on the ground that it departed from the great principle of education in this country, by taking the business of instruction, in a great degree, out of the superintendence and control of the clergy."

[2] Webb, *Manor and Borough*, pp. 734-37.

[3] Eversley, *Commons, Forests, and Footpaths* (1910).

[4] Webb, *The State and the Doctor*, chap. i.

Public provision in America presents certain uniform features. The first to be noted is the non-participation of public authorities in religious movements or establishments, owing to constitutional prohibition—an abstention which prevents neither the recognition of a church marriage as satisfying legally prescribed form, nor the legal observance of Sunday as a holiday, nor the acceptance of parochial-school instruction as fulfilment of educational requirements. The second is the now universal provision of free education, a vast financial burden assumed without question in every state. The third is the adoption, from the very beginning of state governments, of systems of poor-relief based largely on English models. Uniform also is the local distribution of functions: poor-relief belongs to one of the two local government units, the county or the township; and these usually divide with other special districts the burden of education; there are, of course, many minor diversities. Cities are also quite commonly school authorities, and very generally maintain public libraries. While cities are not generally recognized for poor-law purposes, they are occasionally authorized to establish hospitals, or other specified kinds of charitable institutions; they are active in works of sanitation, and relieve distress in many ways outside of the general system of poor-relief. The history of the city of Chicago shows a number of instances of city activities of a benevolent character. State governments maintain institutions for the insane, the blind, the deaf and dumb, and perhaps other specially handicapped persons, and generally also assume charge of the higher grades of the educational system; indeed, until recently, the management of institutions formed the principal part of direct administrative work carried on by the state governments. The national government, in addition to the relief of war veterans, and to carrying on many kinds of scientific work, from an early period adopted the policy of aiding local education by land grants, although a proposal to extend similar aid for the care of the insane was rejected. Again, more recently, there have been national grants in aid of maternity and infancy hygiene work on the part of the states.[1] But, in view of the limitations of the federal Constitution, there is nothing comparable to the national welfare legislation of Great Britain.

When we compare public with private provision for humanitarian objects, we should notice in favor of the former the wider sphere of opportunity presented by the possession of power and the inescapability of obligation. Private charity cannot summon compulsion to its aid (such very exceptional cases as the New York societies for the prevention of cruelty to children and to animals may be ignored); the state can promote child welfare by restraining the father and by giving the mother equal or superior rights; it can advance the cause of education by making school attendance compulsory; and it may supplement poor-laws by vagrancy acts. Enforced sanitation is of more importance than hospital facilities. The exclusively public function of punishment opens a field of humanitarian endeavor in which private action can have only a minor and subsidiary share; the names given to institutions for juvenile delinquents (reformatory, industrial or training school) indicate the profession of such a purpose, and probation work must be regarded as falling on the welfare side of public action.

As regards inescapability of obligation, we observe that the state first provided hospital treatment for forms of diseases which private institutions refused to care for,[1] and, in particular, has been left to occupy fields which for some reason or other had been neglected by private charity and endowment, so notably the institutional care of the insane.

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[1] Act of Nov. 23, 1921.

Notice should also be taken of one possible implication of public provision, the thought, namely, that since it is based on law, it must also tend to be more rigid and less adaptable than private philanthropy. If this is true, it would be an offset to countervailing advantages. However, to identify provision controlled by law with provision unduly standardized is to ignore the possibilities inherent in administrative discretion, and in the various combinations of central control and local or institutional self-government. It is not the practice of legislation providing services of a humanitarian character to prescribe standards or methods in any detail. If institutional management is likely to fall into routine, this is due to institutional and not to legal psychology. It would be difficult to discover differences between state and privately endowed universities in this respect, or to ascribe them to the governmental connections of the former. In the endeavor for the betterment of social work public and private agencies are co-operating without distinction of mere affiliation. Any generalizations upon this aspect of public provision would be hazardous.

More important perhaps is another tendency which is becoming more and more characteristic of public humanitarian provision, and which has accompanied the progressive democratization of government. It is true that in England the reformed Parliament inaugurated a poor-law policy the guiding principle of which was to be that relief should constitute social ostracism; but the development has been away from that idea. It is interesting to note that it was the provision for medical relief which broke down that draconic policy; we are told that the first act for vaccination provided that the service was not to be deemed parochial relief,[1] and that in Ireland the universal dispensary system was made freely available to wage-earners without the stigma of pauperism.[2] A number of most significant transformations of legislative policy have taken place within the last fifty years. In this country we may think first of all of workmen's compensation: an industrial accident occurring without the employer's fault, which formerly resulted in destitution relievable by public or private charity, now gives rise to a legally favored claim. It is possible to treat occupational disease in a similar way, and beginnings have been made in that direction. In either case the burden of relief is placed upon the employer on principles of liability, by simply altering the incidents of a contractual relation. The new status of the workman remains substantially the same though his benefits are payable from an insurance fund to which the state contributes, while, if he himself has been a contributor, the nature of his claim as a legal right is strengthened.

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[1] Webb, *The State and the Doctor*, p. 151: "It was because the voluntary hospitals refused to provide for zymotic diseases or for any epidemic, that the municipal hospital arose. It was because they would not deal with cases of chronic disablement that the poor law had to develop its hospital branch. 'No general hospital,' stated a local government inspector, 'will admit a man suffering from delirium tremens, hence the Poor Law Infirmaries are charged with such cases.' "

The principle of contribution on the part of the beneficiary has been a marked feature of the social-insurance legislation of Germany, which in course of time has come to cover sickness, old age, and unemployment. In England and America there is no contribution by the beneficiary in the case of accident compensation, unless the scale of benefits as compared with his wages may be looked upon in that light; but England exacts contributions from employees and employers to make up health and unemployment insurance funds, and in charging part of the cost upon the employers, marks the legislative sense of the responsibility of industry for economic vicissitudes and the uneven distribution of its emoluments. The cost of old-age pensions in England was, however, originally borne entirely by the state; we have here, in other words, a form of relief closely akin to the old poor-law relief, and distinguished from it mainly by giving to relief the character of that "universal and honorable provision" so long proclaimed by reformers as the goal of social legislation.

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[1] 3 and 4 Vict., c. 29; 4 and 5 Vict., c. 32.

[2] Webb, *The State and the Doctor*, pp. 4, 7.

In America, where, generally speaking, we have as yet neither old-age pensions nor health or unemployment insurance, the idea of the "honorable provision" is most strikingly illustrated in mothers' pensions, which indeed almost approach the character of "grants in aid," whereas the term "pension" suggests deferred payment in consideration of past services, conspicuously exemplified in service pensions to war veterans. It is the association with this idea which makes the old-age pension, and the name given to it, significant.

We must ask ourselves whether there is not something in the very nature of public provision that leads away from charity in its humiliating aspects. Public service is normally gratuitous. Municipally furnished public utilities may be paid for in those cases in which similar service may also be appropriately provided by private capital; thus it is customary to charge for water service, but not for sewage disposal. The latter is at the charge of the taxpayers, and if it is urged that indirectly everyone shares in the burden of taxation, it is also true that the indirect burden is commonly not realized. To the mass of the people the ordinary facilities that a city furnishes (paved and lighted streets, police, sanitary and fire protection, parks and libraries) are things that are enjoyed free of charge. We accept free education in all grades as a matter of course; whereas in Germany the practice is (or was) to charge tuition in all but the elementary schools. It seems a just generalization to say that whereas disposition by way of liberality is the exception in the use of private wealth, it is the normal thing in the expenditure of public funds, and the public is not moved by the impulse of liberality, but by the thought of public welfare and of social standards.

When provision is private and voluntary, we can lump together as charitable, benevolent, or philanthropic the relief of the poor and of the sick, the support of religion, the advancement of education, of science and art, and every other cultural object; and we should include under the same head the gift of a park to city, state, or nation. It is not customary to give for mere utilitarian municipal purposes, but it is significant that the statute of Elizabeth instanced also repairs of bridges, havens, causeways, seabanks, and highways among the objects of charity. If all this is philanthropy if privately provided, why not if provided at public expense? It is true that we think of poor-relief and even hospital care as being in one category, and of streets and parks and schools as being in another; but we do not give ourselves an account upon what basis we make the difference. The difference is assumed by the immigration law when it excludes persons who are likely to become public charges, but it is not elaborated; and it might create some difficulty to distinguish between the inmate of a tuberculosis hospital and the patron of a free clinic or dispensary, between the child in a truant school and the child in the ordinary school.

From the point of view of the study of philanthropy, the significance of the difficulty of differentiation lies in the explanation it gives of the shift in attitude toward public relief in the narrower sense. Is it not natural to ask: Why is an old-age pension not of the same character as free education of a child? Not that numberless differences cannot be pointed out, but that such a question would not have arisen when free education was not thought of. And while different objects of public provision may present different legislative and administrative problems, yet the new orientation will also produce a unity of spirit and principle, the implications of which it is impossible to foresee. Without venturing to judge of wisdom or expediency, notice must be taken of tendencies, the logic of which may ultimately merge philanthropy in public welfare.

There has always been a feeling that certain socially vital functions should not be a source of profit. This is true of religion. The Church of Rome accumulated great wealth, but owing to the institution of celibacy it was always possible to attribute to incidental individual emoluments an official rather than a personal character. Today it is almost regarded as a matter of reproach if education for law or medicine is conducted on a profit-making plan. The correlative of such an attitude is the conviction that these functions, if they are not to be monopolized by the state, must be supported by philanthropic endowment. The assumption that preparation for the professions must not be expected to be paid for in full by the students must be based upon the public-service character of the profession with attendant obligations. And we note here again the difference between public and private provision, that the state can give effect to the obligation by appropriate legislation, while private provision can attach no permanently operative conditions to the bestowal of its benefits. It is the difference between possession and non-possession of compulsory power, which has been referred to before.

3. MINGLING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PROVISION

It is an effect of the considerable extent to which philanthropy has been merged in public service that there is no longer the close connection between municipal governments and funds for charity that characterized the old English municipal corporation. It is not an American custom for testators or donors to make cities or other governmental divisions the recipients or instrumentalities of their benefactions, unless the subject of a gift is a park, a monument, or other similar memorial. There have, however, been a number of notable exceptions to this rule. Not to mention the Smithsonian bequest to the United States which was made by an Englishman, bequests to the cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and Cincinnati, have been the subjects of litigation that ultimately reached the Supreme Court of the United States.[1] In these cases the gifts were made, not for general or particular municipal purposes, but for objects which were merely "germane" to such purposes, and the gifts were sustained upon the theory that the capacity of a city to accept trust funds by way of gift is not necessarily measured by its power to raise funds by taxation. Probably the criterion of germaneness is that the purpose must at least be one for which the exercise of the taxing power might possibly be authorized by the legislature, though as a matter of fact the authority has not been given. On this principle a trust for religious objects would be excluded, and there may be other uses with regard to which municipal administration would be plainly incongruous. There is some case material bearing upon this problem of germaneness, but perhaps not enough to define the limits of the doctrine with accuracy.

If not inconsistent with charter limitations, directions may be given by the donor how the trust fund shall be administered.[2] A special situation will nearly always be created, inasmuch as the normal benevolent activities of the city are conducted on the basis of periodical tax levies, and not on the basis of permanent capital endowments. As to the management of these, the law is therefore likely to be silent, and undesirable temptations may be thrown into the hands of the municipal authorities, particularly in the way of borrowing from such funds or investing them in municipal bonds or warrants.

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[1] *Girard* v. *Philadelphia*, 7 Wall. 1; *McDonough* v. *Murdoch*, 15 How. 367; *Perin* v. *Carey*, 24 How. 465.

[2] *McDonogh* v. *Murdoch*, *supra; State* v. *St. Louis*, 216 Mo. 47.

Interesting questions may also arise, if charges not provided for by the donor are to be met in connection with the gift (as in the case of the Carnegie libraries), or how the gift is affected by the enlargement or division of the city; but the discussion of these questions properly belongs to the law of municipal corporations, and not to the law of charities. Generally speaking, the validity of a trust is not affected by difficulties which may be remedied by legislative interposition.

Attention should be called to a delicate problem, although it has not given rise to actual questions or difficulties, namely, to what extent the exercise of the police power in the narrower sense of the term may be aided by private donation. The problem is of interest, because as soon as the line of pure benevolence is overstepped, private subsidy may mean undesirable private influence. The private payment of police detailed to guard private property assumes a special aspect if that private property is an industrial plant involved in a strike. If official organs of enforcement or of prosecution are paid from private sources, at least the suspicion of unfairness has some color of support. The arrangement under which formerly in Chicago probation officers were paid from private sources appeared unobjectionable, because their function was looked upon as pure welfare work. Plainly, however, considerable embarrassment might arise from the extension of a similar practice into controversial fields.

The counterpart to the private gift to the municipality is the municipal subsidy to a private organization. The customary tax exemptions in favor of charities are a disguised form of subsidy sanctioned by constitutional authority and legislative practice. A cash subsidy is a more obvious mingling of public and private funds, and has to meet the prima facie objection that taxpayers' moneys should be expended only under public responsibility. Still, considerations of expediency have often recommended the utilization of private agencies as the most effective and economical method of discharging a duty of public relief. The history of some charitable organizations in the city of Chicago shows that their original characters provided for appropriations by the city (see the charter of 1857 of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society); but this practice was put an end to by the constitution of 1870 and its judicial interpretation.

The provisions of state constitutions bearing upon this subject vary greatly in detail. The prohibition of public aid may be confined to sectarian institutions or only to sectarian education, or it may extend to all private associations. On the other hand, the practice of subsidies may, with appropriate qualification, be expressly recognized. There was a great deal of discussion on the subject in recent constitutional conventions in New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, without, however, resulting in any constitutional change in the latter states. New York now forbids any public support of denominational schools (Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 4), but permits municipal provision for the support and secular education of inmates of orphan asylums or juvenile reformatory institutions, whether under public or private control, and also payments to charitable, eleemosynary, correctional, and reform institutions wholly or partly under private control, provided that the reception and retention of inmates conforms to rules established by the state (Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 18). In Illinois the constitutional prohibition has been held not to prevent payments by the county to a sectarian institution, to which juveniles are committed by the state, so long as the payment made is not more than the resulting cost to the institution;[1] to this extent, then, the absolute veto upon the mingling of public and private funds appears to be abandoned, and the uncompromising attitude of the earlier law relaxed.[2] So far as non-sectarian institutions are concerned, a reading of the constitutional prohibition in

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[1] *St. Hedwig's School* v. *Cook County*, 289 Ill. 432.

[2] *Washingtonian Home* v. *Chicago*, 157 Ill. 414.

Illinois creates the impression that it was directed against aid to private corporations of a profit-making, and not of an eleemosynary, character.

That subsidies to commercial enterprises and subsidies to benevolent undertakings stand on a different footing appears from the constitutional attitude toward tax exemption. It also deserves consideration that in the case of denominational institutions the subsidy, through the imposition of conditions, may afford facilities for checks upon them that it might be otherwise difficult to apply. There remains, however, the objection to subsidizing private charities that even with such checks enforcement of equal standards is difficult, and that without such equality there can be no reliable criteria of impartial distribution of public funds among private organizations.

It remains to note a special form of combination between public and private provision: the license given to a private institution to establish itself upon public grounds. The Art Institute of Chicago and the Field Museum of Natural History are thus associated with the South Park Commissioners, and a similar arrangement is contemplated for the Rosenwald Industrial Museum. Ignoring the tax levy in favor of the Art Institute, and assuming that the title to the building vests in the public corporation, it remains true that upon an analysis of the legal relation there is a practically irrevocable license to occupy public property, given to a privately controlled enterprise. In Missouri such an arrangement has been declared to be inconsistent with a constitutional provision similar to that in Illinois.[1] But it does not require a more liberal interpretation of the constitution than was applied in the case of the St. Hedwig's Home to find the arrangement unobjectionable. If only land is furnished, the objection of expenditure of public funds under other than public authority disappears; and from every substantial point of view the accessibility of valuable and instructive collections to the general public materially aids the purposes for which parks are established. It is simply a matter of appropriate legal formulation, to establish such a relation between public authority and private management, that there does not appear to be an undue delegation or contractual surrender of that measure of public control which the public authorities are bound to retain.

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[1] *State* v. *St. Louis*, 216 Mo. 47, 1909.

4. PUBLIC CONTROL

Public control of charities rests in part upon doctrines that we have inherited from England: the jurisdiction of courts of equity over trusts, the liability of corporations to be proceeded against by the state for misuse or non-use of powers, and, peculiar to charities, what is known as the "cy pres doctrine."[1] These controls operate through judicial proceedings, which means that they do not operate unless the court is set in motion by some party in interest; and in the case of eleemosynary activities such a party is not likely to be forthcoming.

English legislation provided for supplementing the action of the Court of Chancery, first by the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601), then by the establishment of Charity Commissioners (1853). The act of 1601 operated through commissions created from case to case; it is said that there were about a thousand of these before 1700, but that by 1760 the institution had fallen into disuse. The Charity Commissioners are a permanent office, called into being by the act of 1853, vested with examining, and some approving, powers, and also with power to invoke the aid of the courts. There is nothing corresponding to that office in the United States.

The cy pres doctrine, as the name indicates, gives power to a court of equity to vary trust provisions. It is, but very conservatively, exercised when the donor's or founder's precise directions cannot be effectuated, but an overriding general charitable intention is discoverable, and when the particular object of the trust eventually fails through change in circumstances. It is said that the English courts held the doctrine not available to authorize repairs of buildings when the founder had not given power to use funds for that purpose, although dilapidation made the building unsuitable for its intended purpose. The Charity Commissioners are given wider powers of alteration, but in specified cases only subject to confirmation by Parliament. In connection with the exercise of the cy pres doctrine, and aside from it whenever a charitable trust devolves upon the English Court of Chancery, the Court requires the making of a scheme for the administration of the charity.

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[1] The older doctrine of a prerogative power in England of a wider scope is here ignored; see Zollman, *American Law on Charities*, pp. 119–22.

The cy pres doctrine is also law in America, and has found statutory recognition in New York, where application may be made to the court if literal compliance with the founder's directions has become impracticable or impossible.[1] American cy pres cases are given by Zollman in his *American Law of Charities;*[2] perhaps the most conspicuous instance is found in the case of the Mormon church.[3] But so long as the doctrine operates mainly when a trust cannot be given effect in accordance with its terms, it is obviously an instrument of control of very limited operation.

The sovereign license or recognition which is involved in the grant of corporate capacity is capable of being made a vehicle of public control. In England a royal charter, which is occasionally sought for foundations, particularly of an educational character, is granted only after the strictest scrutiny, so that further control is dispensed with. When it is proposed to incorporate under the general Companies' Act, the Board of Trade, as a condition of granting the requisite license to omit the word "limited," requires the insertion in the memorandum of association of provisions intended to insure that property is held subject to the jurisdiction of the

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[1] *Laws* 1901, c. 291.

[2] chap. iii.

[3] 136 U.S. 1.

Charity Commissioners, that the property and its income are solely used toward the promotion of the charitable objects (subject to specified items of remuneration), that in case of winding up any residue will be applied according to cy pres principles, and that accounts are kept and annually audited by qualified accountants. These provisions are apparently occasioned by the fact that the incorporation takes place under an act which also allows incorporation for the pecuniary benefit of the organizers and their associates, and nearly all of them would be implied in a law permitting specifically incorporation for eleemosynary purposes, and their non-observance would debar the corporation in any event from tax-exemption privileges. License and registration having once been obtained upon compliance with the prescribed conditions, the Board of Trade exercises no further supervision.[1]

American statutes authorizing incorporation for eleemosynary purposes do not explicitly require provisions such as those exacted by the Board of Trade in England. The certificate or charter issued by the appropriate official, usually the secretary of state, is a ministerial act; the written approval by a justice of the Supreme Court required in New York for all membership corporations is a purely perfunctory matter; and the approval by the State Board of Charities of the organization of a hospital corporation in the same state a very exceptional provision. While charity boards or commissions exist in a number of states, they usually have nothing to do with private charities either by way of preliminary approval or by way of continuing supervision, except perhaps when an institution receives public subsidies or has persons committed to its charge by public authority.[2] In New York institutions of higher learning, calling themselves colleges or universities, or granting degrees, require authority from the State Board of Regents; but this is likewise exceptional, and in most states privately organized educational institutions are not subject to state supervision.

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[1] *Report of Home Department Committee on Supervision of Charities* (1927).

[2] Constitution of New York, VIII, 18.

Without venturing on generalizations for all the states, it is safe to say that state control of an administrative character over private philanthropy is in America as yet in the initial stages of development.

Whether there is need or demand for such a control is a question hardly within the province of a legal discussion; in England there appears to be a movement for requiring registration of specified charities.[1] In America, the establishment of a comprehensive control encounters the difficulty that so much of charitable and educational work is carried on under religious auspices. To what extent church charities and sectarian education are amenable to the police power of the state is an open question to which it has been hitherto unnecessary to give close attention. If it be conceded that the law may forbid mendicancy, or may require English to be taught in every parochial school, that does not carry us very far. As soon as we ask whether a religious society might be required to have its accounts audited by a certified public accountant, we find ourselves on controversial ground, whereas there can be no doubt that such a requirement in case of a non-religious private charity would be undisputed.

Leaving the religious aspect of the matter aside, the extent of constitutional powers and therefore of potential legislation offers a challenging problem in other respects. There is a reorientation as to the entire nature of charitable relief, and a growing sense of the danger of indiscriminate or misdirected bounty: Has the legislature the power to enforce a public policy in this respect? The Oregon School case has established a federal guaranty that private education cannot be suppressed: "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."[1] But there was no pretense that methods of private instruction were prevalent that were contrary to any defined public policy. That private philanthropy is safe under the federal Constitution does not mean that all its objects and methods are equally protected.

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[1] See the *Home Department Report* above cited.

When, in 1910, a bill for the incorporation of the Rockefeller Foundation was pending in Congress (it was subsequently abandoned), amendments were introduced looking to the prevention of an undue accumulation of capital, and authorizing, after the expiration of fifty years, the expenditure of the principal as well as the income; also giving Congress the power to impose limitations upon the objects of the corporation in the public interest.[2] Later on the Foundation was incorporated in New York by special act,[3] and while the legislature expressly reserved the power to limit the value and amount of the endowment, the other reservations were omitted. Suppose, then, that a limitation of objects should at some future time be deemed desirable, could it be imposed by law against the will of the trustees of the Foundation? More than a hundred years ago the Supreme Court, in the Dartmouth College case, held a corporate charter to be a contract, the obligation of which, under the federal Constitution, could not be impaired by state legislation. Thereupon many states reserved the power to alter, as part of the charter contract, either in the constitution or in general incorporation laws. New York has a constitutional provision to that effect. Even in the absence of such a reservation the original doctrine of the unimpairability of contracts has been greatly qualified by the recognition of the claims of public policy, in subordination to which every contract is deemed to be made. It might easily be shown that the act of New Hampshire reorganizing Dartmouth College did not profess to be dictated by overriding considerations of public welfare. In the absence of a reservation of legislative power, the Dartmouth College doctrine has perhaps sufficient strength left to repel any legislative action in the nature of a spoliation, but not sufficient strength to count for much in the face of legislation the policy of which commends itself to the courts. Notice may however be taken of the innovation in the constitution of foundations whereby provision is made for the expenditure of principal as well as of income; the possession of this power will always be an effective safeguard against an exercise of public power that may appear unacceptable.

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[1] *Pierce* v. *Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510.

[2] See *Survey*, Dec. 24, 1910.

[3] *Laws* (1913), c. 488.

The exercise of legislative power has been discussed upon the assumption that it is to be imposed upon the charity against the will of its trustees; what, then, if the trustees favor the alteration or the extinction of the original trust? The problem of deviation may present itself in two different aspects: on the one hand, there may be need for protection from unwarranted perversion; on the other hand, there may be need for protection from unforeseen mischief arising from the execution of the trust. The founder of the charity is likely to give little thought to the latter aspect. A change in this respect is noticeable; but the more liberal the founder is in bestowing discretion, the more insistent he may be supposed to be upon the observance of the limits of discretion.

Generally speaking, the founder will be concerned only with the protection of his scheme; but how can he protect it against the action of future trustees? Eliminating from the problem the contingency of faithlessness or neglect, what of doubts and difficulties and new situations? Suppose the founder directs the expenditure of the capital within a given time, and controversies arise as to the meaning of this (absolute transfer of a sum to another corporation which may use it as an endowment fund, use for perpetual purposes, such as land or collections), or grave objections emerge to disposal at a given time, what legal means exist to effectuate the founder's intent?

On general principles of law, the state may intervene through the attorney-general for the protection of a charitable trust. But unless the public interest is so great as to present a quasi-political issue, he will naturally be unwilling to engage in expensive litigation, and, generally speaking, he will do no more than lend the name of his office to one who will assume the financial burden of the necessary proceedings. A judicial proceeding against recalcitrant trustees thus presupposes a countervailing financial interest. Such an interest may exist if upon breach of the trust the property reverts to the heir of the donor; but the courts will, if possible, avoid the implication of a condition with resulting forfeiture. The founder may create a condition subsequent in express terms, but this would mean termination instead of enforcement of the trust, and termination in favor of scattered heirs-at-law, whom the founder is not likely to desire to benefit. Conceivably the founder might name a trust company as "protector of the settlement," providing a gift over to it as trustee, if his original trust is not observed. Assuming this to be consistent with the rule against perpetuities, it would be an altogether inappropriate method for determining controversial construction, and a clumsy method even in case of plain deviation. In the nature of things, an effective protection of the trust against the trustees, under the circumstances indicated, is impracticable under established principles of law.

Effective protection might be possible through the creation of an administrative body analogous to the English Charity Commissioners. Experience has shown how much superior administrative commissions are to the attorney-general in availability for the protection of interests that are not backed by financial resources or inducements. It is quite possible that their powers may be made broad enough that they may serve as protectors of foundations. But it is inconceivable that their function should be solely protective in this sense; they would inevitably exercise a discretion, and intervene only if intervention would be for the public interest. If so, it would simply mean that the founder cannot have effective protection without submitting to legitimate public control.

CHARITABLE ENDEAVOR FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

JESSICA B. PEIXOTTO

Most people with any surplus of time or money busy themselves doing something about social dependency and destitution. The man of action, moved by sympathy or calculated policy, is often as much interested in the problems of poverty as the student of social welfare who is anxious to help the world get beyond a poverty basis. Custom now dictates that, in all classes, those who would lay claim to citizen leadership must show some concern about the problems of social well-being. During the past fifty years a class of professional workers, doing a kind of work now commonly called "social work," has grown up to give impetus and leadership.

Everyone who turns to such "social work" finds alternative ways by which to lend a hand in the control of poverty. Traditions of usage, as well as accepted methods of inquiry, show three possible methods by which to deal with poverty and its problems—methods by no means mutually exclusive, though special bias sometimes makes them appear so. Oldest among these ways to help is charitable work—relief of those who cannot help themselves, treatment of the disease when it is acute, with scientific record of the causes as limits of such work. Philanthropic enterprise, effort to obviate the need for giving relief, comes next in historic sequence. This kind of endeavor expresses itself in gifts to particular classes of preventive agencies, in stimulating and gathering social energies to make good laws and to see each law effectively administered, or in investigating the environmental and personal causes that bring the individual to the charity office. Lastly, there is a program to work out certain modifications in the economic organization of society. The goal of this last program is to eliminate wastes in production and to create a surplus such that everyone may have purchasing power enough to get the full benefits of mass production.

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From the economic point of view, the last of these programs comes first. Charity and philanthropy make a prior claim upon the imagination because both methods of meeting the problems of poverty have been a part of social usage for a longer time. But, during the past hundred years, a call that gains definiteness with each decade has been made upon business leadership to consider business a first and most important method of solving poverty problems.

It has become quite usual to say, either in admiration or with moral indignation, that discerning leaders of business can work in many ways during business hours to abolish poverty, not as philanthropists, but as business managers. For a century or more, the critics of modern industrial life have declared that awkwardness, ignorance, and chicanery in the production processes keep the costs of production so high that prices are high; that business is guilty of unnecessary carelessness and thoughtlessness about human life, allowing dangerous work to kill or use up men whom foresight might protect, working laborers too long or irregularly and paying them low and uncertain wages. The philanthropist, the economist, the radical, and the business man together have gradually concentrated attention upon the close connection between business insensibility and blundering, and the problems of economic insufficiency.

A strong faith in the social benefits that may be expected from socially minded business leaders using a wisely directed business policy is not surprising in this industrial age. It is merely to emphasize a familiar truism to point out how economic life has in our time become the leading factor in molding human relations and public action. The greater part of the ardor and imagination of our age concentrates upon the processes of industry and the economic organization; the direction of research and even of imaginative literature and the arts is immensely colored by this social institution. This truth needs emphasis here because the idealogy of our American life accepts with great reluctance the plain fact that the pattern of economic life, and thus the pattern of the major aspects of social life, is in large part molded by the program of business leaders. We know, but do not always like to admit it, that the business man is a central figure about whom turns all the routine that is economic life. The processes of invention, of savings, of manipulation, of management, and of organization are all in his hands. Business determines the problems of the money market, the policies and conduct of technical operations, the problems of the distribution of tasks, the "rationing of work"; fixes the conditions under which men work, the regularity of their employment, their status in relation to production. Above all, business policies and capacities set finally the rate of the wage which provides the means for living and determines the way the masses live. The concerted policy of business men finally decides the conditions of work and pay that surround a working population, and even the particular pattern of consumption by which the worker satisfies his wants.

For most of us this tendency to fix final responsibility for all types of charitable enterprise upon the business world complicates thinking about the social responsibility for the care of the poor. For a long time social habits of mind put the burden of alleviating the sufferings of the poor upon the pious, whether layman or churchman. Then, for centuries the church took the lead; private individuals still help the church to carry on its own work of charitable endeavor. As the state became a well-defined social institution with infallibility and fundamental responsibility definitely ascribed to it, this autocratic, territorial authority took over the primary control of philanthropic policies and charitable action. The democratic state of our time still does a share of the work of relief. We still pay taxes to the poor-law authorities who, most often alone but sometimes in collaboration with private charity and church work, give help to specified indigent classes traditionally recognized as unquestionably social dependents.

But today the state does not do the major part of charitable work. Neither does the church. Though both spend large sums to meet problems of social dependency, charity has now come to be regarded as, and in practical affairs actually is, primarily a citizen responsibility. The duties of giving money and service fall in this, a democratic age, primarily upon individuals as members of a community. All the charitable endeavor of our day represents, first of all, an answer to an appeal for a show of community spirit through action to remedy destitution. Large as is the total given by the state for the aid of public dependents, private giving is unquestionably larger.[1] The belief that help to the needy accomplishes more when privately done is a legacy from the story of the abuses, some real, some exaggerated, that makes the history of poor-law administration, and from the doctrine of laissez faire. During the past century, voluntaryism in charity has been pronounced safer than public relief—kindlier, more pliable to innovation, more likely to be modifiable to the real needs of each case, more likely to accomplish the ends in view. During the same century which brought leadership in democracies to the business world, leadership in charitable endeavor has also tended to pass from church and state, to rest, in the main, on the shoulders of all citizens, but in particular on the shoulders of those citizens who are leaders in business.

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[1] The author has consented to a footnote raising doubt as to the accuracy of this statement. The question of fact clearly depends upon how much of the expenditure is to be counted as "given to public dependents."—The Editors.

Alfred Marshall once declared his very definite belief that "the question whether poverty is necessary gives its highest interest to economics." This belief, which inferred also that poverty is not a necessary evil but that its main causes were perhaps economic, led to his being regarded in certain quarters as one infected by sentimentality. But, today, orthodox economists tend to write in the same vein. However they may differ on questions of ownership and authority, socialists, laborites, labor economists, and orthodox economists come together in this faith that, when rightly directed, business welfare is the foundation of social welfare and business direction likely to be the most effective. Economists have always hoped for a gradual disappearance of the state of poverty as a general prosperity develops by giving full reign to managerial ability. With regard to goal, the real differences between economists and socialists are concerned with questions of how soon and of the seat of authority and ownership. Logically, all classes of thinkers with programs for industrial organization have the same economic goal—a world of self-supporting, self-directing, satisfied consumers, enjoying a material prosperity made possible by the good management of the directors of business, who employ these consumers in ways that yield steady jobs and uninterrupted purchasing power. Economists and Marxists may not specifically so state their objective. Holding to a creed of scientific method, both reject the idea of prophecy. But, for any student of the subject, the inference is unavoidable that most of those who think in terms of social betterment today forecast in a longer or shorter run, if all goes well with mind and machinery, a world "stocked with every variety of convenience that modern science can devise, cushioned round with insurances against all the ills that flesh is heir to, in which distance has been annihilated, disease prevented or amply provided for, destitution probed to its root causes, regular employment guaranteed to all, and a minimum standard of comfort assured to all except to the undeserving." Such a world is the goal and the test of business success.

John Hobson, repeating the point of view of Adam Smith, calls industry "a great co-operative process for the mutual aid of the members of society." In his recent discerning study of the *Social Control of Business*, J. M. Clark says business is

> harnessed self-interest, and the key to the clash of opinion about it . . . . lies in the fact that one side is looking at the self-interest and the other at the harness. It is the inherent nature of self-interest to break the harness if it can, and it is the inherent nature of the harness to make the efforts of self-interest drag the burdens of production willingly or not.

The worst of the blundering and insensibility to the needs of labor is eradicated. Business is voluntarily harnessing itself through trade agreements. Less voluntarily but with increasing comprehension through legislation and pacts with labor unions, managerial ability dedicates itself to "service," sometimes in advertisement that is mere lip service; but oftener now, in reality, men who direct business try to find a human engineering of business that will add to the contentment of the race. When men like Lord Leverhulme in England and Henry Ford in this country say explicitly "that the dark shadow of the Malthusian philosophy has passed away," and that it is perfectly possible for business men, by taking thought, to improve the hours and the working conditions that surround the laborer, to add to economic security by a sound plan for employment, and to give the worker a fairer share in the dividend by increasing wages, evidently "new business" sees something to do and is ready to set its hand to the doing of it.

This is not the place to discuss those more indirect but terribly real causes of poverty such as business cycles, the uncertainties of marketing problems and of speculation. Knotty, socio-economic considerations affecting adversely the whole body of wage-earners, these questions are directly related to wider problems of regularizing businesses and working out fundamental changes in economic institutions. Thus, though such questions are a part of the problem, they are outside the limits of this discussion.

A word at least on the vital need for regularizing employment cannot be omitted in a discussion of the economic aspects of charitable endeavor. All students of the nature of poverty know the close connection between labor demand and the call for charity funds. Unemployment, seasonal, casual, intermittent, is the one most terrible tragedy of modern industrial life; next to sickness it is the most frequent cause of the need for relief. Specialists are now saying unemployment is intrinsically the result of bad traditions among employers, that it is caused first of all by the failure of business and the state to take concerted action.

Every business man who wants to help can well give some of his surplus to specialists to make analyses of the causes of unemployment and organize a program for prevention. Specialists rightly disparage the ultimate serviceability of the relief work that tries to meet unemployment. Except as it supplies work for the handicapped, for those who are unemployable, special relief work is generally ineffective, if for no other reason than because it comes after the fact. Just now the most popular expedients turn about some plan for shifting public work so that it will dovetail with the ebb and flow of private employers' demand for labor. The expedient has in the past generally done very little good; it is also expensive. But it might accomplish something if planned on a national scale. Employment exchanges help. However, John Commons, wisest of the American students of the subject, believes that "the business man is the only person who is in the strategic position and has the managerial ability to prevent unemployment." Business men must accept this challenge; in reality they are accepting it.

The best business organizers now recognize the loss that "labor turnover" represents, and see the economy of maintaining a strong nucleus of regular workers. Sales departments and bankers are using new methods of business forecasting and publicity calculated to prevent business instability. Dr. Blum's position on unemployment in his *Labor Economics* serves as a sound text for the thoughtful. Unemployment, he says,

> is integrally bound up with our economic system. There is no problem of unemployment any more than there is a problem of banking or a problem of foreign trade. . . . . The realization of this has shifted the emphasis of discussion from a direct consideration of the peculiarities of the labor market and an attempt to smooth out friction in it to an estimation of the forces which are at work creating the fluctuations in business prosperity.

In a word, he who wants to help to prevent unemployment must turn to the specialist in business cycles.

The economic consideration perhaps most closely connected with the problems of charitable endeavor is the doctrine of the living wage, a problem of the economics of distribution, both primary distribution and that secondary distribution through independent families and charitable agencies which we call "spending income."

Are current slogans about a "living wage," a "family wage," or a "family allowance" economically sound? What is a "living wage"? Is it practicable for industry to pay it? If so, how? Can it be paid all workers? Can there be a national minimum? If not, how can we experiment—minimum-wage legislation for workers needing special protection? family endowment? family allowance?

In the first place, what is meant by a living wage? a minimum wage? Does a living wage mean a family living wage or an individual's cost of living? Is the wage to provide simply for the reproduction of the working class at a "lowest" level to be fixed by dietitians and "thrift" budgets; or is it to provide for a "necessary and proper living" that includes the expenses of a margin by which the worker can add to his own capacity and competence as well as that of his children through expenditures for savings, education, recreation, and vacation? In current phrasing, is the wage to be a living wage, a saving wage, or a culture wage?

Many economists define a living wage in general terms such as "a fund for replacing the wear and tear of labor." Rountree defines a "minimum wage," or a "reasonable wage," as "sufficient to allow him [the worker] to marry, to live in a decent house, and to maintain a household of normal size (generally taken as consisting of five persons) in physical efficiency with a moderate margin for contingencies and recreation." Dalton's definition is perhaps the most clear. A living wage, he says, is a "wage which will enable the worker to live and bring up a family at the lowest standard of comfort which modern opinion regards as reasonable or tolerable for human beings." The term a "living wage," a "family wage," or a "family allowance" must, of course, be given time and place elements before it is possible to debate whether a given wage is a living wage. It is probably best to define a living wage as that sum which, at a given time, in a given place, is considered by fair-minded persons on both sides of the bargain as the minimum necessary to supply the needs which custom accepts as minimum requirements of a family or an individual.

Arguments to show the undesirability of a general minimum wage in industry have to do with the unfairness of the proposal or with its inexpediency. The typical employer believes in all sincerity that he pays his worker what he is worth. Usually urging some form of the productivity theory of wages—"to each according to his productive value"—the employer argues that he pays what his laborers produce, must so pay, and cannot pay any more. The laws of supply and demand are also invoked. Employers hold that to set up a minimum wage is to throw the expenses of apprenticeship and of stupidity upon business. Certain classes of irresponsible workers who should never expect good wages would get them.

The contention that forcing wages higher will necessarily act to raise prices is still heard, though not so often since the Hoover report on the wastes in industry showed that this pretension overlooks other causes of high price such as wastes of management. All managers may not have ability, and poor management is a long-understood cause of high price. Also, some of the rewards of managers may come from luck, not management, and thus be fairly considered subject to sharing with workers.

What are the arguments for a minimum wage? Should it be paid to obviate the necessity of supplementing a lesser wage by charity, or is there a good business basis for a fixed lower level apart from the humane plea? Can it be argued that a universal minimum wage helps business since it will give a better class of workers with a higher per capita purchasing power, workers who are able to save and to buy in larger quantities and thus become active agents in business expansion?

As matter of fact, most of the arguments for the minimum wage claim the living wage would bring advantages for the employing class as well as for the worker. The case for better wages is won at least in so far as it is now universally admitted that the "iron law" of wages is not only untrue but poor economy as well. The contention that increased wages do not necessarily raise costs, but tend to lower them, gains new proponents with every year, proponents who claim that dear labor is often cheap labor because well-paid workers who live well are healthier, more energetic, more teachable, more productive, and that such competent employees represent real "economies of production." Able and successful employers such as Henry Ford, Lord Leverhulme, and B. S. Rountree, for instance, insist not only that raising the minimum tends to raise all rates, but that the higher wage-rate carries industry into more efficient channels. To the statement that the rate of wages that can be paid is limited by the specific productivity of labor, it is replied that the specific productivity of labor is raised by the better food, clothing, shelter, and outlook on life that a better wage permits. Philanthropists and economists also contend that one of the most real advantages of a high minimum wage is that the common rule of a standard minimum wage forces out the unimaginative, hard-bargain employer, who cannot afford to pay a living wage because he can neither reduce his wastes of management, increase his sales, nor command high-grade labor. The logical sequence of the realization of the living-wage slogan would in this view ring down the curtain on industrial parasitism. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the best-known English proponents of the living-wage program the Independent Labour party adopted in 1926, feel certain that a high wage stimulates the selection of the best-equipped workers, that a higher wage draws the line more sharply between the unemployable and the employable, and a better class of service unavoidably appears at the bottom. Those marginal men, whether the employer or the employee, whom economists have learned to point to as hindrance rather than advantage in business enterprise, will be squeezed out of industry to the social advantage, and the "margin" will have in it less of awkwardness and less of misery. For a time, charity and philanthropy may have to deal with the handicapped, the incompetent, whom no one will want to employ. Isolation of the unemployables from the employables for social care will probably have the same result that has followed the segregation of mental deviates. Philanthropy and the state will hear and answer the call that unemployables represent, the call to send the next generation of workers to industry better fitted for the many special tasks of modern industry, and better able to spend wages that will enable them to live without the need of charity. Bringing the handicapped and the incapables into a "needy" group drives communities to see much more clearly the necessity for further efforts to extend juvenile education, to give vocational education and vocational guidance.

One of the most persuasive arguments for the living wage comes from those urging the "dilemma of thrift" and pointing to steady employment at good wages as the only "road to plenty." According to this doctrine, mass production needs many buyers. Increasing the share of the laborer promises both savings and increased purchasing among the working classes. Since the business world now turns more and more frequently to the small investor, offering him opportunity to invest his savings, better pay to labor promises profit to banks, investment offices, and corporations.

Finally, lowered costs for charity and philanthropy are also expected. True, new ways of helping may be discovered so that money may be called for to be used in new directions; but the costs of helping the destitute, the most distressing form of help, would obviously be reduced.

Since the National War Labor Board recognized during the war "the right of all workers, including common laborers, to a living wage," in the United States the right, at least, is not debated. When skilled labor takes its disputes to arbitration boards, the question has become, What is enough for a decent living, and can industry pay it?

For over ten years specialists have been particularly busy, by methods of estimate and studies of household expenditures, answering this question of what is a minimum cost of living. A habit of talking about different levels of living has developed. At present, four standards or levels of living are usually indicated. The pauper or charity level is the level assigned to charity offices and, with the principle of deterrent charity in mind, assumed to be strictly the "subsistence" level comparable with but slightly less than the next level, the minimum of subsistence level. At this latter level families are considered to be living in what Rountree has taught us to call "secondary poverty." The total earnings of families at this minimum-of-subsistence level would be just sufficient to maintain merely physical efficiency, provided some portion of that earning is not absorbed by unexpected expenditures, useful or wasteful. The third level is the subsistence-plus level, sometimes also called the minimum of health and decency. At this level the family is assumed to be able to house itself decently in four or five rooms, to purchase food sufficient to meet the biological needs of the family, to buy cheap clothing, and to have, in addition, a modest surplus for recreation and household operation. There are other levels: the minimum-of-health-and-comfort level, the health-and-comfort level, and a level sometimes facetiously called the "keeping-up-with-Lizzy" standard, where competitive expenditure with the highest income groups begins.

Much water will run under the bridge before any final decision is reached about which level or "standard" represents a "fair" wage. The vital fact to be registered here is that the working-class minimum standard has risen not only because of the general rise of all standards of living, but within itself. Both the technique and the mental attitude of investigators have changed greatly during the thirteen years that specialists have been investigating the details of the items of a family budget and formulating estimates of the quantities of goods and services "needed" with their costs. At first the results published gave the percentages of the costs of a misery standard, of "the costs of living without." Since the war, and particularly since the studies in San Francisco and Seattle in 1917, the minimum of health and decency or the subsistence-plus standard is the "minimum" standard usually agreed upon. Since 1917, the investigations for each year, as compared with later years, have this in common: The total amount considered necessary for a man, wife, and three children, the "standard" family of five, has regularly increased; and this higher total, as compared with the totals named before 1917, results from regular additions made to the number of items estimated as the "necessary" goods and services of a decency standard and the increased quantities allowed for many of the items, even more than from a higher price level.

Most thinking men and women of our time recognize the validity of the principle of a living wage in a prosperity era, but believe that any attempt to pay all adults this living wage at once would inevitably put a "crushing burden on industry." An effective group also declare that the idea of the universal living wage is a most "appealing battle cry" for the politician, but an unworkable proposition for the administrator. Professor J. M. Clark points the other horn of the dilemma. Clark agrees that "the social income is not sufficient to provide the higher minima for the poorest groups of workers and also meet all the other unavoidable demands upon the funds," and then goes on to emphasize the further difficulty that "it is coming to be recognized that the minimum is an elastic thing and students of this question tend to distinguish three levels, the minimum of physical existence, the minimum of decency, and the minimum of comfort." In face of what they consider an *impasse*, certain English and American specialists, of whom the leaders are Miss Rathbone and Miss Stocks in England and Professor Paul Douglas in this country, offer alternative proposals to meet immediately the problem of insufficient income for wage-earners' families, especially when the family is more than usually large. Persons of this way of thinking say, in the words of the British Royal Commission on the Coal Industry, "A minimum wage based in any way upon a reasoned estimate of requirements for any given standard of comfort involves and should be accompanied by a system of family allowances."

What are these schemes for family allowance, and what their merits?

This idea of a "family wage" gained impetus during the war. The separation allowance paid by most countries to its soldiers gave the idea what popularity it now has. In France and Belgium, employers voluntarily pay their workers family allowances. An equalization fund is established to which all the business men in a given industry contribute. This is the form of the experiment most often advocated, the form which appeals to conservative minds because it allows those administering the funds the widest opportunity for adaptation to circumstances. Australia has afoot very interesting state machinery to test the social utility and expedience of such plans.

Professor Paul Douglas, whose very readable book, *Wages and the Family*, brings together most of the available information on family wages, describes in detail the way this allowance system works out in France, Belgium, and other countries. Dr. Douglas recognizes that, given the present temper of our courts—perhaps he should also add the temper of the trade-union movement—"the adoption of such a system in the United States must come, in the main, either through action of employers alone or through joint action on the part of the unions and the employers." Dr. Douglas therefore proposes that some experiments with the equalization-fund plan be made in this country to meet the dilemma of the low-skilled worker at least, that worker who most often must appeal to charity for help. The unit basis for action ought, he thinks, to be regional or local in the main, "with a regional fund with a common rate of assessment for all industries." The funds, Dr. Douglas thinks, would be best administered by employers and bona fide labor organizations which represented the majority of the workers. When unions oppose the allowance system, control will go to employers.

The same sense of the insufficiency of the current minimum wage and of the difficulties of paying a general living wage leads Sir William Beveridge, of the London School of Economics, a specialist in unemployment problems, to advocate a contributory insurance scheme as the means to secure a living wage graduated according to size of family. Sir William Beveridge's plan follows the usual methods of social insurance, and contemplates spreading the costs between the state, the employers, and the workers.

The British Labour party proposes a family allowance, a family endowment, that is, a money allowance for each child according to some scheme for prorating the costs per child, the money to be paid to the child's parents, preferably the mother, from birth until the period of leaving school. The Independent Labour party project would have the costs paid by the state out of a special tax levied on the rich. This proposal resembles the systems in Australia and New South Wales that have developed the family-endowment committees and the Basic Wage Commission.

Family endowment has a certain present illustration in the widows' pension schemes in the United States. In California, where it is called "State Aid to Children," the money paid is allotted on a budget plan based on a theory of the cost of living at the minimum level of health and decency. Out-relief granted to families of men unemployed or disabled, and the awards by some Industrial Accident and Workmen's Compensation Commissions, are also on this general plan.

Of these plans, taxation of the rich, contributory insurance and voluntary funds established by employers, the voluntary fund is the most widely used. Report varies concerning the success of its working in France. We are told it is accomplishing its end, better food for children and larger families for the nation.

Opponents tell us that the pool system is destroying the idea of a standard rate of wage. Opposition also urges the risk to the prudential check on the size of families, and the probability that the increased costs of the labor force would creep into prices, thus leaving the worker's situation as bad as ever. Others, notably skilled labor in the United States, claim the skilled workers struggling to get and to maintain a high "standard" wage are likely to be penalized by any experiments in family allowances.

The whole subject calls for earnest consideration. The reader must come to his own decision. Are we prepared to accept the implication that persistent underpay is a necessary feature of our economic system? Can industry never make reasonable provision of work and pay for the workers? We have seen that the whole implication of economic theory is that sound economic organization might in time bring general well-being.

The open-minded business man will help himself in making his decision by asking himself this concrete question: What standard of living do I believe to be necessary, not for any "level" of living based on humanitarian ideas, but just to make the alert, healthy, competent personnel desirable for successful industry? The standard specified, how determine then what rate of wage is needed to buy, in the community in which this employer lives, the goods and services enumerated as "minimum." Should that sum be paid? By whom? Industry? state? charity?

It is a step forward in the general thinking of the community when it is conceded that the problem of relieving the individual or the family group in trouble ought to be approached, not by contemplating the state of workers living without, but by trying to state in exact terms the goods and services "necessary" for those living with just enough and then devising ways by which industry or the community can pay that minimum. We get light to go forward by looking backward. During the past century the improvements in technology have given so startling a history of a better distribution of work and wealth that it does not seem mere idealism to believe that the future may contain possibilities certainly not here today. As an objective there is much to be said for careful consideration of all the proposals for a national minimum wage with or without family allowance.

As another example of the need for a get-together policy in business, take the problem of the aged worker, which asks for special attention. Is this a case for preventive philanthropy, for business, or for public and private charity?

A century of mechanical production has brought us this question. The problem is quite new. It is just about one hundred years since men heard with shocked alarm that the factory work of the world was typically done by young children, and that many factory workers died at about twenty-one years of age. With the expenditure of much sympathy, time, influence, and money, regulations have gradually been enacted calculated to lengthen the life of the worker, until today we face an opposite problem. In the United States, at least, the typical worker has been so well protected that, given the opportunity, he can and will work until and often beyond fifty. Yet, as things now are, reaching the age of forty or fifty often comes as a disaster. Given current ideas of efficiency and the frequent changes in process, workers become superannuated, from the point of view of the employer, at an age which does not always correspond to any theory of physical superannuation, certainly not to the average individual's own idea of the period of life at which he is ready to retire from work. If any mischance—a merger, a long illness, or any other reason beyond their control—makes them lose their job, men past forty-five or fifty find that such happenings leave them not only without work but in an industrial society wherein it grows more and more difficult to find a new position. In fact, workers past fifty face the fact that their lot is probably precarious employment or none. In the United States alone, the number who find themselves facing adversity in this form is said today to be a million or more.

Possibly sympathy exaggerates the count. But whether millions or thousands, discerning employers and specialists have noted this difficulty of the middle-aged frequently enough to know that experiments to meet the embarrassment should be set afoot and something finally found to prevent a situation that will otherwise prove a distressing cause of poverty.

The dilemma of industry is real. Business men have reasonable grounds for hesitation about using older men. Modern business requires supple minds and active bodies. Business men can show convincingly that older persons often cannot meet the needs of high-powered industry. Older men do not like new processes; they are slower to learn them. On the other hand, the schools turn out plenty of young people more competent than their elders, and, in particular, more adjustable, eager to get work, better trained especially in mechanical contrivances, intensely interested in innovations that the older men rebel against. Also, many large businesses now pension their workers. For this reason employers naturally feel they should be wary about assuming any more responsibility than circumstances force upon them for employees advanced in age.

What is the way out? As a theory of industry at least, old age at forty-five or fifty calls for some considered program. Given their traditions, long-tried remedies such as old folks' homes and out-relief to the aged are at best kindly expedients repugnant to all principles of self-help and satisfaction. By and large they register failure—at best, failure of human ties; at worst and most often, social and economic disability. For a man at fifty in reasonably good health, such charitable enterprises represent no solution at all. The philanthropic solutions usually offered are savings plans, stock-ownership plans, co-operative annuities, public and industrial pensions. All these plans have possibilities and are capable of being experimented with on a humane basis, but no savings nor pension scheme has as yet met the need of men who break at fifty or find themselves out of work at that age. The average low-skilled worker's earning power and the character of his working tenure give very little ground for a hope that his savings, unless generously supplemented by industry, by government pension, or by his children, will allow him much beyond a mere pittance for his later years.

The average wage-earner's working life is said to be fifty years at best, from fifteen or sixteen to sixty-five. During twenty years of that period at least, a worker gives full or partial support to a family. This should be the peak period of his earning power. Let us suppose it is. This is also the time for expenditures beyond mere physical needs, expenditures of a kind vital to himself and his family, the expenditures to provide against the hazards of life and to prepare his children for life. Experience among aged dependents shows positively that this preparation of his children for work is not only a public and "natural" service, but is self-protection. His children are very often the only real investment or "savings" a worker can count upon for later life. To "save" these children for his old age, a laborer must spend for them while his earning power permits.

But even the security of a small income from pension or children will not meet the whole problem. Many men are not ready to retire at fifty. Isolation from the business world constitutes in itself, for many workers, the real hardship. There is room for some original thinking in business circles which shall do more for the man over fifty than give him charity or a state pension. There is a field of possible business usefulness for older men. Secretary of Labor James J. Davis, for instance, feels that there are in the older workmen elements of skill and particularly of stability which can be brought into use in factories and other work places. Some class of part-time work or specialized work could and should be passed over to these men who are at present often retired to begin a hazardous or hopeless search for work. Of the two industrial solutions most frequently discussed—pensions, or employment modified to fit the capacities of the older employee—it is probable that employment holds the greatest satisfaction for the individual and the more real benefits for society. Except for men past sixty or sixty-five, the pension system can never yield more than a life of undesired leisure at a minimum of subsistence. Industrial employment at a minimum pay or shortened hours, and at specially selected work, could better combine at once the psychological needs of the individual, the good of industry, and the best philanthropy. The problem of devising jobs of this kind is up to the business engineer.

Sometimes one hears the query: Should social insurance be considered philanthropy or simply a socio-economic question? Surely the latter, ideally speaking. Certainly, social insurance as it now works, with the German precedent followed in many places, is a "class legislation," in part at least philanthropic, a paternalistic attempt to meet the recognized handicaps of the laboring classes. Insurance against hazard is a social institution of proved value. Insurance does not altogether prevent, yet insurance methods have led to meeting and even in part to preventing the hazard of fire. But insurance against such hazards as illness, unemployment, invalidity, whether social or mutual, voluntary or compulsory, has not yet been organized either to meet the total costs of that which it "insures" or to prevent them. Insurance covers the chances against not attaining the goals of well-being, long life with capital savings, fire prevention, continuous health, steady work, and the like. Itself a palliative, insurance leads toward preventive measures, not away from them.

Rightly conceived and on a basis of universal eligibility, social insurance would meet some of the most poignant situations in economic life. Poorly planned and administered, whether for health, accident, unemployment, old age, or anything else, social insurance gives opportunity for abuses economically and socially as unfortunate as the stupidities of the poor-law administration of the eighteenth century. More than any other proposal to help those on whom the hazards of life bear the hardest, social insurance must be directed with wisdom. Insurance schemes can rob the poor of their little surplus to give little in return but a meager burial or a postponement of a visit to the charity office. No socio-economic proposal has within itself a more even balance of promise and risk. Business, the public, the specialists, trained social workers, and actuaries must all have a hand in organizing voluntary or state schemes that should be considered "always in the melting pot."

II

These are the more outstanding among the economic problems closely related to charitable endeavor; these are the centers of interest for those latter-day economists who tell the business man that solving them will be his first and best contribution to charitable endeavor.

The theory that a man engaged in competitive business can, in the long run, do his best for the society he finds about him by putting all his surplus of money and energy directly into new business ventures and better business methods gets a popularity through press and other propaganda which is possibly disproportionate to the truth of it. But the growing popularity of the opinion is very likely the fundamental reason why business men feel doubts about diverting money to philanthropy and to governmental expenditures in social service fields, and ask whether such funds might not be better spent in improving business so as to provide a more continuous demand for labor and thus, in this, the best way, constructively reduce the claimants for charity and philanthropy. Single-minded people sometimes incline to put on blinders, to refuse to do any charity, refuse to listen to the claims of philanthropy, and insist they will do whatever good they may feel able to do, by way of their business activities. In a play just now popular all over the United States, the leading character, a lady of great wealth, ruling her family and her money affairs with a rod of iron, makes one of her greatest hits when, in reply to a reproach that she never gives to charity, standing at center and addressing the audience with fiery ardor, she says in substance: "No, I do not give to charity. Instead, I invest in real estate; I build railroad systems; I support business enterprises. That's the way I give people work; I help them to help themselves." The frenzied applause that greets this highly colored sentiment illustrates well how exactly this statement corresponds to popular belief.

Because they have this new faith in the beneficent power of business activity, men ask: Does not giving undivided time and attention to a strenuous business activity act in the long run as the real factor in preventing poverty? Cannot a man engaged in competitive business best use his surplus by continually spending this surplus for improved conditions of work, for better pay, and by creating widened demand for work rather than by spending it on philanthropy and charity?

This solution is naïve, to say the least. Incidentally, for most of us it is also inexpedient. As things are, both ways must be tried out and should be tried out. Men of action and vision with a sense of the needs of the poor, never have been able to work out a clear-cut alternative between business and philanthropy; such men know life really yields no straight and narrow path, but only chances for trial-and-error experiments by several routes.

Someone has well said that "charity and philanthropy always have to steer a middle course between the sentiment of pity and the instinct of self-defense." Even more likely is it that business has also to acquire this difficult art.

It is idle to ask: Can philanthropy do the work? Is philanthropy an economic investment? Obviously philanthropy cannot do all the work, although philanthropy may sometimes be an economic investment. Just now perhaps it is the most generally accredited way of acting to further the social interests. There is such a thing as philanthropy in business; there is also business in philanthropy. The impulses of men urge them one way or the other. Emphasis in action will fall according to preference and capacity. Given human nature, certain men may be in business, may also do some charity and support or lead philanthropic work. The relief worker, the humane business man, and the business-like philanthropist are all wanted now. Philanthropic policy is greatly affected by business conditions and by the way of looking at life called the "business way."

The business man and the philanthropist have most often been considered sharply contrasting types appropriately assigned to widely separate social rôles. By hypothesis, the philanthropist centers his interest on non-profitable endeavor to relieve certain aspects of human misery or to do away with some form of it. On the contrary, the man engaged in the business of getting a living must obviously hold profit-making his primary duty. His survival as man and as producer of goods to satisfy human wants depends upon such concentration. Theory counsels specialization. But the fact that in daily life one man may and often does essay several parts is too familiar an experience to require more than statement. Business men do other things; they always have given more or less time to other social claims. History shows many successful business men also generous givers and ardent philanthropists. What needs to be emphasized here is the fact that in our time business is asked to assume, and actually begins to assume, a fundamental responsibility not only for better business but for all types of charitable enterprise. With increasing frequency, at the lunch hour, after business hours, even with regard to the organization and administration of their own business, business men find themselves called upon by a new "business" code of conduct to sponsor all types of humanitarian work. It is the business man who is now asked first of all to listen to the story of practices obviously not humane and often unnecessary, and to join others less strategically situated in urging that these things can be done better by some other means or need not be done at all. To question the socio-economic value of the service of protest, of new eleemosynary institutions, new legislation, and law enforcement, which is the essence of philanthropy, is to be blind to history. Philanthropic enterprises have sometimes been badly conceived. Those schools of industry which were founded all over England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to teach little children how to earn a living by the time they were three to five give horrifying evidence of the fallibility of good intentions. But on the contrary most of us feel assured that the philanthropic imagination which started the free public-school system sponsored a supreme national investment.

One of the greatest social services philanthropic protest has rendered is the great impetus it has given to the habit of putting social faith and social action on a factual basis. Sometimes the work of presenting facts has been done by impassioned writers like Kingsley, Dickens, Charles Reade, with their hundreds of ardent followers of our own time. Sometimes dramatic pictures like those that Riis, Hunter, and Spargo were the first to write stir the emotions. The settlements have acted primarily as interpreters of the life of the slum dweller, backing their arguments for improvement by facts.

But the most useful work that philanthropy pays for is the serious social study. Money spent for social surveys, rightly conceived and directed, is certain to be a paying investment. The valuable mass of vital statistics the public-health movement has gathered is evidence and argument enough for the value of the costs of this type of philanthropic contribution. The cynic may define surveys as "an expensive way of finding what everybody knows," but the essence of the "right" method of knowing is analysis and proof. Doubters must be answered, and social research brings them factual proof. Social studies first proved that the causes of poverty were social as well as personal; showed the close relation between modern industry and poverty. Between inquiries such as Eden's *State of the Poor* and Malthus' *Essay on Population* at the end of the eighteenth century, and Charles Booth's *Life and Labor of the People* and the Pittsburgh survey at the end of the nineteenth century, there is a hundred-year period of cumulative effort by a plan continuously more scientific, an effort to establish on the basis of facts the general faith in the possibility of treating poverty as a disease. Only those who selfishly sanction a world that gives them personally all they need can question the economic and social serviceability of the protest and experiment that has brought into existence committees by the thousands—committees to investigate health conditions, committees to study the child populations, to investigate the housing of the poor, the slum life. Instead, it is heartening to think that philanthropy gains many new recruits, though the numbers by no means compete as yet with those doing charity; that philanthropy takes many forms. Every decade brings new movements to present claims for a better economic life and a better public service calculated to reduce poverty—movements to add to free and universal education, to prevent needless waste of life and to develop vitality, to find mental deviates and to prevent their number from increasing; movements to provide against hazards, to raise the rate of wages, to add quantity and quality to the leisure time of adults and children; movements to reform taxation, to educate consumers. Surely no one who watches this surge of citizen feeling can doubt that the investments of time and money made by the men and women who lead in the philanthropic enterprise bring in good and full returns.

III

Growing convictions that poverty is more than mischance or character defect, and that the cure for poverty is to be expected more from changes in political and economic institutions than from personal repentance or patience and industry, have brought this new crop of doubts about the utility of philanthropy and even more of relief work. Skeptics voice uncertainties such as the following: Why must we do charity? Is not charity a way to develop among the well-to-do at best sympathy and a sense of service, but most often just a disagreeable smug sense of vested benevolence? Does our money really do any good? Does charity bring even a portion of the indigents to economic sufficiency? Can it? Is the real malady ever relieved by caring for the destitute? Does not the money given through charity really discourage thrift, initiative, and self-help? Does it not rather encourage the least desirable parents recklessly to have large families; turn funds away from productive enterprises to charitable ventures that have no essential social utility?

How can these queries be answered? What are the facts?

Doubts about relief work are not new. In times past, as today, thoughtful persons have called charity futile and dubbed it "sisyphism"—effort made only to be made again, effort never really serviceable either to the poor or to society. In all ages, but more particularly since the middle of the eighteenth century, there is always a group to question sharply the utility of giving direct help to the poor. But, first of all, charity is a social habit. Doubts and hesitations notwithstanding, always and everywhere relief work gets precedence. By tradition, by the nature of human emotions, and on the grounds of expediency the work of helping the indigent exacts attention and gets it. Most men today share in the work of relief. The method of direct help responds to certain customs deep rooted in religion and ethics, to the native impulse of mankind to take sympathetic action when facing a fellow-creature in trouble. Many are making this response according to a belief that the instant need never can and never should be denied by individual or state, and that the personal service to the needy is the only way that common sense persons can expect to prevent poverty.

The work of charity takes many forms. No one could argue that all relief work is good. Much charity is poorly conceived and badly done. In relatively remote parts of the world, relief giving still spells nothing but personal preference; charity is an anarchy of impulse; neither person nor community reviews results. Large sections of modern civilized nations still believe that relief giving never should be anything but a genial impulse. Those who "cease not to give without any regard" are still with us. In the most socially sophisticated communities, it is possible to find any and every type of giving. The method of giving a casual night's lodging competes with carefully considered case treatment. Indeed, human nature being what it is, the same person can be found doing charity in both ways. The state's attempt at monopoly of charity, enforced in medieval England with brutality at times, ended in failure partly because communities seemed unable to take sympathetic and considered action, but most of all because human nature ran contrary to a prohibition of the right of everyone to follow the impulse to give help. Voluntaryism has conquered with regard to charity because the hearts of men and the doctrine of laissez faire run parallel.

Most of us think of charity and philanthropy as private endeavor properly not in the hands of the state. He who visualizes charity in the United States thinks mainly in terms of a vast network of agencies, the major part of them due to private initiative, privately endowed and directed, giving many classes of social dependents care and relief either in institutions or in their own homes. Hundreds of thousands of private individuals function to make this network, counting up to many thousands of small groups of well-meaning persons gathering goods and money from the community presently to give funds and service as they see fit, to fellow-nationals, to co-religionists, to the needy in general.

The cynic argues that relief work must be done to keep contented masses who might otherwise revolt and menace property. In reality this motive for benevolent action now colors relief work but slightly. Theological convenience, what Warner long ago called "fire insurance," is possibly more frequently a motive. Charity done just because of the spiritual advantages deriving from giving until it hurts, unless rescued through professional social work, eventuates most often in elementary types of emergency relief, such as soup kitchens and wood yards, forms of charity that doubters in general and economists in particular have usually and rightly considered, relatively speaking, disservices. Personal and income sacrifice are fine discipline for the prosperous, but not necessarily aids to the underdog. Charitable endeavor risks being a disservice whenever it is done for self-regarding motives. When the work of giving help is begun but is not carried through to a finish, unquestionably society suffers. When charitable work leaves the object of charity half-fed, poorly clothed and housed, irregular in habits, then the time and money spent are, relatively speaking, wasted. The history of charitable endeavor includes evidence that institutional care and out-relief can be socially a menace because of carelessness about human weakness, callousness to human sensibilities, and niggardliness in imputing needs. This kind of care of the poor led the economist to shake his head and contrast relief of the poor with his ideal of a population fully employed at a living wage under the leadership of competent business organizers. When economists, since Adam Smith, have disapproved of charity, what they had in mind was usually indiscriminate giving either by individuals or through the workings of the poor-law. In the time of Adam Smith and Malthus, the poor-law administration actually did menace able-bodied men's chance at work and a living wage. Private charity did the same thing, and sometimes today affects the wage standard adversely by providing the needy with jobs at pay lower than the true "minimum." It is charity of this kind that stirs the doubts which make men ask: Is not charity a disservice?

But the real question is not: Is charity really serviceable? What we should ask is: What way of doing charity is serviceable? How can those temporarily or permanently without income be best helped to self-sufficient lives?

There is no one positive answer. Even in a world that sees clearly the general direction that social betterment work should take, the details must and should remain a field of experiment. Indeed, the same questions are still to be tested by action that were in the minds of those who drafted the Elizabethan poor-laws. It is entirely appropriate continually to ask: Should anyone be helped by charity? If so, who is entitled to be helped? Who is called upon to assume the main burden of the care of those who ought to be aided—the individual, the church, the state, or the community on a voluntary basis? If help is given, what form is best calculated to serve the general good—institutional care, the gift of work or food or money? How much must individuals be left to do for themselves, and how much can be done for the poor by some form of relief work? To nourish honest doubts like these and continually revise the set of working rules that answer them is part of the way to healthy growth in charity work.

Organized charity is probably that way of doing charity which, given our present knowledge, is most serviceable. The work of charity-organization societies during a half-century justifies calling this class of relief work the most economical and most hopeful way of giving relief yet devised.

Among the thousands of agencies doing relief work, charity-organization societies are as yet only hundreds, but their standards and methods slowly color, to its advantage, the work of all relief. Directed first against fraud, against the faker who begged for himself and the sham who begged for fake charities, the organization idea has also been used to bring about better mutual acquaintance between the several voluntary and public societies and thus prevent duplication of effort. The ideal is yet to be accomplished. Lesser societies and charity-organization societies still work independently. But the principle laid down by those who in the last half of the nineteenth century launched the idea of organized relief work gains ground with every decade. The organization principle in charity tends to socialize the directors of voluntaryism. Group conferences on the problems of relief increase in number, in reach. Conferences between the members of a given agency, between several agencies at work in the same field; conferences annually between specialists in related fields; conferences local, national, international—all this getting-together permits, by intention and program, a revaluation of the work done and a careful consideration of next steps. At all types of conference the quality of the discussion shows plainly that every decade is bringing more people to a sense of the intricacies of problems of poverty and to an increased eagerness to meet these problems fully by scientific methods.

The method of family case work is the child of organized charity. The method contemplates helping all applicants to economic sufficiency. Each case of need is to be cared for, not by a fixed dole the same for each and all as was the old way, but according to a considered plan specially adapted to the requirements of each case.

It is a fact that the writer is not alone in regretting that traditional precepts and lack of funds together make it true that the "principle of deterrence" still controls the standards and the work of most relief offices. Deterrent charity aims to make the taking of aid so repugnant to pride that the poor will be induced to make new effort rather than ask for help. As a canon of behavior, this rule was definitely laid down in the poor-law reforms of 1834; it rests upon the economist's belief that to establish the right to more than a pauper level of living unavoidably leads to pauperization. The abuses of the poor-law in the eighteenth century created a well-defined notion that, when benevolence to human beings was in question, self-restraint on the part of charitable givers was imperative. The poor must be taught to refrain from asking for help; the benevolent might not give too freely.

This is not the place to debate the theory of deterrence. The writer would like, however, to register the belief that it is as absurd and as socially harmful to discourage a needy family from asking for help as it is to lead a sick man to feel ashamed to take medical care. Society gains when the sick and the needy are under social watch and ward. The risks for society and the individual are not in the fact of asking assistance, but in the kind of help that is given. Every needy person should have the advantage of a case diagnosis. When case-workers are trained in such social diagnosis, they should be as free to take every case of need as doctors are to attempt to cure any and every type of illness. The writer hopes and believes that in the best charity offices the principle of deterrence is operative only because charity workers never have money enough; that only an actual lack of funds, not any strong conviction about the soundness of the principle of deterrence, deters the best case-workers from giving family groups they help enough to pay the real costs of a "decency" standard of living. A recent study of the income and expenditures of low-skilled workers in Chicago, made by Miss Houghteling, shows that, in the Chicago charities at least, the principle of deterrence is not operative. Miss Houghteling's splendidly marshaled facts show industry paying its workers a sum less than the charity offices were giving, though the latter sum total was carefully calculated in terms of basic needs.

Because of convictions, but doubtless even more because a really generous support is never forthcoming from the community, the long-standing rule about making charity unattractive holds. As things now are, the standard of living which charity offices adopt for relief cases is, as a rule, not only theoretically but actually lower than the living the lowest-paid worker can buy with the wage he earns. In general, the food and shelter costs of a minimum of health and decency are all that charity offices can now pay for. Sometimes in the prosperous West of the United States more than the amount necessary to pay for the food that will sustain life and the shelter that will "decently" house a family may be given. But, even in cases like these, where traditions of deterrence would lead conservative social workers to call the giving too generous, the clothing that is provided will usually be cast off except for the children, the furnishings likewise. It may be said that today, materially speaking, adequate relief means, at best, only adequate food and a "decent" house.

But whether the principle of deterrence is effective or not, constructive case work justifies itself as an economic and social benefit. The hope of restoring economic sufficiency is frequently carried to reality—needy families are helped to self-support; children without normal protectors are educated to become efficient members of the working population. Since every family helped to economic sufficiency adds one more unit of competence, energy, and hopefulness to the national life, and since the facts show many families have been so helped, evidently there are no sufficient grounds for asking whether money given to relief brings any economic benefit. An amazing number of persons do ask the question, but no one who takes the trouble to investigate the case work of a competent family society remains among the doubters. For all inquirers who want to study poverty scientifically, the thousands of intensive case "histories" now accumulated in charity offices are vital social documents. These case records furnish the most exact evidence yet available concerning the nature of the misfortunes that make and keep families poor. Their existence as factual evidence is argument enough for a continued and generous support of relief work.

What is the final test of good charity work, organized or any other? The pecuniary test so often made is really a very poor test. Some of the most important cases of need require advice only. Many require more advice than money. The costs of such advice appear in the overhead, in the salaries of trained workers. To rate successful work by the relation of overhead to money spent in relief is a vicious practice if for no other reason than this, that the social service which appears in overhead is a most vital aspect of relief work. Periodically one meets the man who, with hopeful faith, would measure good work in charity by the reductions made in the number of cases a given office deals with each year. Such a man forgets the shifts in the business demand for workers. As long as casual and seasonal employment characterize labor demand, large numbers of families must be expected to go every winter to the charity offices for emergency care, and the test of reduced numbers will continue to be an absurdity.

The results of charitable endeavor, like the results of good housewifery, cannot be shown adequately in a profit-and-loss balance. The test of good charity is that incommensurable thing, human results, personal and social. By plan and principle, charity offices deal with residual people for whom society has as yet devised no other protection. The writer, for one, is convinced by much experience and investigation that the work the best charitable agencies are doing gives at the present time a double economic service. Free dispensaries care for the sick who cannot pay for their care; but they demonstrate also how much it is to the social interest to give thorough medical care without fee to those in ill health, and so prevent illness by an active public-health program. The money that goes to behavior clinics brings an immediate personal return to each case served; but, in addition, mental deviation is diagnosed, and the diagnosis in the long run brings to the nation a better level of mental and physical fitness. Such sifting-out of mental deviates reinforces the labor supply with able-bodied workers and saves employers the loss that arises from trying to use subnormal types in industry. In the same way, it is surely obvious that loans to earners in trouble, employment service freely given to the unemployed, instruction and paid work provided for the handicapped, represent not only direct services to individuals, but at the same time distinct advantages to economic life. Surely industry first and society in the long run gain by well-conceived relief work.

It has often been said, but cannot too often be repeated, that the service which charity represents cannot be dispensed with in a world other than utopia any more than the family doctor or the specialist of any sort can be spared from his office practice to give all his time to the study of causes. The imagination likes to dwell, as Wells has led it to dwell in his *Men Like Gods*, upon a world rid of doctors and dentists and all benevolent persons busied with social betterment, a world where men live for the joy of "pioneering in the unknown." It is pleasant to believe, as Bernard Shaw has pointed out, that every good dentist is engaged in trying to eliminate the need for his services. But, meanwhile, until someone finds the way to prevent pyorrhea or holes in the teeth, dentists must plug holes up and struggle to keep teeth from falling out. At the present stage of social development, doubts about the serviceability of relief work seem quite as fantastic an absurdity as doubts about the serviceability of a good and conscientious dentist.

Omitting questions of humanity, reasons of social expediency require that every case of need be studied and cared for in the hope of giving, besides the means to live, health, skill, and character as well.

IV

Civilized men have always dallied with the knotty point whether national income properly distributed would not do away with the need for charity. Bernard Shaw is only the latest in a long line of idealists to assert confidently that the recognized ways of sharing the national dividend are not right, that the existing distribution is "anomalous, monstrous, ridiculous," must be changed, and can be changed by taking thought. The Greeks, the monastic orders, the eighteenth-century reformers—all but a few of the utopists favored the biblical ideal of "neither poverty nor riches" as the way out. In reality, this habit of favoring a nearer approach to equality of income ordinarily contemplates nothing more than banishing luxury. When divided, the total dividend is not expected to yield anyone a large income. But that does not matter. The arguments for equality of income rest upon a preference for the simplification of wants as not only a necessity but also intrinsically an advantage. Most of the goods and services we use are said to be custom needs not really required by biological necessity, but the expression of irrational fads, fashions, emulations, and the like.

Unless one is ready to accept as a working faith some doctrine of a socially controlled consumption of goods, faith in a theory of greater equality of income seems disingenuous. The controlling dream of our time is the hope of universal prosperity through mass production. This dream sanctions, also, as the present main chance for the exercise of self-interest, an unlimited increase in desires on the part of a consumer whose best defense against producers' oppression is the exercise of freedom in the selection of the goods and services his theory of his own best interests dictates. This social ideal of a rising standard of living acts to emphasize income differences.

Of course it is not idle dreaming to anticipate that, by taking thought, mankind will be able to increase the national income and distribute it better to our 116,000,000 consumers. When compared with those of 1910, statistics compiled in 1922 show a larger share going to the masses; show that middle-class incomes are increasing faster than those of the rich, that the earnings of artisans are growing faster than those of the professional classes, and that the wages and the opportunities of the average worker are better than ever before. Though only 1 per cent of the population in this, the most prosperous nation in the world, can command an income over $10,000; though only 3 per cent have incomes over $5,000—yet these latest figures suggest that, since in the United States the worker's share is larger than for any other country or at any previous time in history, the facts warrant the belief that a better redistribution of wealth may come. The way of accomplishing the end will doubtless be the question of central interest for a long time.

It is indeed idle to believe that any redistribution of the national income would remove the need for charity and philanthropy. No matter what the plans for altering the existing division of income may be, no matter what is accomplished, always a certain irreducible minimum of individuals will require social protection. Given human nature as we know it, it is difficult to see a valid reason for believing that all men can always use their own resources. Redistribution could thus be only temporary; the need that relative economic insufficiency represents would continue. He is a dreamer, indeed, who believes that certain types of dependency, widowhood, desertion, illegitimacy, would disappear because income had been redistributed, or that persons subject to these social disadvantages could always be protected from economic insufficiency. Better economic arrangements might correct the poverty that results from unemployment, from congestion, from underpay; but crime and vice are not so directly ascribable to economic causes. It is pleasant to think the biologist, the student of birth control and of other population questions, the psychologist interested in the habits of those unable to adjust themselves socially, may, in a long-time process, fathom the causes of these disabilities; but that time is far distant. Meanwhile charities and corrections are the only way to deal with certain human disabilities and faults. Stupidity, selfishness, and social lag will long continue to interest and arouse the philanthropic. Only a utopist can cherish the hope that any distribution scheme could be devised to do away with the irreducible minimum of mental deviates, social rebels, and sodden sinners.

V

All communities include a very audible proportion of persons who question the utility of charitable endeavor of any kind. Why do they doubt?

It is not always sufficiently clear why even thoughtful givers indulge in the idle gymnastic of contrasting the three possible ways of doing charitable work as alternative and mutually exclusive, asking: Shall I give to charity, or shall I support philanthropic ventures? Can I not do charity better by giving all my energies strenuously to business activity? Is it not preferable to prevent business depression rather than to divert money to philanthropy or to taxes to be spent for social dependents? The query often ends with the skeptical question: Can anything really be accomplished in any field?

Most often these qualms about the economic and social benefits of charitable endeavor are a rationalization of selfish indifference or the result of cherishing belated medieval notions about poverty. Those who question the serviceability of any solicitude for the poor usually make one of three professions of faith in regard to poverty. Either they warm the cockles of their hearts with canons about the spiritual values of poverty (they are persuaded that poverty-people are needed to carry economic enterprises forward successfully), or they feel assured that poverty encourages initiative, self-help, and thrift, while charity discourages these qualities.

Probably no literature in any language is without a body of writing that sets forth with ardor the inherent privileges of a state of poverty. The poor themselves sometimes find fortitude and cheer in the idea. The story of mankind includes narratives about many men and women who, accepting this dictum, have formed communities—monastic, anarchist, socialist, co-operative, religious—wherein the common aim was to live according to a vow of poverty. Even in our "prosperity" era, without going quite the length of the Franciscan beatification of poverty, someone weary of mass production, ordinarily someone whose income assures him or her all the major comforts of life, arises occasionally to write a well-phrased essay in praise of My Lady Poverty. The saint is acclaimed as a guide far more satisfying than the deluding god of wealth who lures to nothing but a mad scramble for purchasing power. When poverty presents itself to the imagination as a moral advantage, it is also usual to look upon it as man's surest opportunity for spiritual freedom through the exercise of the supreme virtues, humility, industry, content. From this angle of judgment, charity that does more than alleviate physical misery obviously looks like action to rob the poor of their spiritual advantages.

Skepticism about charity and philanthropy comes also when poverty is regarded as part of the divine order, as a "normal walk of life." In this view the poor are a caste, a class predestined to poverty. Men of this turn of mind admit that poverty is perhaps a disability, but hold it is socially inevitable, probably foreordained by the wise Providence that shapes our ends, in all probability a beneficent expedient to get "hands" for the economic drudgery that must be done.

Captains of industry often argue this way, the way the mercantilists all argued, frankly saying that a poverty class is an unavoidable adjunct of that exploitation of natural resources and development of utilities which spells economic progress. When the charitable announce a program admittedly intended to raise the masses above economic insufficiency, people of this cast of mind register shock and hint at ill-judged interference with the "invisible hand," with that Mother Nature who set the poor among us for her own purposes, first among which is industrial progress.

A third and long-standing reason for objecting to charitable work rests, not on admiration of poverty as the best hope of heaven, but on the argument that charitable endeavor menaces character, that poverty is the best spur to the qualities of self-help, initiative, and thrift, which, with ambition to boot, get a man from poverty to riches. Giving charity, it is often argued, makes a supine working class addicted to overpopulation and sodden poverty.

Oddly enough, this was the view of the economists of the past century. Even men like J. S. Mill thought that neither society nor the individual gained much by charitable endeavor. Not only did charity deflect money and energies from new capital investments and higher wages; it also worked against the main objectives of democratic liberty—the growth of equality of life and opportunity. The presence of the indigent pauper in the community tended, it was thought, to create two classes, the benevolent and the pitiable. The well-to-do continued to consider themselves a different order of creation and to regard the poor as a class to whom they owed something of the same sympathy and care that they give dumb animals. Also, charity encouraged the poor to feel a self-pity which, as Gissing said, was one of the consolations, but also one of the degradations, of poverty-people. In the seventeenth century, economists had believed and taught that industry depended upon a kind of manual work which no one would do except under the prick of necessity, and that, since economic activity depended on such drudgery, due regard for economic and social progress dictated caution lest charitable endeavor balk its own ends. Barring work for dependent children, usually recognized as a legitimate public service, the only aid considered safe and sane, and certain to bring return both to those who gave and to those who took, was custodial care or the casual service—a meal, a night's lodging, a work test. A great many people still cherish this way of thinking, accompanying it by a well-defined feeling that the responsible classes may profitably use the poor as an instrument for "good works," but that good works carried beyond the act of sympathy tend to be mere self-indulgence and can only result disastrously for society and especially for economic welfare. The "classical" economists barely escaped this point of view. Modern economists are most often on the fence.

However, even the successful now feel less confident than formerly that the unsuccessful have only themselves to blame, and that charitable endeavor simply makes matters worse. Whatever the rationalizations they may have indulged in, most of the world has always really believed that the world is better, not worse, for having inhabitants who have income enough as well as health and peace of mind. Whatever may be the lingering lip service paid to quietism or the eulogistic attitude toward poverty, most men direct their daily lives according to the more or less openly expressed conviction that the good life and prosperity are not incompatible, and that poverty is a harassing handicap.

Almost anyone who reads Montesquieu's reflection that "the poverty of the Greeks constituted their opportunity" responds in imagination with the sense of a pleasurable escape from the nerve strain of modern accelerated ways of getting a high-standard living to the dream of "the simple life." The ideal of a simple scale of living, always a cherished dream of intellectuals and mystics, has, now and again, a charm for everyone, even the man most infected with desire to enjoy all the new-known goods.

But this happens once in a while only. Most of us know that modern poverty and the simple life are not the same thing. In the Greece Montesquieu used as example poverty meant a scale of wants without complexities. There were no appreciable differences in the levels of living among the citizens of Greece, while the working population, the slaves, had at least security of work and of food. Maeterlinck's exquisite delineation of the satisfactions of the inner life in *Treasures of the Humble* pictures at the same time Greek "poverty" and the Greek ideal of the good life; but it does not picture modern poverty in our slums. Especially since slavery and serfdom were abolished, poverty is not this serene life of Burns's cotter or Goldsmith's "happy" poor, exempt alike from insecurity and from the pleasures and pangs of a rising standard of living. On the contrary, modern poverty is fundamentally a state of chronic uncertainty about income. If it is opportunity, surely it is opportunity with many hazardous handicaps. Certainly the poverty with which contemporary charity deals is a scale of living and a relation to work and life hedged about with hazards of ill health and insecurity of job. Above all, it represents a scale of living in such marked contrast to "standard" notions of living that the sense of inequality and unfairness is added to physical discomfort. Public education has added "felt" poverty to "primary" and "secondary" poverty. In essence, the poverty of our time is economic insufficiency and insecurity, and inequality, a social situation that many besides those loving "the state of the poor" regard as objectionable, repugnant, remediable.

Not only charity workers and students of economic life believe poverty is an aspect of economic evolution. Whether they are aware of it or not, thousands in the general community think, work, and live by a hazy faith that accepts the economist's hypothesis that there is a "road to plenty" along which men and women may go together toward a greater universal advantage, providing that the desires and purposes which spur them on are dictated by the conviction that poverty is a preventable social disease; that the vicissitudes of earning a marginal and insecure income engross the masses so that interest, sympathy, and courage are aborted; and that, per contra, exemption from the dread of privation by regular work and leisure for rest and improvement would find them better citizens of a republic. This is "enlightened materialism," for which prosperity is not necessarily an end, but a recognized means to an end. Men do not live by bread alone, but bread they must have. The question of how much butter on it remains unsettled. Even if it were true—though I do not think it is—that, as the Hammonds say in a recent book, our "age has turned aside from making a society in order to make a system of production," if the production system is made according to the best standards of industrial organization the results may also be "a society." Ideally, prosperity may help us all to become "interested spectators of time and eternity."

PHILANTHROPY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE SOCIOLOGIST

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS

The idea that philanthropy should concern itself altogether with the destitute or stricken is not in accord with current sociology. In normal times the dependent element includes many who inherit weakness of body, mind, or character, and there is no reason why they should be helped to overcome their difficulties in preference to elements of greater social worth. There is no reason why the man who loves his fellowmen should not make it manifest by seeking relief for cancer victims, by aiding discouraged farmers to find a means of combating a devastating insect pest, by underwriting experiments intended to adapt the school régime more closely to the demands of the child's nature, by providing clinics for the promotion of mental hygiene, or by agitating against the exploitation of little children in industry. The needs of the impecunious are indeed more obvious, urgent, and arresting than the needs of most others; moreover, the poor appeal for aid, whereas the other hard-pressed elements ask for nothing. Nevertheless, the least resourceful among us are by no means entitled to all the aid there may be.

THE ART OF "QUALIFYING" FOR ALMS

The stretching of the helping hand to the distressed fellow-creature is a moving and beautiful act, and the sociologist will always hail it as proof that a social bond exists and that the spirit of solidarity is not dead. However, at a certain stage of social development the practice tends to become stereotyped in the form of the giving of money, i.e., the bestowal of alms, and at this point the sociologist calls attention to certain important social consequences. The custom of giving something for nothing virtually puts a premium on that conduct, trait, or plight which enables one to qualify to receive alms. Once almsgiving is general and regular enough for the parasitic to count upon it, then, if being destitute qualifies one to claim alms, there are those who will idle, will drink up or squander or gamble away their resources, trusting to the generosity of the charitable to extricate them from the inevitable consequences of such conduct.

If it is ghastly mutilation or piteous deformity that opens the hearts and purses of the passers-by, experience shows that beggar bands will steal and deliberately maim or deform children in order to use them for luring coins from the compassionate.

If having infants in arms and hapless little ones clinging to one's skirts qualifies, then beggar women will borrow or rent children to set the stage for their heart-rending appeals.

If a woebegone appearance qualifies, professional beggars will throw shoulder or arm out of joint or simulate the loss of a limb, while cunning impostors who own houses and bank accounts will play the rôle of the stooping, twisted, hobbling street mendicant.

The experience of England under the poor-law in force up to 1834 shows that if having the responsibility of a baby qualifies for relief, there are young women, more calculating than nice, who will bear a bastard in order to obtain the parish dole, while dependent couples who are allowed so much for each additional child will regard the tenth baby as an asset instead of the liability it is to the self-supporting pair.

If having a wife qualifies, reckless marriages are encouraged and therewith their natural results. The out-of-work, the cripple, or the vagrant finds it money in his pocket to take to himself a wife. In England not only did laborers marry earlier than before the allowance system grew up, but it was noticed that they married earlier in liberal parishes than in strict parishes.

If moving "hard-luck" stories qualify, then impostors will concoct the most plausible and harrowing tales of misfortune and tell them with an art that would wring tears from a graven image. Likewise, if it is the begging letter that harvests the coin, then pathetic situations will be imagined and described in letters such as no honest person in trouble can match.

PHILANTHROPY THAT PAUPERIZES

The point of all this is that careless and uninquisitive benevolence pauperizes. It constitutes an "effective demand" for paupers, and it will not be long ere there is a supply sufficient to satisfy the demand. In the Middle Ages the profuse and indiscriminate almsgiving of monasteries, hospitals, guilds, and magnates made it easy for the shiftless to live without work. A horde of professional beggars was called into being who wandered from place to place making the rounds of monastery, hospital, and religious festival and ever increasing in numbers and boldness. "Around the gates of St. Bartholomew and other great foundations," testifies Ashley, "gathered swarms of the miserably shiftless and idle, decrepit, halt, and maimed, covered with rags and filth, like those still to be seen around the entrance to many a Continental cathedral."

A system of public outdoor relief is likely to be counted on by those concerned until it becomes in effect a bounty on idleness and improvidence. Under the old poor-law of England the pauper was often better off than the poor laborer, who was thereby disheartened in his struggle to maintain his independence. Hence, as time went on, the proportion of paupers grew. In some parishes rents were so generally paid by the vestry that the poor made no effort to provide their rent. Landowners have been known to tear down cottages so as to keep out pauper settlers and to draw their labor from surrounding parishes which made up the deficit in wages by an allowance. When farmers were allowed to have the labor of the idle at a shilling a day, the deficit being made up by the overseers of the poor, they turned away their laborers, thus creating an idle class, in order later to hire them back at a cheap rate. When employers were required to hire paupers, rather than the self-supporting, saving was seen to be a bar to employment, so that thriftlessness was encouraged. The policy of a regular allowance for the out-of-work prompted some laborers to be as lawless and useless at work as possible in order that they might be discharged and supported in idleness.

After 1834 in England the poorhouse became a workhouse; but even this was discontinued. Its practice of giving lodging to destitute wayfarers created professional vagrants. The freedom to go and come called into being a class of loafers who availed themselves of the hospitality and the mixed company of the workhouse, but, when they craved a change, left it and lived as they pleased. When deterrent regulations were adopted, vagrants found jails more comfortable and did little to escape imprisonment for a week or two for vagrancy or petty thievery. In Manchester an enormous prison-like casual ward was built on the newest deterrent model. The number applying for lodging fell off at least half, many homeless men preferring to sleep in the streets. Philanthropic people then provided a free shelter under lax management. This emptied the ward and the lodging-houses and attracted great crowds from neighboring towns. Public opinion forced closing of the shelter, and again the men slept out.

A recent critic of the English workhouse writes:

> It was a curious experience in visiting a large number of workhouses to find, as one went from one place to another, that what one had to look for was the most spacious and prosperous-looking institution in the place, set in the best-kept grounds, surrounded with expensive walls and handsome gates. . . . . "Indoor-relief" has bred a class of lazy parasites, willing to submit to any conditions so long as they are well fed and relieved from all responsibilities. They are not even precluded from injuring the outside

community, inasmuch as the law permits them to go in and out at their pleasure, using the workhouse as a convenient resort and a protection to their noxious lives from the discipline of hunger and cold.

The Poor-Law Commission reporting in 1909 recommended that no outdoor relief be given save to persons leading respectable lives in decent houses. Slum areas should be proscribed, inasmuch as the attraction of these degraded areas lies, not in low rents—they are really high—but in the absence of restraint, and the liberty to overcrowd and to lead irregular lives which is to be found under the slum landlord.

Nothing so lends itself to anticipation as endowed outdoor relief, which is sure to become widely known and which works blindly, in good years as in bad years. Not only has it been found that in English cathedral towns with endowments for the poor pauperism is far greater than in other towns, but fixed doles always attract to a place more than enough paupers to absorb them all. No doubt many a down-and-outer has drifted to New York because of the publicity the Sunday newspapers have given to the midnight "bread line" maintained by the endowment of the baker who started it.

The experts oppose even a relief fund for the charity organization society lest it betray them into the giving of indiscriminate relief. Such a fund at once saps the energy and ingenuity of agents. On the other hand, being obliged to find relief case by case as the need arises, they have to justify their decisions and methods in order to secure the necessary approval and co-operation.

THE SAVING VIRTUE OF INDIVIDUALIZING THE NEEDY

Let no one suppose that the general truths I have just stressed are offered as an excuse for stinginess or hardness of heart. There are, indeed, abundant opportunities to help the needy without in the least encouraging in them undesirable types of behavior or character. For one thing, thorough acquaintance with the individual case will safeguard the kindly disposed man against such a use of his money as will foster in the beneficiaries habits of idleness, self-indulgence, and improvidence. For a little scrutiny makes clear that some applicants for relief are the victims of misfortunes which might befall any of us, whereas others are only suffering the consequences of their own misconduct. The former have been termed "God's poor," while the latter might well be called "the devil's poor." If we are so simple as regularly to relieve "the devil's poor," such succor will come to be counted on and their faults and vices will cease to be attended by their natural penalties, the result being that the number of loafers, sots, vagrants, and frauds will grow. On the other hand, if the distress of persons of good character who are the victims of wrong or mishap is relieved there is no tendency for the number of such victims to grow.

A little over a hundred years ago Dr. Chalmers in his parish of St. John's, Glasgow, in which there were about ten thousand people of the poorer element, became convinced that indiscriminate almsgiving did more harm than good. He persuaded the civic authorities to forbid all almsgiving and to allow him to institute a system of friendly visiting among the needy by a corps of workers. They gave relief only in cases of extreme necessity, their principal concern being to help the poor to help themselves. The result was that suffering was very greatly diminished, the amount of money required to relieve need decreased, and there was a great reduction in the number of paupers.

About the same time in London relief societies multiplied. Some of them introduced the practice of visiting the poor, but these visitors usually gave relief, so that the relationship between the visitor and the poor was not that of neighbors but that of giver and receiver. Thus the practice of visiting failed to do the good which it might have done.

Mr. J. R. Green thus describes the situation in East London:

> The greater number of the East End clergy have converted themselves into relieving officers. Sums of enormous magnitude are annually collected and dispensed by them either personally or through district visitors, nine-tenths of whom are women, and the bulk silly and ignorant women. A hundred different agencies for the relief of distress are at work over the same ground, without concert or co-operation or the slightest information as to each other's exertions, and the result is an unparalleled growth of imposition, mendicancy and sheer, shameless pauperism.

About 1868 Edward Denison went to live among the poor in the East End of London, and presently he came to the conviction that giving aid to the poor was a mistake because by giving them alms you perverted their moral nature. Said he, "Build schoolhouses, pay teachers, give prizes, form working men's clubs, help them to help themselves, lend them your brains, but give them no money except what you sink in such undertakings."

Out of such ideas sprang the great movement for charity organization first in England and then in the United States. In line with its famous motto "Not alms but a friend," there has been a great development of case work by those who used to be called "friendly visitors" but now are known as "social workers."

At first the movement was misunderstood and abused. It was charged with selfishness, with inhumanity toward the poor, with substituting for the kindliness of the cheerful giver hardness of heart and coldness of spirit. However, on longer acquaintance it has become apparent that, instead of making charity mechanical, the new principles really spiritualize it, for they require aid to be preceded by personal acquaintance and interest and make *the rendering of service* to the poor much more prominent than *the giving of things*.

Such principles have been largely adopted by almost every case-working agency in every field of social work in this country—child-placing societies, societies for the prevention of cruelty to children, juvenile courts, juvenile-protective associations, and some mothers-pension administration authorities. In short, agencies which attempt to adjust social relationships by dealing with individuals and families recognize the necessity of following the principles and methods worked out by organized charities. Their principle of friendly visiting is a means of bringing together the fortunate and the distressed to their mutual advantage. In the words of Mr. Kellogg as quoted by Gillin,

> It is the means by which the higher resources of society, its hope, discipline, thrift and kindness of heart, are diffused among the depressed and those who have fallen by the way; it is the means of contact with poverty of mind and purse; it is the vital agency in evoking the capacities of the poor for self-maintenance.

EMERGENCY RELIEF

It is obvious again that coming to the help of the broken or destitute victims of fire, flood, earthquake, or tornado does not add to the frequency of such natural calamities nor is it likely to beget in anyone the pauper attitude. The same is true of the relief of wounded or crippled soldiers, war refugees, war widows and orphans. The feeding of the famine-stricken, however, is not always so blameless. Sometimes it defeats nature's remedy for chronic want of balance between growth of numbers and increase of food. It may confirm the masses of an Oriental people in those reckless procreative habits which augment the pressure of population to such a point that every bad season brings famine in its train.

RELIEF OF THE DISABLED

Sickness is so afflictive and alarming that ministering to the ailing may be trusted not to weaken the efforts of the individual to avoid sickness, although it may deter him from accumulating the means of defraying the expenses of sickness and tiding over periods of idleness from this cause. Free care and medicine by no means cure sickness with the speed and certainty with which free soup kitchens stop the pangs of hunger. Nevertheless relief of the victims of a general epidemic is more justified than the relief of ordinary and calculable sickness.

It is safe to say that succor for the victims of industrial accidents does not add to the number of those wounded in industry; for no workingman will take needless risks or allow himself to be crippled merely in order to qualify for relief. There is, and from its nature can be, no compensation for the pain, fear, and horror felt by the structural steel-worker whose foot slips or the miner crumpled by a cave-in. Moreover, not even the loss or reduction of earning power is fully indemnified. So far from compensation calling into being a greater number of industrial casualities, in so far as it is at the charge of the employer it has the effect of lessening the number of preventable industrial accidents. There is no sounder philanthropy than to diminish the hazards of workers by placing the burden of compensation where it properly belongs—on the industry itself.

PREVENTION VERSUS RELIEF

Once it is apparent that a source of misery admits of being stoppered, it is in order for the rational philanthropist to address himself to the problem of prevention rather than relief. The contrast is epitomized in the pithy maxim, "Better a fence at the top of the precipice than an ambulance at the bottom." Samples of preventive philanthropy are: the promotion of research into the cause or cure of a disease; rehousing enterprises that may result in blotting out the slums; legal aid for those too poor or ignorant to assert their legal rights; non-commercial employment bureaus to bring together the manless job and the jobless man; the planting of social settlements, playgrounds, and vocational schools so that fewer of the children of the poor will grow up into criminals or vagabonds; the bringing of pure milk within the reach of poor nursing mothers; the instituting of loan funds to help poor but promising individuals to get on their feet.

Ignorant and emotional people prefer to relieve rather than to prevent. They are stirred to generosity on learning that neighbors or fellow-townsmen are suffering from lack of food or clothing or fuel. Nothing moves their hearts like the spectacle of little children or mothers with their children suffering hunger and cold. But once they know that the objects of their compassion have been warmed and fed, they feel no further concern about them. They are not interested in preventing the recurrence of the situation. On the other hand, those gifted with intelligence and constructive imagination are tempted to abandon to the sentimental many the providing for urgent visible human need and to center their efforts on filling up the holes in the path of life where the incautious may break a leg, to putting up warning signs where the path runs close to an abyss, and to seeing that he who stumbles shall not be trampled broad by his competitors before he has had an opportunity to get on his feet again.

The ordinary giver has to content himself with contributing his check to a preventive enterprise already under way. But the philanthropist who has large resources and can command expert advice may be able to realize the best dreams of the lonely thinkers on the advancing frontier of thought by launching something novel and unique. He may plant on new lines a play school, a "little theater," a child-research station, a heart clinic, or a tuberculosis sanitarium. He may set up a nutrition laboratory to tackle the problems of human diet, organize a corps of researchers to find out why civilized man's teeth give him so much trouble, explore and put upon the map an overlooked social morass, endow a bureau to fight through to the courts of last resort every serious encroachment upon the constitutional rights of the negro, or found a check newspaper to show up the deliberate lies, exaggerations, and silences of the subservient commercial press.

PREVENTION MAY REQUIRE THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY

More than ministering philanthropy, preventive philanthropy is likely to require the exercise of public authority. Those who are not content to stand still and help the human wrecks that file in endless procession before them but have curiosity enough to follow up the feeders of this river of human misery find sometimes that the source is one that cannot be abated without invoking the power of law. For example, such springs of evil as the illegitimate opium traffic, food adulteration, lotteries, fraudulent get-rich-quick investment schemes, preventable industrial diseases, "loan sharks," the premature labor of children, the inaccessibility of justice to the poor, unsound practices on the part of savings banks, excessive hours in industry, or devastating immigration can hardly be sealed without the help of legislators, courts, administrators, and enforcement officers. In case the prevention of misery or crime calls for constructive legislation or social policy, the rôle of the private philanthropist becomes that of promoting research into the particular social evil, dragging the hidden reluctant facts out into the light of day, broadcasting them, hammering out with experts the appropriate remedy, and building up public opinion on behalf of remedial action on the part of lawmakers or the public authorities.

THE SOCIAL-REFORM PHILANTHROPIST REAPS ABUSE

One who devotes his means to relieving distress will have nothing but appreciative words. His protégés are grateful and the onlooking public applauds. But he who attempts to prevent misery by wiping out red-light districts, bucket shops, patent-medicine frauds, "ambulance chasers," or fake promoters must be ready to take punishment. Everybody is for the volunteer life-saver at the beach; but the man who originates the "Plimsoll line" or blocks the sending to sea of unseaworthy ships will be roundly abused. Even those for whom he works will show small gratitude, for few of them catch the significance of what he is doing. Yet such preventive work is more worth while than relief, for the latter will never come to an end so long as the mills which produce wreckage and poverty are permitted to grind on. To wipe out the mills is the more fruitful and durable philanthropy. For this reason those who dedicate their efforts to bringing about a social reform which abolishes one of these mills deserves the title of "philanthropist" quite as much as the man whom everybody praises because the good he does upsets the apple-cart of no crooks, frauds, grafters, or confidence men.

FIELDS OF PREVENTIVE PHILANTHROPY

In the degree that it becomes enlightened the public is ready to grant money and authority to prevent human distress rather than merely to relieve it. Experience shows that it can be persuaded to support rather costly constructive policies provided it appears that they will add greatly to the individual's capacity to cope with his problem in virtue of his own strength. Hence, more and more the enlightened philanthropist with ample resources finds it well either to endeavor to wake up the public to a social evil of magnitude or else to tackle ameliorations too far from the interest of the legislator to hope to command public support. Such are international exchange fellowships, research into venereal diseases, the scientific study of population, investigation of the results of race-crossing, a seismic station, research into mental pathology, an institute for tropical diseases, a research expedition for epidemiology or vulcanology.

Sometimes the wise philanthropist invests his money and efforts at so great a distance from the human suffering he aims to abate that some will doubt if he is a philanthropist at all. The man who devotes himself to combating the waste and destruction of our forests, to bettering our system of criminal justice, to directing attention to the international problems of the peoples about the Pacific, to spreading eugenic ideas, to creating sentiment for stable money, to promoting international peace, to organizing sentiment for the repeal of laws against the communicating of birth-control information to married couples who seek it, not only wins no one's gratitude but will bring down upon himself the enmity of people of a contrary way of thinking.

THE DISEASES OF PHILANTHROPIES

A business is likely to be kept up to the mark by the enlivening prick of competition; but an enterprise whose prime function is to give something for nothing does not feel the spur of competition and hence is subject to a number of diseases. Among them are indifferentism, formalism, obsolescence, and absolutism.

Indifferentism.—So long as a philanthropy is young it is likely to be in charge of energetic persons who have the cause at heart and will not tolerate listless subordinates. But after its service has struck root, a certain good will has been built up, and a guiding routine established, a type of man worms his way into it who thinks more of how much he can get out of his position than of how much he can put into it. In an organization brought into direct relations with the general public, e.g., a store, post-office, or customs bureau, indifference is so quickly noted and resented that it will not long be tolerated. A philanthropy, however, which undertakes to do something for ignorant or lowly persons—such as orphans, the unemployed, the ailing poor, borrowers, discharged prisoners, immigrants, refugees—is not so free from this disease. The recipients do not know the kind of treatment they are entitled to and may not be inclined to "look a gift horse in the mouth." Moreover, their complaints as to the slackness of those charged with serving them are not likely to be listened to higher up. Hence, the humbler the persons whom a philanthropy serves, the more it stands in need of being frequently inspected and checked up by outside experts.

Formalism.—It is the way of the dull person to content himself with "going through the motions" of rendering service without troubling himself to see whether the benefits intended are indeed realized. Either because formerly success attended them or because they *look* as if they can produce the desired effect, he assumes that certain forms are inevitably efficacious and never thinks of testing their actual results.

Institutions for dependent children are the natural prey of formalism because the victims make no outcry and no one of influence takes a strong interest in the fate of the individual waif. It seems incredible that a foundling asylum which loses 97 per cent of its babies should live; yet experience has shown again and again that good people, pleased with the imagination that they are succoring foundlings, will keep on with it. A large orphanage is just the sort of thing the formalist loves. The money laid out makes a brave show, the bigness of the charity is obvious, and the children, made spick and span, can be collected in one place to feast the eyes of donors and visitors. It is overlooked that children cannot be raised well on the wholesale plan, that the institution child lags far behind other children in development, that the best parts of its nature atrophy from disuse, that all through life it will never stand for much nor alone, and that it would be infinitely better off if placed in a normal family, even if thereby the service to the orphan sank out of public view.

The formalist loves visible material relief of destitution—baskets of food and bales of clothing distributed to dingy women in shawls—and he never thinks of visiting the tenements to see how the weakly dole at the poor-office affects the habits, morals, and character of the poor. He sneers at charitable societies which dispense few groceries but waste their income in paying salaries to "a lot of trained workers who do absolutely nothing for the poor"—save to hunt a job for the out-of-work, overhaul the plumbing which has produced disease, arrange for the removal of the ailing family to a better neighborhood, persuade the landlord to wait for the rent, stand off the holder of the chattel mortgage, teach the mother to cook or earn, put the boy to a trade, or entice the children to the social settlement where they will get aspirations instead of alms.

Obsolescence.—A philanthropy regulated by the terms of the will of a donor who died centuries ago is almost sure to fall behind its time and to find itself doing something that is useless or even absurd. The history of English charitable foundations is instructive as to the folly of allowing the present to be regulated by instructions and conditions dating from the distant past. Owing to changes unforeseen by the testator, thousands of the twenty-eight thousand perpetual charities brought to light by the great endowments survey instituted in England a little over a century ago had become useless or even harmful. Funds had been left to provide forever for superannuated wool-carders, but the trade had become extinct; for teaching children to card, spin, and knit, although these are now done by machinery; for apprenticing the children of poor Protestant soldiers in Cork, a city in which for a long time there had been no Protestant soldiers; for conducting services in the French tongue in the Walloon Chapel of Canterbury Cathedral, although the congregation had known no French for a hundred years; for disseminating the doctrines of a sect that had died long since; for repairing causeways and bridges in a wet district which subsequently had been so well drained that causeways and bridges were no longer needed; for the ransom of Christians held captive by the Barbary corsairs, although the piracies of these had ceased long ago; for the relief of those imprisoned for debt; for leper hospitals; for doles to needy persons who will stultify themselves by repeating some prescribed religious formula; for schools with fixed courses of instruction reflecting the educational ideas of the Elizabethan period.

Such absurdities are possible because donors fail to realize that society, being a living, plastic thing, is bound to change. Even wisdom does not qualify men to read aright the social future, for wise and far-sighted testators have failed as egregiously as ignorant testators in forecasting society's path of development.

From this liability of a philanthropic endowment to become futile in consequence of unforeseen changes in society three practical consequences may be deduced.

1. Courts should feel free to divert a perpetual endowment to the nearest related use when it has been shown that, owing to changes in circumstances, the prescribed use of charitable funds is no longer practicable, or even results in utter waste of money, with positive harm to society rather than benefit.

2. One launching a philanthropic institution intended to function after he is gone will beware of laying down in its charter or deed of trust very explicit and specific directions as to its activities and methods. He should content himself with a broad and general definition of its aims.

3. The idea of summoning into life a work of beneficence that will endure for all time and be functioning a thousand years hence, while very alluring, is not sensible or practicable. No one alive can tell what will be the needs of our grandchildren's grandchildren. Hence the wise philanthropist will be satisfied to stamp his impress upon his own time and will leave the needs of the future to be met by philanthropists yet unborn. Every age will beget its philanthropists, and it is idle for a contemporary to imagine he can function in the twenty-second century as if he were living then. In view of the futility that in time blights even some of the noblest and best-conceived foundations, the founder of a philanthropy should plan to have principal used as well as interest and should reckon on having the whole thing wound up within sixty or seventy years at the latest.

Absolutism.—This is a disease of endowed philanthropies absolved from obedience to the judgment and wishes of their time. A philanthropic endowment should be subject to the wills of living men, not to those of men long removed from the scene—subject to living men, moreover, who know and care most about the purposes of the endowment and its problem. The policy of an endowed charity hospital, for example, ought to reflect the judgment not only of the dead founder but also of the living who best understand and are concerned about the relief of the ailing poor.

An unendowed charity will be kept in sympathy with its time by its need of current contributions. It is the financially independent establishment that is likely to be caught in an eddy. Ever since the church lost general control of charities, the favorite form of government for a foundation has been the board of trustees which fills vacancies in its membership, i.e., the co-optative or self-constituted board. But such a board easily gets out of step with its generation. Any special tendency which may develop in it is likely to become intensified and fixed. The element which happens to be in the majority when a vacancy is to be filled naturally picks a man of its way of thinking. He in turn helps to get in others of the same kidney, so that a passing bias becomes chronic. It would be hard to invent a system surer to bring the institution under a clique and eventually set it at odds with intellectual advance, moral progress, or social development. What has prevented our private foundations thus governed from becoming ossified has been the necessity of wooing givers, owing to the fact that few of them are rich enough to take full advantage of their opportunities. It is to be feared that foundations of ample means, like those of Carnegie, Sage, and Rockefeller, will in time show the unadaptedness to be expected of self-continuing boards.

The only security that a public-service institution shall constantly reflect in its ideals and policies the best thought of its time is to found it on the intellectual-moral apexes in society. This interest in the advancement of natural science apexes chiefly in universities, the government scientific bureaus, and the national scientific associations. Here, then, are given the groups that should share in selecting the trustees of a scientific-research institute. Enlightened concern about public health comes to a head in public-health associations, anti-tuberculosis associations, medical societies and colleges, and like groups. Where are better sources of judgment as to who should have a hand in governing a medical-research foundation? There is little intelligent solicitude for the poor that does not express itself in charitable societies, charity-organization societies, and a host of other philanthropic groups. Generally those included in such groups work with a deep and unselfish interest and are ahead of, rather than behind, their time. If boards in charge of endowed orphanages, rescue homes, and free hospitals filled vacancies from names submitted in turn by these groups, it would be impossible for the management to continue long at odds with the best contemporary knowledge and ideals. No doubt the board itself should fill every third or fourth vacancy in its membership in order that unorganized or minor interests should not go unrepresented. Moreover, when a nominee is personally obnoxious to a part of its members a board should have the right to call for another nomination.

Here, then, is a means of recruiting the governing boards of quasi-public institutions which insures their ready response to the best forces of their time and yet does not entangle them with the political organization and open the door to "politics." If the ultimate authority over the enormous blocks of wealth being left for public purposes is not linked in some such way with the living élite of society, it is absolutely certain that in a century, perhaps in much less time, the stately foundations rising about us will be cursed by our posterity as citadels of stupidity, prejudice, and perhaps even of political conservatism and class self-interest.

BACKGROUNDS OF SOCIAL WORK

STUART A. QUEEN

Philanthropy, charity, welfare work, social uplift, humanitarianism, social service—do these terms stand for different activities or do they all mean the same thing? Both popular discussion and the literature of the field leave us very much in doubt. These varied labels seem to be attached rather indiscriminately to a miscellaneous array of activities whose historical backgrounds are quite diverse. Yet through them all one senses a sort of unity—a unity which is felt rather than formulated. In order that we may appreciate the diversity and similarity, the independence and the co-ordination of these varied fields of effort, let us first examine some current conceptions of "social work" and then delve into a study of their origins.

Apparently social work means quite different things to different people. Some would limit it to "caring for derelicts," while others would make it include all efforts toward "forming character under adversity." William Graham Sumner long ago described it as a case of "A and B getting together to tell C what he should do for D." More recently a facetious critic has referred to it as "organized gossip." To some people it stands for almost anything that is supposed to be good for anyone else or for the public in general, while others appear to have in mind a rather specific vocation. One of the best statements of the former or "general" viewpoint has been made by Edward T. Devine.

> Social work, then, is the sum of all the efforts made by society to "take up its own slack," to provide for individuals when its established institutions fail them, to supplement those established institutions and to modify them at those points at which they have proved to be badly adapted to social needs. It may have for its object the relief of individuals or the

> improvement of conditions. It may be carried on by the government or by an incorporated society or by an informal group or by an individual, or it may be a temporary excrescence on some older institution which exists primarily for some other function. It may be well done or badly. . . . . It may be inspired by sympathy or expediency or fear of revolution or even of evolutionary change, or by a sense of justice and decency. It includes everything which is done by society for the benefit of those who are not in position to compete on fair terms with their fellows, from whatever motive it may be done, by whatever agency or whatever means, and with whatever result.[1]

Over against this are various efforts to define a distinctive field of effort requiring specific knowledge and skill and devoted to the solution of clearly formulated problems.

> Perhaps the nearest we can come to a definition is to say that social work is the art of adjusting personal relationships, of helping people to overcome the difficulties which may arise, for example, between native and foreign born, between employers and employees, between school and home. These are just the things that each one tries to do for himself and that we frequently try to do for our friends and neighbors. Most of us have not made a special study of such problems, of their causes or of the scientific basis for their solution. There would be much less confusion if the term social worker were reserved for people who have made such special studies and are trained in scientific methods of dealing with difficult problems of human relationships.[2]

> Social work is the business of producing, changing or adjusting social organization and procedure in the interests of human welfare according to scientific standards.[3]

Perhaps the whole matter might be summarized by saying that the term "social work" is today applied to (1) professional services for the development of personality and the organization of groups—families, clubs, neighborhoods, communities, etc.; (2) civic activities for the support of professional services and the promotion of wholesome living conditions. The former is sometimes described as the narrow or professional view of social work, while the latter is regarded as the broad, general conception of the field.

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[1] Edward T. Devine, *Social Work*, pp. 21–22.

[2] Stuart A. Queen, *Social Work in the Light of History*, p. 18.

[3] L. A. Halbert, *What Is Professional Social Work?* p. 25.

Apparently it is quite impossible to understand or account for this complex situation without examining the influences which have contributed to its development. A first reading of the histories of philanthropy often adds to one's bewilderment. But on further study certain significant movements and types of activity stand out. One of these is simple neighborliness in primary groups, a widespread phenomenon in all periods of human history. Another is "organized neighborliness" in groups where primary relations are giving way, as in the growth of towns. A third is charity extended to detached outsiders, as pilgrims, crusaders, traveling merchants, beggars. A fourth is the police power employed especially to repress begging. A fifth is charity extended by one social class to another, as in the humanitarian movements since the Industrial Revolution. Finally, we see social work emerging as a specialized service available to any maladjusted person or disorganized group.

SIMPLE NEIGHBORLINESS

Long before there was anything which remotely resembled organized charity, people helped each other "naturally" as friends and neighbors. Fire, flood, sickness, death, and other misfortunes were met, not by official action or by private philanthropy, but by mutual aid, spontaneous and unorganized. Some of the most significant instances of this mutual helpfulness in primary groups are to be found in the history of the early Christian church, the medieval manor, the guilds, pioneers in America, and isolated rural communities of the present.

During the first three centuries of our era the Christian church was a closely knit group living in the midst of a larger "community" which was not infrequently quite hostile. The enthusiasm of those with a new faith, the relatively small numbers, the distinctive teachings of Jesus, and the persecutions from without helped to weld each congregation into a solid unit. There was a spirit of "each for all and all for each." Hence when trouble came, it was a problem not merely for the afflicted individual, but for the whole group. But ordinarily this helpfulness was not extended to the "heathen." It is important to bear this in mind, for some may be inclined to attribute the spirit and practice of philanthropy directly to the teachings of Jesus and a love for mankind in general. It seems quite plain from the evidence that we have in the first instance not service to all men, but mutual aid within a clearly defined group.

Another such group was the medieval manor. Of course the situation differed in many respects. The rural village of medieval Europe was more stable and more isolated than was the congregation of the early church. But both were compact social units whose members practiced mutual aid after the fashion of real neighbors the world over.

Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristics of local community life in the Middle Ages were fixity and isolation. Nearly everyone "knew his place" and "stayed put" both socially and geographically. Most of the villagers were blood kinsmen. They traveled little and received few visitors. They produced nearly everything necessary for their existence. Indeed, there were laws against detachment from one's "home town," and traveling merchants were subject to strict regulation. On the manorial estates there was a host of common activities and interests. It was literally impossible for anyone to "live unto himself." Each tenant was annually assigned a number of strips in the three great fields, in which he raised the same crops in the same way as did all his neighbors. Together with them he rendered certain customary services to the lord of the manor, turned his cattle into the common pasture, attended the manorial court and the parish church.

It is significant that we can find no historical mention of charity within the manor. It is also noteworthy that tithing and parochial relief which did exist in an earlier period (and which we shall discuss in the next section) largely disappeared during the Middle Ages.

When anyone suffered misfortune, he was among friends and relatives who had been sharing all the experiences of life with him and who took it for granted that they should help him out. There seem to have been no committees, no collections, and no institutions maintained by any of these little communities. The neighbors just came in, and whatever they could they did gladly and as a matter of course. Moreover, many of their troubles were even more obviously group calamities. If there were a crop failure, it meant hunger for the whole village. If there were a pestilence, the absence of sanitary conveniences and medical knowledge meant that it would strike every family.

Similarly we might describe the mutual aid in early settlements in America, where the colonists, facing common dangers and hardships, practiced co-operation rather than charity. We might tell of the spontaneous helpfulness to be found in certain rural districts today. But probably enough has been offered to display a type of situation and a type of activity which appear to have significance for the interpretation of present-day social work. What we have been presenting is the practice of mutual aid, or simple neighborliness, among the members of a localized, primary group. Its basis is sympathy within and often conflict without. Its objective, if it may be said to have an objective, is the preservation of the group.

ORGANIZED NEIGHBORLINESS

When the members of a group increase in number, especially through the coming-in of various types of folks, the original solidarity is likely to break down. Definite machinery must be set up to get things done which formerly "took care of themselves." We shall see how this happened in the early Christian church, the medieval parish, guild, and town.

While the Jerusalem church started out "like one big family," the membership grew rapidly and soon came to include some who spoke Greek and some who spoke Aramaic.

> Now in these days, when the number of the disciples was multiplying, there arose a murmuring of the Grecian Jews against the Hebrews, because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration. And the twelve called the multitude of the disciples unto them, and said, It is not fit that we should forsake the word of God and serve tables. Look ye out, therefore, brethren, from among you seven men of good report, full of the Spirit and of wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business.[1]

The common meals of the church members became more or less formal "love feasts" and later a means of providing for the poor. Children who had lost their parents were at first simply taken in by friends and neighbors, but presently it became the duty of the bishop to have them brought up at the expense of the church, "and to take care that the girls be given, when of marriageable age, to Christian husbands, and that the boys should learn some art or handicraft." The visiting and ransoming of prisoners were at first attended to by those who knew them personally and needed no urging; but soon these activities had to be stimulated by the elders. Hospitality to traveling Christians soon became a burden and was gradually displaced by the establishment of institutions known as *xenodochia*. These *xenodochia* provided lodging not only for wayfaring brethren, but also for widows, orphans, aged and sick persons. It is evident that simple neighborliness was no longer adequate. It was being supplemented by institutional care. But with rather few exceptions these relief measures were restricted to members of the church. Organized charity like mutual aid was for the benefit of the "in-group."

This parish relief—for such it really was—has continued in one form or another to the present day. But after the period of the *Völkerwanderung* and the establishment of feudalism most parish churches ceased to collect tithes for the support of the poor. This seems to have been associated with the decentralization, isolation, and fixity to which we referred in the previous section. But with the revival of commerce and the growth of towns there was a renewal of charitable activity in many parishes.

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[1] Acts 6:1–3.

The merchant and craft guilds of the Middle Ages were in the beginning primary groups, similar in many respects to the early Christian congregations and the village communities already discussed. They were composed of persons engaged in the same trade; they were quite exclusive; they developed a high degree of self-government; they lived on the same street or in the same neighborhood; they attended the same church and celebrated the same holidays. Apprentices often lived with their masters; journeymen expected soon to become masters; all worked together in the intimate relations of the small shop. But after a time there were built up barriers between the various grades. Conditions of apprenticeship were made hard; journeymen were prevented from becoming masters; some of the masters set up an inner circle known as the "mystery."

With this transition from primary-group solidarity to a more complex social organization we find a parallel change from simple neighborliness to organized relief. Thus the bakers of Strassburg made a contract with the hospital in their city according to which the superintendent was to receive any member of the guild who might be brought in by the proper official. Some guilds established hospitals of their own. This was done, for example, in the fifteenth century by the goldsmiths of Paris, the farriers of Florence, and the apothecaries of Rome. From an ordinance of the white-tawyers or leather-dressers of London, in 1346, we learn that they provided a collection box to secure funds with which to keep a candle burning in the Church of All Hallows.

> Also, if by chance one of the said trade shall fall into poverty, whether through old age, or because he cannot labor or work, and have nothing with which to help himself; he shall have every week from the said box 7*d.* for his support, if he be a man of good repute. And after his decease, if he have a wife, a woman of good repute, she shall have weekly for her support 7*d.* from the said box, so long as she shall behave herself well, and keep single. . . . . And if any one of the said trade shall depart this life, and have not wherewithal to be buried, he shall be buried at the expense of the common box.[1]

The guilds, of course, represented the dominant element in the medieval towns. But there was an increasing number of persons who belonged to no guild. Also there were, in time of famine, pestilence, and the influx of beggars, problems which the guilds working separately were unable to solve. So, along with other powers and duties, the municipalities assumed an increasing measure of responsibility for relief work.

In numbers of English and German cities the mayor provided food for the citizens in time of famine, and in the sixteenth century the mayor and aldermen of London were ordered to make annual purchases.

In all the medieval towns there were institutions known by such names as Maison-Dieu, almshouse, and hospital. These were founded and controlled by various agencies. Some were in the hands of religious orders, others belonged to guilds, still others had a more or less independent organization. Now it was notorious that there was much laxness of administration. Hence it is not surprising to find the town governments undertaking to regulate these "hospitals." In some cases burgesses were made trustees. In others more or less frequent inspections were made by city officials. In not a few cases the municipality actually took charge of existing hospitals, and occasionally it founded new institutions.

In addition to disaster relief and institutional care there was developing in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries aid to the poor in their own homes. Thus the city officials of Genoa in 1413 appointed some "upright citizens," known as *officiales misericordiae*, to collect and distribute alms for the indigent. Similar arrangements were made in numerous French towns under such names as Table des Pauvres, Table-Dieu, and Carité et Pauvreté. But this "outdoor relief," as the English call it, had its principal development in those countries of Northern Europe which broke with Rome during the sixteenth century. The *Regulation of a Common Chest*, which was drawn up by Luther in 1523, became the basis of a widespread reform in Germany.

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[1] From "Ordinances of the White Tawyers of London" (1346). Quoted by Erle Fiske Young in *History of Social Work*, Sec. A II, 5*b*, 1.

> Begging is to be rigidly prohibited; all who are not old and weak shall work; no beggars are to be permitted to stay who do not belong to the parish. Poor householders who have honourably laboured at their craft or in agriculture, shall, if they can find no other support, be given loans, without interest, from the common chest; and this aid shall be given to them without return, if they are really unable to restore it. The income of the chest shall be composed of the revenues of ecclesiastical estates, of free contributions, and, if necessary, of an assessment upon resident citizens, and a small poll-tax upon servants and journeymen. The administration shall be in the hands of elected citizens.[1]

With such a plan as this we have come a long way from the spontaneous, mutual helpfulness among members of a primary group. Indeed, it is even more than "organized neighborliness," for we have now introduced the power of the state to regulate begging and collect taxes. But in spite of weakened solidarity, we still have aid to members of local groups. In fact, the relief measures of parish, guild, and municipality were almost exclusively for the home folks. But while neighborliness must certainly have continued, it was frankly recognized as inadequate; charity had become a necessity.

AID TO DETACHED INDIVIDUALS

So far we have been discussing the ways in which local groups have cared for their own members. We shall consider now their methods of dealing with persons overtaken by misfortune while away from home and friends.

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[1] William Ashley, *Introduction to English Economic History*, I, II, 342–43.

Through most of the medieval period the great majority of people stayed rather closely at home. Not many wandered far from their own village. Yet at all times there was a small number of persons who were detached temporarily or permanently from their primary groups. There were pilgrims on their way to holy shrines, merchants with pack horses, knights errant, begging friars, and ordinary mendicants. Petty, medieval warfare, bad roads, robber barons, sickness, and accident brought many of these wanderers to distress. Simple hospitality might conceivably have met the needs of the strangers. But they did not "belong" to the people who lived in the place where their trouble occurred. Hence neighborliness could not be counted on. Mutual aid, which covered the needs of members of the local group, was not generally extended to these detached folk.

The misfortunes of strangers called into being a distinct set of agencies, usually under the auspices of the church, but quite independent of the local parishes. The various monastic and hospital orders established institutions which served as refuges for pilgrims, soldiers, peddlers, and beggars. In them the wanderers found lodging and food, care in time of illness, and protection against those who would do them harm. It is true that the monasteries, hospitals, and asylums of various sorts gave aid also to needy folk of the immediate vicinity, especially lame, halt, and blind, foundlings, and aged. But they functioned as independent institutions serving separate individuals rather than as community enterprises serving members of a group. This is shown by two sets of facts. First, the monasteries and hospitals were usually not under the control of the local clergy but of a religious order which was responsible to some higher dignitary, often to the pope himself. Second, the relief given, both in the institution and outside, involved little consideration of the community relationships of the applicant.

Typical of the agencies for helping detached persons was the Teutonic order, founded about 1200 in Palestine by the Duke of Swabia. Members took the oath of chastity, poverty, and obedience. They were informed that their first duty was care of the sick; the second was defense of the Holy Land. It was laid down in the rules of the order that wherever they acquired land they must build a hospital.

> Besides the care of the sick, these hospitalers of the Teutonic order, like all others of the Middle Ages, had general missions. They received the shelterless and impotent poor, gave alms freely to the poor of the district, sought out deserted, orphaned and "exposed" children for care and rearing, and gave lodging to strangers and travelers. An account from Coblenz in 1318 says: "They dedicate themselves with pious zeal to the care and needs of the poor and sick, they feed the hungry, give water to the thirsty, they receive travelers with hospitality, clothe the naked, visit the sick, show sympathy and pity with their suffering, and send tokens of love to their burials."[1]

Perhaps the most striking and widespread of all relief measures employed during the Middle Ages was the general distribution of alms from hospital and monastery gates, from church doors at the time of funerals or anniversaries, and from the homes of prelates and nobles.

> With great prelates and nobles this almsgiving assumed huge proportions, and rivalled that of the monasteries and hospitals. They often provided food daily for scores and even hundreds of persons, with double or triple alms on the great festivals; and many of them had their "dealing days" thrice a week, when doles were distributed at their gates to all who applied. Stowe tells us that "Edward, late Earl of Derby," fed "aged persons twice every day, sixty and odd, besides all comers thrice a week"; that West, Bishop of Ely, "daily gave at his gates, besides bread and drink, warm meat to two hundred poor people."[2]

The purpose of such almsgiving was very different from that of the mutual aid within local communities. Indeed, one might well wonder how it came about that medieval folk, who viewed strangers with so great suspicion, made such prodigal gifts indiscriminately to all who came. The key to an understanding of this apparent anomaly is the doctrine of the religious merit of almsgiving.

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[1] From an unpublished manuscript by Anna T. Gilchrist.

[2] Ashley, *op. cit.*, I, Part II, 328.

Many interesting statements of this doctrine may be found in the writings of the Church Fathers. Thus Chrysostom wrote in one of his homilies: "With whatsoever sins then thou mayest be burdened, thy charity outweighs them all."[1] Moreover, virtue inhered in simply giving something away, quite aside from its relation to the real needs of the recipient. In one of his sermons Chrysostom plead for generous, openhanded, undiscriminating almsgiving.

> Why do you make so much trouble for yourself? Why do you investigate so carefully? If God had commanded us to inquire into the lives of others, to demand reports from them and to investigate their habits minutely, would not many be indignant? Would they not say among themselves, What is the purpose of this anyway? God has given us a difficult task. Can we investigate the lives of others? . . . .
>
> Wherefore, I beseech you, let us cast aside this inopportune curiosity and give alms to all the poor, and let us do it generously, that we too, on that day of judgment, may receive from God abundant pity and kindness.[2]

The results of this policy are not hard to guess. Begging and idleness grew apace until gangs of vagrants became a positive menace to "quiet folk." As a result, stern measures were adopted throughout Western Europe in the effort to repress mendicity.

REPRESSIVE MEASURES

It was in the fourteenth century that the first systematic efforts to stamp out begging made their appearance. But apparently it was not a recognition of the fruits of indiscriminate almsgiving that gave rise to the new legislation. Rather was it an attempt to keep laborers in the state of servitude from which they were just emerging with the breakdown of the feudal system. As a consequence, the laws of this period prescribed similar penalties for beggars, gamblers, jugglers, and for laborers who asked for higher wages or went to new places in search of employment. The whole matter was brought to a head in England by the Black Death of 1347. As a result of this epidemic laborers were very scarce and rather independent; hence landlords were not inclined to look with pleasure on the reckless distribution of alms, whether by religious orders or private citizens. The outcome was the famous Statute of Laborers (1349).

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[1] Homily 7, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* (2d ser.), Vol. XIV.

[2] Quoted by Lillian Brandt, *How Much Shall I Give?* p. 90.

> It begins by stating, that, "Because a great part of the people, and especially workmen and servants, late died of the pestilence, many, seeing the necessity of masters and great scarcity of servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive wages, and some rather willing to beg in idleness than by labour to get their living"; and it then goes on to direct "that every man and woman, of whatsoever condition, free or bond, able in body, and within the age of threescore years, not living in merchandise, not exercising any craft, nor having of his own whereof he may live, nor proper land about whose tillage he may himself occupy, and not serving any other, shall be bound to serve him which him shall require, and take only the wages, livery, meed, or salary which were accustomed to be given in the places where he oweth to serve. . . . ."
>
> . . . . It is, among other things, enacted, "That, because many valiant beggars, as long as they may live of begging, do refuse to labour, giving themselves to idleness and vice, and sometimes to theft and other abomination, none, upon pain of imprisonment, shall, under colour of pity or alms, give anything to such which may labour, or presume to favour them in their sloth, so that thereby they may be compelled to labour for their necessary living."[1]

This was followed by a series of enactments of varying degrees of severity, but apparently with uniform failure to accomplish their expressed purpose. Laborers were ordered to stay in their home communities. Able-bodied persons were forbidden to beg. "Beggars impotent to serve" were attached to the place of their residence or birth, where they sometimes received licenses to ask for alms. Gypsies were deported. The penalties which were imposed included whipping, cutting off the ears, branding, compulsory labor amounting almost to slavery, and even death. But in England, as on the Continent, we have abundant evidence of the failure of these repressive measures. The preamble of an act of 1530 recites:

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[1] Sir George Nicholls, *History of the English Poor Law*, I, 36–37.

> In all places throughout this realm, vagabonds and beggars have of long time increased, and daily do increase in great and excessive numbers, by the occasion of idleness, mother and root of all vices, whereby hath insurged and sprung, and daily insurgeth and springeth, continual thefts, murders and other heinous offences and great enormities, to the high displeasure of God, the unquietation and damage of the king's people, and to the marvellous disturbance of the common weal.[1]

Eventually the inadequacy of merely negative action became apparent and more positive measures were introduced. Local responsibility was fixed, taxes were imposed, the needy were classified. The great law of Elizabeth (1601) laid the foundation for public relief in England and America, until now we have tax-supported institutions and agencies for service to persons in a great variety of difficulties. We have public-relief officers, almshouses, orphanages, homes for the feeble-minded, employment bureaus, pensions, and insurance schemes. But they all represent a growing out of and away from the earlier repressive measures whose purposes were to preserve a cheap and servile labor supply, to escape the annoyance of importunate beggars, to maintain "law and order," and to economize in the expenditure of public funds.

MIDDLE-CLASS HUMANITARIANISM

It will be noted that the "welfare work" discussed so far has been either a kind of mutual aid among the members of limited groups or an undiscriminating attention to detached individuals. The nineteenth century brought something different from either of these, namely, the charity of one social class extended to another social class. An understanding of this new development requires consideration of the Industrial Revolution and its consequences.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

A detailed study is both impractical and unnecessary for our present purposes, but it is important to be reminded of the tremendous economic and social changes involved in the appearance of the factory system, the growth of cities, increased mobility, and the realignment of social classes. The use of power machinery required the assembling of many machines in one place. This in turn called for the bringing-together of large numbers of workers and their families. The possibility of finding similar work in various localities, the release from medieval restrictions on residence, and the improved means of transportation greatly increased the mobility of the population. But for all the new "freedom" the working people found it hard to make more than a bare living. The principal returns from the improved processes of production went into the pockets of those who already had wealth or otherwise found themselves in strategic positions. As a result the main outlines of the social structure of England and Western Europe were greatly changed. (This transition came somewhat later in America.) Instead of a majority of the population being tenant farmers or peasants, the majority were industrial wage-earners living in cities and towns. Instead of the ruling class consisting of the nobility and the clergy, control passed to the merchants and manufacturers. Moreover, there developed an intense class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, commonly referred to as "capital and labor."

These momentous changes in the social order gave rise to new problems involving health, housing, child labor, women in industry, alternating booms and depressions, immigration, etc. Because it was all so new, the builders of factories and city dwellings did not know how to provide for sanitation and safety. Ignorance, avarice, and the rapid growth of towns produced overcrowding in houses and tenements. Boys and girls who had formerly worked at home with their parents were now put into factories to operate machines twelve or fifteen hours a day under the stimulus of an overseer's whip. Women found employment outside the home, leaving the health and training of children largely to chance. With the manufacture of goods for a world-market, instead of mainly for home consumption, employment fluctuated with the rise and fall of general business conditions. Laborers alternated between overwork and unemployment. The constant hope of better times somewhere else, in another city, another state, another country, lured invididuals and families from place to place. American cities in particular presently came to present the aspect of a mosaic of immigrant colonies, negro districts, and other areas of workingmen's homes, surrounded by apartment-houses and exclusive residential districts. With the growth of urban population and wealth, areas of deterioration, often known as "slums," developed in the heart of our cities.

But the Industrial Revolution not only precipitated new problems; it brought forth new sponsors and new motives for charity. The new middle class (standing between the old nobility on the one hand and the proletariat on the other) was anxious about its "place in the sun." It won its way first economically, then politically, last of all socially. In all three fields "welfare work" was a device for gaining recognition and power. Employers wanted to "keep the workers contented." Wealthy men sought political preferment through conspicuous philanthropies. Their wives loved the sense of importance derived from having poor families "under their wing" and the publicity gained through sponsoring charity balls. Some of them found a thrill in the adventure of "slumming." Some were genuinely sympathetic with the unfortunate members of the working class. They hoped somehow to bridge the gap between social classes and to offset some of the hard things in the capitalistic system. But in general they were careful not to "mix philanthropy and business." That is, they were willing to give of their surplus to the "lower" classes, but they had no notion of wiping out class lines.

Some of the forms which this middle-class humanitarianism took were employers' welfare work, housing reform, prison reform, child-saving, charity organization, and social settlements.

The spirit of the whole movement is indicated in the commonly accepted definition of employers' welfare work—"Anything for the comfort and improvement, intellectual or social, of the employees, over and above wages paid, which is not a necessity of the industry nor required by law."[1] In other words, this is regarded definitely as a gratuity. The wide range of facilities and activities included under the head of "welfare" is shown in bulletins of the United States Steel Corporation. They list dwellings, boarding-houses, churches, schools, clubs, restaurants, restrooms, playgrounds, hospitals, relief for injured men and their families, visiting nurses, pensions, etc.

Turning from employers' welfare work to housing reform, we get another glimpse of "bourgeois benevolence," as someone has called it. Mrs. Wood describes the first legislative investigation of tenement-houses in New York as follows.

> [The committee decided] "to proceed to a thorough personal inspection of tenant houses in every ward of the city." Safeguarded by a detail of police, guided by the chief of the sanitary bureau, and accompanied by reporters, they "penetrated to localities and witnessed scenes which in frightful novelty far exceeded the limit of their previously conceived ideas of human degradation and suffering." The committee felt that they were indeed exploring a strange and hostile land in what they described as their "arduous, painful, and as may be conjectured, hazardous duty."[2]

Housing reform has taken a variety of forms. Philanthropic trust funds and limited dividend companies ("charity at 5 per cent") have provided "model tenements," flats, and single dwellings. Followers of Octavia Hill have sought to combine the duties of rent collector and friendly visitor. Employers and chambers of commerce have constructed houses to rent or sell at low rates. In addition, there has been restrictive legislation and more recently zoning. In Europe, but not in America except during the war, there are numerous examples of state or municipal housing.

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[1] *U.S. Bur. Lab. Stat. Bull.* 250, p. 8.

[2] Edith E. Wood, *Housing of the Unskilled Wage Earner*, p. 29.

A third type of middle-class humanitarianism was prison reform. Many of the leaders in this movement have been Quakers. As early as 1776 they founded the Philadelphia Society for Relieving Distressed Prisoners, and in 1787 the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons. Beginning with religious services and personal comforts for individual prisoners, they went on to study the construction and conduct of prisons. Other societies were started for the purpose of removing juvenile offenders from common jails to houses of refuge. Out of these grew reform schools, and much later probation.

It is interesting that very often prison reform and child-saving were linked together. The reason was apparently a belief that the surest way to prevent crime is to rescue the children of the poor from their sordid surroundings. So it was perhaps natural that a book devoted to the history of the New York Children's Aid Society should be called *The Dangerous Classes of New York and Twenty Years' Work among Them*. In this book we find "emigration" described as "the best remedy for juvenile pauperism." This society distributed children, often in carload lots, from Manitoba to Florida, at the rate of two thousand or more a year. Along with it and other child-placing societies there appeared orphan asylums, humane societies, societies for prevention of cruelty to children, and many others. In this group of agencies we find a strange mixture of motives, sentimental, religious, and economic. These are interestingly set forth in a circular issued in 1853.

> This society has taken its origin in the deeply settled feeling of our citizens that something must be done to meet the increasing crime and poverty among the destitute children of New York. Its objects are to help this class by opening Sunday meetings and industrial schools, and gradually, as means shall be furnished, by forming lodging houses and reading rooms for children and by employing paid agents, whose sole business shall be to care for them.
>
> As Christian men, we cannot look upon this great multitude of unhappy, deserted, and degraded boys and girls without feeling our responsibility to God for them. The class increases: immigration is pouring in its multitudes of poor foreigners who leave these young outcasts everywhere in our midst. These boys and girls, it should be remembered, will soon form the great lower class of our city. They will influence elections; they may shape the policy of the city; they will assuredly, if unreclaimed, poison society all around them. They will help to form the great multitude of robbers, thieves, and vagrants, who are now such a burden upon the law-respecting community.[1]

Another expression of nineteenth-century humanitarianism is to be found in the host of relief societies which made their appearance in every city under some such name as Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor. They gave rise to such confusion that complaint was made on all sides.

> From every quarter testimony arises that the system was without adequate safeguards of investigation, tests of destitution, or means of hindering duplication of relief from several sources simultaneously, or of making the relief adequate to the necessity. Private almsgiving, for the most part through organized and often incorporated societies, was profuse and chaotic, while still behind the demands made upon it, and was dispersed in tantalizing doles miserably inadequate for effectual succor where the need was genuine, and dealt out broadcast among the clamorous and impudent.[2]

To meet this situation there developed first in England and then in America a group of agencies known as charity organization societies. Their purposes included correlation of the work being done by other societies, repression of public outdoor relief, abstention from relief-giving but mediation between client and possible sources of relief. Their methods included registration, investigation, friendly visiting, "provident schemes," and co-operation with the police to repress begging. Watson has stated the functions of these societies in more general terms as, "first and basic, the rehabilitation of families which for any reason fail to be self-sufficient; second, the education of the community in correct principles of relief; and third, aid in the elimination of the causes of poverty."[1] At first the workers were all unpaid, but the demands laid upon them became so great that a full-time, paid staff was built up in all but the smaller societies. However, for a long time the "friendly visiting" and "spiritual alms" of the volunteers were accounted "the very soul of the movement."

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[1] Quoted in *Report on History of Child-Saving* (National Conference of Charities and Correction, 1893), p. 3.

[2] Charles D. Kellogg, in *Nat. Conf. Char. and Cor.* (1893), p. 53.

Rather different from the humanitarian efforts already described, and yet very much like them after all, were the social settlements which developed in the eighties. A German student of this movement has defined a settlement as follows:

> A settlement is a colony of members of the upper classes, formed in a poor neighborhood, with the double purpose of getting to know the local conditions of life from personal observation, and of helping where help is needed. The settler gives up the comfort of a West End home, and becomes a friend of the poor. . . . . The settler comes to the poor as man to man, in the conviction that it means a misfortune for all parties and a danger for the nation, if the different classes live in complete isolation of thought and environment. He comes to bridge the gulf between the classes.[2]

The activities of the settlements have been exceedingly varied. They carry on educational activities ranging from kindergarten to classes in English for adult foreigners. They maintain gymnasiums and playgrounds, direct clubs, pageants, and entertainments of various sorts. They conduct investigations of social problems that appear in their districts. They seek to promote a revival of neighborhood life, making their houses the headquarters of communal activities.

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[1] Frank D. Watson, *Charity Organization Movement in the United States*, p. 94.

[2] Werner Picht, *Toynbee Hall and the English Settlements*, p. 1.

Most of these and many other agencies were private, nonsectarian societies, maintained by the upper and middle classes for the supposed benefit of the working class. Sometimes they were mere camouflage for exploitation, sometimes they were devices for gaining prestige, sometimes they were organized expressions of genuine sympathy, sometimes they were adventures in the world where "the other half lives."

SOCIAL WORK AS A PROFESSION

It is important to realize that the activities which we have described belong to the present as well as to the past. We still have simple neighborliness and genuine sympathy for the unfortunate person or family in need of help. We still have organized co-operation and mutual aid, in modern trade-unions as in medieval guilds. We still have indiscriminate almsgiving to strangers, frequently now as in the past, under religious auspices. We still punish beggars and order them out of town. We have still a host of private, non-sectarian agencies, maintained by the upper fourth (economically speaking) of the population for the benefit (real or supposed) of the lowest fourth. But out of all this we see the gradual emergence of social work as a profession, a specialized, skilled service, available to any maladjusted person or disorganized group. In one sense, it is mutual aid on a vastly larger scale than ever before. But especially it is distinguished by the effort to define its tasks clearly and to develop the knowledge and skill necessary to their performance.

Thus we find that many of the activities which were started as employers' welfare work are being put on a different basis. Some are still administered by the employer, but as "good business" rather than as charity. Some are being taken over by the employees organized for self-help. Others are being prescribed by law. The state itself is establishing bureaus of vocational guidance, employment exchanges, and insurance funds. Employers' welfare work was distinguished as a bounty; social work in industry represents skilled service.

Tenement-house reform has by no means disappeared, but more and more attention is being given to providing suitable housing in acceptable surroundings for all the people. Hence we have not only "model housing laws," but also co-operative housing, city and regional planning, devised and administered by persons with special training in these fields.

Prison reform is still in order, but more significant are the appearance of trained probation and parole officers, policewomen and institutional heads, the establishment of juvenile courts and psychiatric clinics.

In work with children the "saving" of "juvenile paupers and criminals" has yielded ground to promoting the welfare of all children. On the physical side we have "well-baby stations" and school hygiene. For recreation and leisure time we have playgrounds, Campfire Girls, Boy Scouts, and summer camps. For education we have supplemented compulsory attendance with child-study departments, special schools, visiting teachers, and "socialized" curricula. For the emotional life we have established child guidance and habit clinics. For legal protection we have enacted children's codes.

> Our century long efforts to care for dependent, neglected, defective and delinquent children have all the time implied the ideal of a child welfare minimum for *all* children; but we have been so busy trying to overcome separate and specific handicaps that we have not clearly seen the implication. For example, the orphan asylum implies that every child should have a real home. Special institutions for the deaf imply that all children need ears that can hear. . . . . To protect children against neglect and cruelty implies that all children ought to have loving care and sympathetic discipline. To forbid persons to employ children at exhaustive work for long hours implies that all children need constructive work conditions adjusted to their strength. . . . .[1]

A similar change has taken place with the supplanting of charity organization societies by family-welfare associations.

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[1] Henry W. Thurston, in *Nat. Conf. Soc. Work* (1918), p. 52.

Instead of merely organizing relief and friendly visiting for "poor" families, these agencies are emphasizing the adjustment of personal relations and the development of family integrity. It is significant that the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the first charity organization society in America was celebrated in 1927 by a Conference on Family Life. The reasoning which accompanied this transition from an economic to a sociological viewpoint ran somewhat as follows:

> We have seen poverty and sickness and disaster affect people, and they have held up their heads against fate without the slightest concession. We have seen minor reverses crumple an individual, children with apparently good advantages turn out socially unsuccessful. And the common denominator has seemed to be the family. In the first series, there has been coherence in family ties which has borne the individual over the tragedy; in the latter series, family disruption or conflict laid the ground for defeat before the individual faced his test.[1]

Gradually there has been built up an "educationally communicable technique" known as "social case work," which has been defined as "those processes which develop personality through adjustments consciously effected, individual by individual, between men and their social environment."[2] To the development of this technique the family social workers have probably contributed most. But as the possibilities of the case-work approach were grasped by workers with children, old people, unemployed, sick, mentally defective, delinquents, and others, each group made its own contribution. So that social case work today includes diagnosis and treatment, personal influence and modification of the environment, direct service, and the co-operation of specialists in other fields. The influences of economics, religion, and law have been supplemented by those of medicine, psychiatry, and sociology.

Likewise great changes have taken place in the field of neighborhood and community work. Starting with the social settlements planted in "slum" districts by middle-class uplifters, this movement has come to emphasize increasingly the self-organization of natural groupings of people. In fact, the study of "human ecology" with its search for "natural areas" is coming to underlie new ventures in this field, as well as to modify the superstructure of other types of social work. The settlements persist, but we have an increasing number of neighborhood-improvement associations, social centers in the schools, community churches, and community clubs.

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[1] Frank J. Bruno, *Family*, VIII (1927), 262.

[2] Mary Richmond, *What Is Social Case Work?* pp. 98–99.

As the number and variety of social agencies has grown, the problem of correlation has become increasingly important. The first real steps toward its solution were taken by the charity-organization societies. Especially were their confidential exchanges important devices for interagency cooperation. More recently charities indorsement committees have contributed toward a view of social work as a whole; and still more recently councils of social agencies have been established to bring about genuine team work among the various organizations in a given locality.

The same problems of correlation have appeared among the tax-supported agencies. In any given city there might be a relief department, probation office, employment bureau, factory and housing inspection, hospitals, clinics, parks, and playgrounds. Kansas City started the board of public-welfare movement with its program of bringing many of these separate but related activities under one department. A similar development has taken place among the state departments. First there was a separate board for each institution, then came the boards of charities and corrections to supervise the state and local institutions—with usually more or less control over private agencies as well—and now some states have departments of public welfare with highly centralized control over many public and some private institutions and bureaus.

The problem of financing all this array of social-work agencies is naturally very insistent. The total cost no one can tell, but the American Association for Community Organization found the income of these agencies in 19 cities to be nearly $113,000,000 in 1924. Of this total 31 per cent was provided by taxes, 22 per cent by contributions, 4 per cent by endowments, and 43 per cent by earnings. The wasteful and annoying methods of separate financing in the private agencies has led to the rapid development of community chests, until there are now known to be 310 in the United States and Canada.

In all these fields of social work there has been a growing interest in research. The Federal Children's Bureau, the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Community Center Association, the Association of Community Chests and Councils, the Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency, the American Association of Social Workers—these are only a few of the agencies which are adding to the fund of information about social problems and possible ways of dealing with them.

For the training of social workers there have developed since 1904 more than twenty-five professional schools, most of them requiring a background of social science and offering specific courses in the techniques of case work, group work, administration, and research. Over four thousand persons who have had training and experience in "recognized" agencies are banded together in a professional organization, known as the American Association of Social Workers. Its objectives are *esprit de corps* and higher standards of work. It is engaged in job analysis, and studies of personnel practices, professional ethics, recruiting, and training.

Just what forces have produced these recent changes it is hard to tell. But undoubtedly the development of social work in the last few decades has been influenced by the democratic movement and by the sciences of biology, psychology, and sociology. But, whatever the reasons may be, social workers of today are less and less kind-hearted uplifters, but more and more skilled workers with a sporting interest in their profession. Young men and women seem to be choosing this vocation on much the same basis as they might select law or medicine or teaching or engineering as a life-work. They regard it as an interesting game which challenges them to be at their best; they expect from it the recognition that comes from satisfactory performance of any important task; they hope to find in it security of tenure and adequate remuneration.

In the light of this historical review we can make a distinction which was impossible at the beginning. We can describe charity as the rendering of service or offering of material relief without expectation of the usual return; while we can define social work as the adjustment of personal relations and the reorganization of social groups. Charity may be applied equally well to free service from physician or lawyer, free groceries, coal or clothing from the merchant, or free service in the adjustment of family relations. But just as medical service is medical service whether rendered in the charity ward of a hospital or in the expensive office of a private practitioner, social work is social work whether supported by taxation, community chest, or payments from the persons served.

What, then, are the prospects for the future? The rôle of the prophet is hazardous, but there are certain trends of the present and recent past on which we may fairly base tentative predictions. First, as to personnel, it is likely that the field of social work will gradually be dominated by men and women with professional training. This training will be constantly revised in the light of scientific (especially sociological) research. The financial support of established types of social work will be increasingly a matter of taxation. But there will always be new problems and new ventures calling for private funds. For a time community chests will increase in number and financial strength, until the body of givers becomes so great and the pressure on recalcitrant citizens so strong that the transition to a tax-supported system will be easy. Community trusts and foundations will continue to grow, with the constant menace of the "dead hand" and the great advantage of freedom from popular caprice. Social agencies will be used increasingly by persons of all economic and social classes, but most of the clients will be people of very limited resources. There will be increasing attention to the prevention of poverty, disease, crime, and various forms of social maladjustment. The spirit of charity will not disappear, but it will gradually be overshadowed by the spirit of democracy and the spirit of science.

BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CHARITY

H. S. JENNINGS

In connection with recent developments of biological science, questions have been raised as to the ulterior effects of charitable work, as to the effect of that work on the constitution of later generations. As now practiced, charitable work is directed mainly toward improving the lot of the individuals of the present generation. It cannot be urged that the welfare of any particular future generation in itself is more important than the welfare of that one now existing. Yet the welfare of the present generation would be purchased at too high a price if it involved the deterioration of all succeeding generations. Is there ground for holding that the methods employed in charitable work tend in that direction? Further, may charitable work profitably take more fully into consideration the improvement of life in future generations? Is there positive work in such a direction that it should undertake, in addition to that now carried on?

Charitable work attempts to make human life more worth living, both by ameliorating the conditions surrounding life and by improving the human individuals, through raising the level of physical and mental health and efficiency. It is in connection with this second line of work that suggestions are made for change in charitable aims and methods. The physical and mental health and efficiency of a generation depend not alone on the conditions under which that generation develops, but also largely on what individuals of the previous generation are the parents of that generation, and on how those parent-individuals have mated. The question is raised as to whether charitable work takes this matter sufficiently into consideration. The question is raised as to whether charitable work as practiced does not tend to preserve the poorer individuals and to make them the progenitors of later generations that shall inherit their poor characteristics—thus deteriorating the race.

At times the radical suggestion is made that the entire enterprise of improving the conditions of life, through charitable work, is in the wrong direction. Charitable organizations, social workers, public-health workers, it is urged, are promoting the survival and propagation of the unfit. By protecting us from our enemies, the bacteria and the viruses, by removing the sources of disease, by improving our nutrition, by showing us how to avoid unfavorable conditions and to find favorable ones, they are progressively filling the race with the weak and degenerate, who must hand on their weakness and degeneracy to their descendants. Conditions should be made harder instead of easier; any other procedure results in corrupting the race.

Clearly, in any general form this thesis is untenable. Organisms cannot live without selection and control of the environment. Every organism must seek out, draw to itself, those conditions which are favorable to its physiological processes; this is the daily business of life, throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms. All organisms must protect themselves against the injurious forces of nature; against heat and cold and wind and weather; against starvation and overeating; against unfit food and drink; against bruises and breaks; against plagues and poisons. If any organism ceased to select its environment, ceased to protect itself, its kind would become extinct in a generation. The practices of charitable organizations; the practices of public health, of hygiene; the improvement of living conditions—these are but further links in a chain that goes back to the beginning of life; this is work in which man has been engaged since a period long before he could be called man.[1]

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[1] See the further development of this point in the author's address, "Public Health Progress and Race Progress—Are They Incompatible?" *Science*, LXVI (1927), 45–50.

We need not, therefore, consider seriously the rejection *in toto* of such activities as are carried on by charitable organizations. But there remain the questions proposed in our first paragraphs. Are changes desirable in their activities, particularly with relation to the improvement of the constitution of future generations? Can these activities be so altered that no tendency toward deterioration of the racial stock will result; so altered as to raise the quality of the future population? What measures can be taken that will lead in such directions?

For an intelligent judgment on these matters, the worker with human beings must have in mind certain features of the biological basis for diversity of human characteristics. It will be worth while to outline the essential features from this point of view: those features of the relation of parents and offspring which have most direct bearing on improvement or deterioration in the population.

Knowledge of the details of human inheritance is little advanced, so that a picture of the situation must be based largely on what has been learned from other organisms. This has its dangers, but there exist the strongest grounds for holding that in those main features which bear on the matters under consideration, the situation in man is similar to that in other higher organisms. In common with other animals, and with plants, man has visibly in the nucleus of his cells a complex genetic system, a set of genes, forming the chromosomes. And in its chief features, it is known that in man this system works in the same way that it does in other higher organisms. And it is precisely these features that are of interest from our present point of view.

In man, as in most other organisms, the individual begins as a single cell, the fertilized egg, which is formed by the union of two germ cells, one from each of the two parents. By experimentation on breeding and development, by studies of inheritance, and by microscopic examination it has been discovered that many of the most important differences between individuals are due to original differences in the constitution of the single cells from which they come. The student of these matters must have in mind a picture of the main features of this constitution and of its method of operation; otherwise the ways of inheritance are utterly unintelligible. To no one is such a picture more indispensable than to the social worker.

The cell from which an individual comes is known to contain a very large number of distinct and separable substances on which development depends, seemingly a thousand or more. The development of the individual is brought about by the interaction of these thousand substances—their interaction with each other, and with the oxygen, nutrition, and other conditions that surround them. We know that different individuals start with different sets of these substances, different combinations; and that the different combinations give different results, diverse characteristics for the different individuals. Some combinations produce imperfect individuals, feeble minded, or insane, or deformed; or merely weak, ill natured, or stupid. Others produce normal, strong, beautiful, sensible persons. And there are combinations yielding every intermediate type. No two persons begin with the same combination, except in the case of what are called "identical twins." Aside from these, every human being is originally different from every other.

The thousand diverse substances, thus variously combined, are commonly called "genes." It is known, from experimental breeding, that altering a single gene in one of these great combinations may produce a very great difference in development, causing a great change in the characteristics of the individual produced. A defect in a single gene may cause the individual to develop with an imperfect brain, so that it becomes feeble minded. What the genes do is to furnish a great number of substances that are necessary for development, so that altering or omitting one of them may be disastrous. The alteration of certain genes produces, however, but slight effects; production of blue eyes in place of brown, or of red hair in place of black. By a vast amount of investigation it has been shown that by the alteration of genes all classes of characteristics—physical, physiological, mental—may be altered. There are no characteristics that are exempt from the influence of the genes. This does not mean that characteristics are influenced by nothing but the genes; on the contrary, many characteristics are greatly influenced by the conditions under which the individuals develop and live. All peculiarities of an automobile can be altered, either by changing the materials out of which the parts are made, or by changing the processes to which these materials are subjected, or by changing the method of making the automobile. The genes are the materials out of which individuals are made; by changing them the individuals may be made different, though individuals may be altered also by changing the conditions to which these materials are subjected. For the present we are concerned with the results of altering the genes, with the influence of different combinations of genes on the characteristics of individuals. How can future generations be produced in which every individual shall start with a good combination of genes?

The requirements for this, and the difficulties to be met, depend largely on certain rather simple peculiarities in the way the genes are disposed in the cells; and in the way they are transferred from parent to offspring. Acquaintance with these peculiarities is the indispensable key to the understanding of questions of heredity. It is known that the genes are minute particles present in the nuclei of the cells. It is known that these particles are strung up in long strings, like strings of beads; these strings of genes being what are known as the chromosomes (see Fig. 1). It is known that each of these thousand genes thus strung up has a different function from each other one, a different part to play in development. And it is known that each different kind of gene has its regular and invariable place in the strings. It is therefore possible for the different genes to be numbered or named, and their locations with relation to each other defined; this has been done in certain animals for a large number of the genes. Gene No. 4 or No. 47 or No. 176 in the series is then always the same gene, with the same function.

We know a further matter concerning the number and arrangement of the genes; a matter of extreme practical importance, the key to most of the extraordinary features of heredity. Each of the two germ cells, coming one from each parent, has a complete set of these genes, strung up in the way we have described; each therefore supplies all the materials necessary for development. When these two come together, therefore, the new individual so produced has a double set of genes.

This is one of the capital facts of genetics. Each kind of substance necessary for development is represented in the first cell of the individual and in all his later cells, by two discrete genes, forming a pair. As it is often put, there are two doses of each kind of substance required for development: one of each kind from the father, one from the mother. The order and arrangement of the genes in the cells is then that shown in Figure 1—a set of pairs of minute particles, arranged in longitudinal strings. One must keep in mind the picture of this arrangement in pairs if one is to understand the ways of heredity.



Fig. 1.—Cell from a grasshopper, showing the chromosomes as strings of paired particles. (After Wenrich.)

The two genes of a given pair—the two doses of a particular sort of substance—have the same general function in development; if one has to do with the production of eye color, so does the other; if one has to do with acuteness of vision, so does the other. But, what is most important, the two members of a pair may be somewhat diverse in the way they carry out this function. One may cause the laying-down of more pigment in the eye, yielding brown eyes; the other of less, yielding gray eyes. A gene may be deficient or defective in some way, so that it does not play its proper part in development. If its function is to lay down pigment in hair, skin, and eyes, it may fail to do this, yielding albinos. Or it may fail in laying a proper foundation for the brain, yielding a feeble-minded individual. Defects among the genes, some slight, some most serious, are rather common; practically all individuals have a number of defective genes. How these defects arise is little known, though Muller has recently discovered that they may be produced by means of X-rays. But any of the genes may show defects, and hence any of the characteristics of the individuals developed may show defects.

The advantage of having two genes to a pair, the advantage of having two parents, now becomes obvious. A particular gene from one of the parents may be, and often is, defective, so that if this were the only one, the individual produced would be correspondingly defective. But the corresponding gene from the other parent may be normal. In this case the latter as a rule performs the entire function, so that the individual produced is normal. Thus the defectiveness of one gene of a pair, in a given individual, has no evil consequence, or little. The doubleness of the genes therefore acts as an insurance; the individual has two chances of getting each function in development properly performed. Only if both genes of a pair—that from the father and that from the mother—are defective does the required function fail of performance, so that the individual produced is defective; is feeble minded, physically weak, or without pigment in the body; or the like. It appears that this insurance through doubling of the genes is the primary biological ground for our having two parents.

Differences between the action of the two members of a pair may be very slight; a mere difference in quality or quantity, rather than a matter of defectiveness; as when one gene brings about the production of much pigment in the eyes, the other of little. In such cases, when both sorts of genes are present in the individual, the usual rule is that the gene that carries the developmental function farthest is the one that produces its effect; as in the case just mentioned, in which much pigment is laid down in the eye and it is dark. The peculiarity that prevails is then said to be dominant, the other recessive.

With relation to questions of superiority, or inferiority, gene peculiarities that may be characterized as defects are of most importance. Some gene defects, if they affect both members of a gene pair, may bring about very great injury to the individual produced; may bring about feeble-mindedness or bodily deformity or lack of coagulability in the blood; or general weakness and susceptibility to disease. Or but a slight change may be produced. Every grade and quality of such effect is found in different individuals: slight weakness; susceptibility to certain diseases; indecision; lack of industry or patience; dullness; stupidity; lack of inhibitions, resulting (under certain conditions) in criminality; an infinite series. In the majority of these defects, the presence of one normal gene in the pair prevents the appearance of the defect in the individual. There exist also defects that are dominant; that is, the presence of one defective gene, even though accompanied by a normal one, causes the individual to become defective. For simplicity's sake, and because the recessive defects are far the commoner, we shall deal here with the latter only.

Obviously, some of these gene defects produce results as harmful as can any possible defects in the conditions of life.

Obviously, it is not desirable that the next generation should consist of feeble-minded, insane, or blind individuals. If the aim of charitable organizations is to make life worth living, in the future as well as in the present, then obviously they should by no means include in their program procedures that increase the proportion of individuals in the next generation that bear serious gene defects. On the contrary, they should include in their program, so far as possible, the prevention of the appearance of congenital defects of a serious character.

How can these things be accomplished? How can charity know whether its procedures are increasing the proportion of defectives in the next generation? How can the appearance of congenital defects be prevented? Light on these questions will be best obtained by examining the methods used in nature, and considering their relation to the purposes proposed.

The commonest means employed for the prevention of congenital defects is through the insurance plan that occurs in nature; it is to keep the defective gene covered and protected by a normal gene in the same pair (see the diagram, Fig. 2). Every human being doubtless bears a number of at least relatively defective genes, each with a companion that is normal and performs the required function. This protection of defective genes by normal ones is taken advantage of in the rules of what may be called "family eugenics"—the methods employed for insuring normal offspring from a particular mating. What these rules try to do is to prevent two defective genes from getting together in one pair (as at *F* in Fig. 2). One of these rules is that persons belonging to families that show instances of similar defects should not mate—even though the two individuals themselves may be normal. For each may bear, hidden away, one of the defective genes. And since each contributes one gene to each pair in the offspring, these two hidden genes may get together in a single one of the children, as in Figure 2, *F*, whereupon the child produced will be defective. A closely similar maxim of family eugenics is that close relatives should not mate. Close relatives are persons that have gotten some of their genes from the same ancestor. If some of these genes were defective, as is very probable, considering the commonness of defectives genes, then the mating of two close relatives may very well bring together two defective genes in the same pair, resulting again in imperfect offspring. The efficiency with which these rules of family eugenics are carried out may be greatly increased by



Fig. 2.—Diagrams to show certain relations of defective genes to normal genes. The diagrams represent sections containing six pairs of genes, in the chromosomes of the two parents (*P* and *M*), and the offspring (*F*) produced by them. Each of the black bodies represents a normal gene; each of the white ones, a defective gene. When offspring are produced, a single chain of genes, containing one member of each pair, passes from each parent into the offspring (*F*). The diagram illustrates how from normal parents, each containing one defective gene (in the second pair from the left), offspring may be produced having both genes of that pair defective, such offspring being therefore personally defective. (One-fourth of the offspring produced will be of this defective type.)

increased fullness and accuracy of family records, so that the presence of similar defects in the families of two persons considering marriage may be known. Institutions engaged in the preparation and preservation of such family records are worthy of support by those seeking to make life more worth living.

There is a third principle touching the avoidance of congenital defects, and the production of superior offspring; one that is perhaps an extension and generalization of the two just mentioned; one that is of great practical importance in the breeding of plants and animals, as well as for human families. It is, briefly stated, that matings between individuals belonging to diverse stocks or races, or coming from diverse parts of the country, are likely to give superior offspring. This is because the gene defects borne by such persons will usually have arisen independently, and so will be in different pairs of genes. When such persons mate, therefore, two defective genes will not come together in the same pair, in such a way as to give defective offspring.

This works out in a very striking way, an astonishing way. It works out in such a manner that even if each of the two parents is personally defective, as a consequence of having two defective genes in a particular pair, nevertheless their offspring may be perfectly normal. It works out in such a way that two weak, deformed parents whose troubles are due to defective genes may produce offspring that are all strong and perfect, of superior type. The method of action involved is one that plays a very great part in determining the characteristics of men and other organisms. It should be familiar to all students of social problems.

The underlying point is this. To produce any characteristic, mental or physical, many of the genes interact, co-operate. In the fruit fly, the organism whose heredity is best known, it requires the co-operation of at least fifty genes, scattered in various parts of the genetic system, to produce merely the red color of the eye. If any one pair out of this fifty is defective, the eye color is imperfect. The same situation prevails for all characteristics. Anything that is produced in the later or adult stages of development has been built up by the interaction of many different genes. Hence such a characteristic can be made defective by altering any one of many different gene pairs. It is known that feeblemindedness in man may be produced by a defect of one pair of genes. But in some individuals this will be a given particular pair, in others a different pair; in others still another pair. And this is true for all congenital troubles, slight or severe. That is, in different individuals the same imperfections, or very similar ones, may be produced by defects of different pairs of genes.

Look, then, at what happens when two parents mate that are both seriously defective, perhaps in the same respects; but their defects are due to imperfections in different pairs of genes. Two such are represented at *P* and *M*, in our diagram (Fig. 3); one is defective in the second gene pair, the other in the fourth. One member is taken from each pair of genes, and the two sets are placed together. And now, as the diagram shows, neither pair of genes has two defects. The mother supplies a normal gene for the father's defective pair, the father a normal gene for the mother's defective pair. In the offspring (*F*) there is therefore a normal gene for each pair; all the offspring are therefore quite without personal defect; they are perfect and complete. In this way in the fruit fly two parents with small, useless wings may produce offspring all having perfect functional wings; two parents with defective eyes may produce offspring with perfect eyes; two parents that are weak and short lived may produce offspring that are vigorous and long lived. The happy results are all due to the contribution by the two parents of complementary genes, so that each supplies what the other lacks. If the two parents had been defective in the same pair of genes (Fig. 4), no such results would have followed; all the offspring would have been defective.

This supplying of complementary genes may extend to many defects, in diverse pairs. A mother with say five serious defects in five of her gene pairs, mated with a father having say six serious defects in six other gene pairs, may give children having one normal gene in every pair (as in the diagram, Fig. 5), so that they have none of the numerous defects present in the parents. It is to this, in whole or in part, that are due the well-known phenomena of "hybrid vigor." Two races of corn, weak, short, and spindling, producing almost no yield, when



Fig. 3.—Diagram to illustrate how from two defective parents normal offspring may be produced, provided the parental defects are in diverse pairs of genes. Chains of five corresponding pairs of genes represented from each of the two parents (*P* and *M*) and from the offspring (*F*). Each parent is personally defective, since *P* has both genes of its second pair defective (white), while *M* has both genes of the fourth pair defective (white). One of the chains of genes is taken from each parent for the offspring (*F*). As the diagram shows, *F* has one normal gene (black) in each of its pairs, so that it is not personally defective.

mated together give tall, vigorous offspring with a high yield. This sort of thing must be continually occurring in man. Two feeble-minded parents might perfectly well produce normal children if their gene defects are in different pairs; and the studies of Danielson and Davenport[1] show that this does occur. The same type of thing may occur with all kinds of gene



FIG. 4.—Diagram to illustrate the results of the mating of two defective parents, having their two defective genes (white) in the same pair. The two parents (*P* and *M*) each have both genes defective (white) in the second pair. From each parent one of the two chains of genes passes into the offspring (*F*). All the offspring therefore necessarily have two defective genes (white) in the second pair, and are therefore personally defective in the same way as are the parents.

defects, save the unusual ones in which the defective gene is dominant.

It is important, too, to realize that this method of operation is not limited to large or severe defects; but works also for slight inequalities. If one parent, through slight gene defects, is lazy, careless, stupid; while the other, through defects in other gene pairs, is slow and lacks ambition, the two may perfectly well produce children that have none of these defects; that are quick, intelligent, industrious, and ambitious, so forming superior individuals. This sort of thing is probably in large measure the origin of superiority; of genius; an unusual and effective combination of genes, resulting from the contribution of complementary genes by the two parents.

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[1] F. H. Danielson and C. B. Davenport, *The Hill Folk*. (Memoir of the Eugenics Record Office, No. 1.) 1912.



Fig. 5.—Diagram to illustrate the fact that many defective genes may be present in a normal individual. Of the two chains of genes belonging to an individual, one containing five defective genes (white) came from one parent, the other, containing six defective genes (white), came from the other parent. But the defective genes were in different pairs in each parent, so that this individual has one normal gene (black) in every pair, and is therefore throughout normal.

It is obvious that the methods thus far considered for preventing the appearance of congenital defects, while effective in their immediate action, do not get rid of the defective genes. The defective genes are merely hidden and rendered temporarily of no effect. These methods result thus in keeping concealed in normal individuals a large number of genes that are defective in greater or less degree. And since these individuals are normal, they may mate and propagate. And when two individuals bearing the same defective gene mate, then to some of their offspring (on the average to one-fourth of the offspring) they will both contribute this defective gene, so that two defective genes will come together in the same pair; and a personally defective child is produced—feeble-minded, weak, shiftless, lazy, or the like. This is the origin of most hereditarily defective individuals; they come from normal parents that carry concealed defective genes.

This continual appearance of defective children from normal parents is bound to continue so long as defective genes are thus hidden. The more thoroughly the rules of family eugenics are carried out, the more widely distributed become the defective genes. By adequately kept family records, the rules of family eugenics can be made to operate more effectively; but also the distribution of defective genes becomes wider. In time they must reappear; defective offspring are bound to be produced.

Clearly, it is desirable if possible, not merely to hide the defective genes, thus scattering them through the population, but to get rid of them; to remove them from the race. If this could be radically done, it would beyond question very greatly increase the average welfare and happiness of the coming generations, perhaps more than any other natural change that could be suggested. It is the vision of what would thereby be accomplished that has aroused the enthusiasm of the propagandists of eugenics. It is this that induces the President of the American Eugenics Society to say that "eugenics is incomparably the greatest concern of mankind," and to exhort the members of his society in the following terms:

> We should endeavor to show that eugenics supplies the most effective and permanent solution to the problems that have been so ineffectually dealt with hitherto by physicians, public health officers, social workers, clergymen, and reformers,—the problems of combating disease, disability, defectiveness, degeneracy, delinquency, vice and crime.[1]

To approach any such results, the defective genes present in the population must be gotten rid of, so that their effects will not reappear in later generations. The rules of family eugenics, above set forth, do not help in this; on the contrary, they are perhaps the chief obstacle to its accomplishment—they hide and protect the defective genes. There is only one way to end the career of defective genes; that is, for the individuals bearing them to refrain from propagation.

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[1] Irving Fisher, *Report of the President of the American Eugenics Society* (New Haven, June 26, 1926), p. 18.

But who are the individuals bearing defective genes? As we have seen, it is highly probable that practically all individuals bear some genes that from certain points of view must be considered defective, genes at least whose effects are less desirable than certain others existing elsewhere in the population. It is clear that a clean sweep cannot be made of all undesirable genes at once. They must be attacked individually. Certain seriously defective genes must be selected, and efforts centered upon these.

For any such seriously defective genes, there are, as we have seen, two classes of individuals that carry them. On the one hand there is the great multitude that bear but one defective gene to a pair. In these the defective gene produces no recognizable effect, so that we have no direct means of recognizing these "carriers" of defective genes; no way of removing from the race the defective genes borne by them. This is the greatest obstacle to the program of eugenics. It is indeed the chief element in the situation, so far as eugenic measures are concerned, though it is often ignored. Can anything be done to meet this difficulty? To this question we return.

The second group that carries defective genes consists of the relatively small number of persons that bear two of the seriously defective genes in a pair. These are the individuals that are themselves defective: the feeble-minded, the heritably insane, the deformed, the weak, the degenerate. The eugenic measure commonly proposed is to prevent the propagation of these individuals. So far as their troubles are due to defective genes (not all cases in any of these groups are of this class), this measure appears most worth while. In the case of genes so defective as to produce feeble-mindedness or insanity, it is difficult to see how any doubt could be raised. It appears incredible that anyone can knowingly advocate continuing the operations of defective genes producing such frightful results as feeble-mindedness. And to stop the propagation of the feeble-minded appears to be clearly within the bounds of practicality. It gets rid of only a small proportion of the genes producing feeble-mindedness, but every one stopped is a gain. This is a measure for the improvement of life in future generations that should be supported by all charitable organizations.

How great are the results that may be looked for from this measure? Here arise two fundamentally important questions. One question is: How far does this measure go in ridding later generations of the defect to which it is applied? How far does it go in eliminating feeble-mindedness or insanity or the like? To this question we return. The second question is: To how many of the delinquent or defective classes of society is this procedure applicable? To how many ills is there a partial remedy in stopping the propagation of the individuals suffering from them?

This measure can be applied to all ills that are due to defects in a single pair of genes. The known number of single-pair gene defects so serious as to make it practicable to stop the propagation of the affected individuals is as yet small. Feeble-mindedness is the clearest case; though some instances of even this are due to disease or accident. Haemophilia, a defect of the blood resulting in uncontrollable bleeding from any wound, is another clear case of a single-gene defect. Some cases of insanity probably belong in this group, though seemingly many do not. Probably there are cases of goitre, of diabetes, of epilepsy, of susceptibility to tuberculosis, of susceptibility to cancer, that belong in this group; though in most of these cases it is still uncertain how large a proportion are due to gene defects; how large a proportion to disease or accident acting on normal gene combinations.

This brings out one of the greatest of needs, before eugenic measures can be applied with precision on a large scale, and with important results. This need is for more knowledge as to what troubles of humanity are due primarily to single-pair gene defects. Investigations along this line are difficult; but they form one of the two greatest needs, if the program of eugenics is to be made effective. The promotion of such investigations is one of the enterprises most worthy of support by persons desirous of improving the future lot of humanity. So fast as serious single-pair gene defects are identified, those afflicted with the troubles which they produce must be brought to cease propagation. It must be recognized, however, that since there are all degrees of such defect, grading off into normality, and since in many of the types environmental conditions have much to do in deciding whether the trouble shall appear at all, or in what degree it shall appear, it will in many cases be difficult to decide whether cessation of propagation is required. Compulsory measures, through laws, can probably be applied to but few of the defects; mainly those which bring the affected individuals into public institutions. More can be done by educating social workers and medical men to take this matter seriously, that they may give warning by spreading abroad a knowledge of these matters, and by arousing the conscience through an understanding of the consequences of propagation by persons bearing such defects. This is work most worth while for charitable organizations. But to make it effective, increase of knowledge on these matters is greatly needed. With such increase of knowledge the list of defects to which this measure can be applied may in time become large.

But it is necessary to recur to the first question proposed above. In the case of troubles known to be due to a single-pair gene defect, how far does this stoppage of propagation by the defective individuals go in correcting the evil; how far does it reduce the number of defective individuals in the next and succeeding generations? The defective individuals are those bearing two of the defective genes to a pair. Stopping their propagation affects only one of the two classes of individuals that have the defective gene. It leaves untouched the great class of normal "carriers," the individuals bearing but one defective gene in a pair, protected by a normal companion gene. Can an estimate be formed of the relative numbers of individuals in the two classes, and as to the result of stopping the propagation of but one of them? Such an estimate can be made.

To illustrate the situation, feeble-mindedness may be taken as a type. It is the simplest, most clearly defined, and least affected by the environment of any of the defects with which eugenic measures can deal. How effectively can they deal with feeble-mindedness?

Statistics indicate that the feeble-minded make up about one-third of 1 per cent of the population; so that in a population of 100,000,000 there are about 330,000. So far as these are cases of heritable feeble-mindedness, they are the individuals that have in a single pair two of the defective genes that produce feeble-mindedness. From this proportion, it is possible to compute, by known relations, approximately the proportion of normal individuals that bear one of the defective genes. It turns out to be about 10 per cent of the population. If the number of feeble-minded is 330,000, the number of normal carriers of the gene is about 10,000,000. For every individual bearing two of the defective genes, there are about 30 normal individuals bearing one such gene.

Thus the population of the country consists of three groups. There is the small group of about 330,000 feeble-minded, carrying two defective genes to the pair; then there is the group of about 10,000,000 normal carriers, with one defective gene to the pair; and a group of about 90,000,000 normals having none of the defective genes of this type.

The feeble-minded of the next generation come, on the one hand, from the small feeble-minded group; on the other, from the large carrier group. In addition, new carriers are formed by mating of individuals from these two groups with individuals from the normal group. By stopping the propagation of the feeble-minded group, the production of feeble-minded individuals and of carriers from that group is ended; but their production from the carrier group is not affected. What proportion of the feeble-minded are thus gotten rid of, from the next generation?

The answer to this question depends to a certain extent on how widely scattered in the population are the defective genes. If they are widely scattered, the calculations of R. A. Fisher[1] indicate that about 11 per cent of the feeble-minded of any generation come from the mating of feeble-minded of the previous generation, while 89 per cent of them come from matings among the carrier group. Thus by stopping the propagation of the feeble-minded of the present generation we get rid of about 11 per cent of the feeble-minded of the next generation. That generation still contains the 89 per cent produced by the carriers. If the original number of feeble-minded was 330,000, in the next generation the number is about 293,700.

This procedure has affected very little the reservoir of carriers, so that it remains nearly what it was. In a third generation, it still produces about 290,000 feeble-minded—even though the feeble-minded themselves are not allowed to propagate. That is, by entirely excluding the feeble-minded from propagation, in present and future generations, the number of feeble-minded is reduced at the first generation by about 11 per cent; thereafter very little progress is made in reducing their number.

As generations pass, however, there is a slight farther reduction, resulting from a small decrease in the number of carriers. This is due to the fact that since the feeble-minded do not farther propagate, none of them mates with normals or carriers to produce additional carriers. But the decrease due to this cause is slow. It has been computed that if we start with a proportion of one feeble-minded individual per thousand of the population, then by preventing the propagation of all feeble-minded individuals, it will require about sixty-eight generations, or some two to three thousand years, to reduce the proportion to one feeble-minded per ten thousand of the population. In the main, the 11 per cent reduction at the first generation is what is accomplished by stopping the propagation of the feeble-minded.

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[1] "Elimination of Mental Defect," *Journal of Heredity*, XVIII (1927), 529–31.

If the feeble-minded genes are not widely scattered through the population, then a greater immediate effect would be produced by stopping the propagation of the feeble-minded individuals. Fisher estimates that possibly a reduction of 30–40 per cent might in such a case be produced.

A reduction of 11 to 30 or 40 per cent in the number of the feeble-minded would be a great achievement; and it seems clear that it could be brought about in no other way than by stopping the propagation of the individuals affected. Every effort should be made to bring about this result to the full. A somewhat similar result may be expected when this procedure is applied to other sharply defined single-pair gene defects. Social workers and charitable organizations need to be acutely alive to the possibilities of this measure. So far as they encourage and make possible the propagation of individuals that are defective in consequence of serious gene defects, they are indeed assisting in the deterioration of the race; they are indeed improving the lot of the present generation at the expense of that of later generations.

But this measure of eugenics, though valuable in itself, is still far from solving the problem of gene defects, even of gene defects so sharply defined as to make practicable the entire stoppage of propagation by the affected individuals. The majority of the affected individuals—probably the very great majority—arise in each generation from the class of normal "carriers" of the defective gene. And these carriers are very little affected by the measure proposed. The process of eliminating defects in this way is an enormously slow one.

Obviously, for a rapid and radical extirpation of gene defects, there is great need of an advance in knowledge. What is required is some method of recognizing the carriers of defective genes—persons that are themselves normal but have one of the defective genes in one of their pairs. To discover methods of identifying such individuals would be one of the greatest biological discoveries that could be made; one of the most fruitful in immediate practical application.

For such extreme defects as result in feeble-mindedness this seems not outside the range of possible future discovery. In many cases, in animals and plants, the bearers of a single defective or recessive gene, having a normal or dominant companion, do differ in certain respects, usually little marked, from individuals that have both genes normal. It seems not impossible that by refined chemical tests, or by other tests, individuals bearing but one of the genes that induce feeble-mindedness might be identified. When that is done, if ever, such normal "carriers" of the feeble-minded gene could be brought to cease propagation. If that were thoroughly done, eugenic measures could totally remove hereditary feeble-mindedness from the race in a single generation; could close institutions devoted to that class of dependents. And the same could be done for other ills due to any serious gene defects of which the normal carriers could be identified. There is no prospect that such a discovery could be made once for all, for every sort of defective gene. Detailed studies would be required for each type; special methods devised for each. Investigations extending for many years will be demanded before such discoveries can be widely extended. To promote such investigations in human genetics is probably now the most direct way to further the welfare of future generations through eugenic measures.

But the cases with which charity has most largely to deal are not those showing single sharply defined pathological traits, such as hereditary insanity or feeble-mindedness.

Rather are they individuals and families of low economic status, not able to support themselves without aid. In the more extreme conditions we have pauperism, "unemployability," even criminality. In less extreme forms there is poverty, illness, loss of a job, temporary dependence. What is the biological status of these cases?

In all or most of such cases we are dealing with behavior, with reactions to the environment—reactions which turn out inefficient or harmful. All such reactions depend both on the genes, the constitution with which the individual starts, and on the nature of the environment. By altering either, the reactions would be changed. A great complex of interdependent causes is at work.

Environmental conditions certainly play a large rôle here. Certain psychologists attribute most or all of the undesirable traits of character shown by individuals to shocks and injurious influences operating during early childhood.[1] It appears beyond doubt that these play an extremely important part. Along with these frequently go birth into poverty with consequent loss of opportunity, defective or harmful education, bad traditions, bad social organization, specific misfortunes. Estimates of the weight of these and other environmental matters differ greatly. Here no simple biological principle is decisive; it is as clear biologically that environment affects behavior as that constitution does; and biology furnishes no automatic method of determining the relative rôle of each. Only familiarity with the conditions actually found in dependent families, resting on a basis of acquaintance with genetics and with the other springs of behavior, can yield a useful judgment. In many cases there is little doubt that a suitable change either in the environment or in the original genetic constitution of the individual or family would correct the situation.

But in the groups receiving charitable aid or institutional treatment, it cannot be doubted that on the whole less favorable gene combinations accompany the unfavorable environmental conditions. That is, in the dependent group the gene combinations contain on the average a larger number of genes that must be classed as at least relatively defective, and these are present in many cases as "double doses": two unfavorable genes to a pair. The group receiving charitable assistance is a reservoir of less favorable genes, as compared with the reservoir of more favorable genes in the self-supporting group.

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[1] See John B. Watson, *Behaviorism*. New York, 1925.

This difference must not be exaggerated. The same sets of genes found in the dependent groups would in other combinations result in individuals that were self-supporting, efficient, or even superior; this through the contribution by the parents of complementary genes, in the way already described. This often happens in the production of offspring within such groups. In the same way, from parents of superior types, new combinations of genes may result in offspring that are so inferior as to become dependent or criminal. There is by no means a sharp separation or an impassable barrier between the two sets of individuals; by recombinations within each group, individuals fitting the other group are produced. But on the average, a real difference in the proportions of unfavorable genes would be found in the two groups.

Such being the situation, what measures may lead to a decrease in the proportion of inefficient, dependent, or criminal groups? On the one hand, measures for improving the environment are proposed; on the other, measures for improving the genetic constitution.

It is probable that changes in environment; changes in the treatment of infancy, in education, in tradition, in the customs, ideals, and organization of society, will do much more in this direction than can be done through direct attempts to change the genetic constitution of the population. The recent paper by Davenport[1] on the problem of criminality may be taken to illustrate the attitude of the intelligent student of such matters, even though primarily interested in eugenics. Certain changes in the treatment of criminal individuals are considered to hold out more hope for amelioration than any measures of eugenics. And similar relations hold for most other dependent groups.

Yet certain measures have been suggested, or can be suggested, that would probably improve the genetic basis in such a way as to help in doing away with dependent groups. Two general classes of procedures are open: one based on statistical considerations, the other dependent upon advance in detailed knowledge of human genetics.

In the former group, the measure proposed is that the propagation of dependent or "inferior" groups shall be lessened; that of "superior" groups—more efficient or intelligent individuals—be increased. Methods suggested for doing this are: that habitual criminals be not allowed to propagate; that the present ban on the dissemination of knowledge as to how to decrease the number of offspring produced be removed, so that such knowledge may become available to the less efficient or intelligent groups; that the economic status of individuals of superior intelligence or abilities be in some way raised; that the conscience of both groups be aroused, so that the more intelligent and efficient shall deliberately produce more offspring, the less intelligent and efficient fewer.

There have been exaggerated hopes as to the rapid effectiveness of these and similar proposals, based mainly on the deceptive maxim that "like produces like." In relation to human characteristics on which depend "superiority" and "inferiority" this maxim is largely fallacious. The "inferior" individuals possess largely the same genes as the "superior" ones, but in less fortunate combinations. One individual may possess all that brings a man into the superior class, except ambition or industry or patience. Or his genes may predispose him to disdain of worldly distinction, or to scattering his efforts on many objects of interest. Mated with another undistinguished individual, who bears, hidden or manifest, genes that supply the missing qualities, certain of the offspring may receive a combination that includes all that is required for distinction. In characteristics taken singly, an individual so produced may not be superior to his undistinguished parents, or to most members of the stock to which he belongs; but his qualities supplement and support one another, placing him in the front rank. And when he reproduces, the combination that gave him superiority is taken apart; his offspring may relapse again into the normal obscurity. From the great mass of mediocre parents arise more superior offspring than from the few distinguished parents; more inferior offspring than from the inferior parents. And superior parents often produce mediocre or inferior offspring; inferior parents at times produce mediocre or superior offspring. In consequence of this situation, decrease or even complete stoppage of the propagation of the "superior" individuals, or of the "inferior" individuals, has little effect on the average grade of the next generation.

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[1] C. B. Davenport, "Crime, Heredity and Environment," *Journal of Heredity*, XIX (1928), 307–13.

Although all this be true, nevertheless in the very long run an effect is produced. In spite of the great numbers of individual exceptions, a million "superior" individuals probably produce a greater proportion of "superior" offspring than a million "inferior" ones. This may not have been rigidly proved, so far as the genetic basis of character or mentality is concerned; it appears to be denied by Pearl.[1] But it is in accord with what we know of other characteristics, and its probability for important human characteristics is sufficiently great to justify acting on it. If this be valid, then by increasing the propagation of "superior" groups and decreasing that of "inferior" groups the general level is, however slowly, raised; evolution proceeds rather upward than downward. Well-considered measures of this sort therefore deserve the support of those who are interested in the promotion of human welfare. Yet change brought about in this way must be enormously slow, measurable in thousands of years rather than in shorter periods.

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[1] R. Pearl, "Eugenics," *Proceedings of the International Congress of Genetics.* Berlin, 1927.

For more effective action in the same direction procedures based upon increased knowledge of human genetics are required. One of the greatest needs has been set forth above—acquirement of the power to recognize normal "carriers" of defective genes. Another, a most immediate need, is for increase of knowledge as to what human troubles are due to definite single-pair gene defects. To obtain this knowledge, the same method must be employed that the plant or animal breeder employs in searching for the genetic basis of particular characteristics. The environmental conditions that induce defectiveness must be removed, for these mask the distinctive effect of the genes. That is, measures of public health must be carried out; overwork and bad conditions of living done away with; faults of diet, quantitative and qualitative, corrected; grinding poverty abolished, economic and social ills conquered; the treatment of infancy and childhood reformed. In other words, just the work now undertaken by charitable organizations is required as a basis for eugenic measures. When these things are done, when the human plant is given conditions under which it can unfold its capabilities without stunting, poisoning, and mutilation by the environment, then will it be possible to discover what defects are due primarily to defective genes, and to plan such eugenic measures as are required for their eradication. Acting on such precise knowledge, far more rapid and effective results will be possible than in blind action on general statistical principles. When particular troubles can be positively attributed to particular gene defects, and when, if ever, it becomes possible to detect the normal carriers of the defective genes that are responsible, then humanity will have in its hands the power completely to suppress such troubles within a generation. Feeble-mindedness can be brought rapidly to disappear, and with it hereditary insanity, inherited tendency to tuberculosis, to cancer; hereditary weakness, abnormality, and degeneracy; with all other troubles traceable to single-pair gene defects.

Charitable organizations, then, in so far as they operate to remove the environmental conditions that induce defectiveness and that thereby mask the effects of defective genes, are effective agencies tending toward the ultimate improvement of the racial constitution. It is desirable that they become strongly conscious of this aim, as well as of their aim to make life worth living for the present generation, in order that they co-operate in detail with all intelligent efforts toward improving the quality of the future generations of humanity.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

ELLSWORTH FARIS

It has been said that there are three "vices" or ways in which injury can be done to another. The first is the vicious attack on person or property which is usually called "crime"; the second is the vicious neglect or indifference to suffering and distress because the heart is hardened; the third is the "vice" of the philanthropist. It consists in helping people who do not want to be helped and accusing them of ingratitude when they are not profuse in their thanks. Not seldom has the actual recipient been known to bite the hand that feeds, and pauperized families often complain that they do not receive enough. The hardened recipient will go to as many agencies as will receive him, a fact to which the central registration bureau of any city will bear witness. The blame for such a result was formerly placed on the recipients of charity, and the poor were not only regarded as normally ungrateful but were considered to be low in their intelligence as well as their moral standards. More careful consideration, following a more intelligent practice, has shifted the responsibility. There are the ungrateful poor, but they become so because they are dealt with unwisely. It is the manner of giving and not the receipt of help that produces the unlovely results.

Modern social work has no principle more insistent than that help must be given without pauperizing the recipient. Agencies are sometimes criticized for spending so large a proportion of their funds on their staff and for giving so small a share as money relief. But modern social work glories in this charge and sees its best results when a family is guided into self-sufficiency without loss of self-respect. It is a proud record that shall one day stand forth when the public is made aware of the epoch-making change that has come to pass in our time.

It is, then, not only a possibility but an actual accomplishment that charity can be given without harming the client. If this were the only problem we should not need to plan a book on the subject, but there are other and more basic questions. Indeed, any questions are in order, for here there must be nothing so sacred that it may not be called in question.

Why give? Is it a religious duty? Is it in addition a moral obligation? Is there a human and universal feeling that makes the strong wish to bear the burdens of the weak? Does charity arise from sentiment, and is sentiment the only justification? Is it a demand of our nature that must be met regardless of consequences, or do the consequences determine the justification? And what are the results? No practice can long be defended which uniformly produces harmful effects. But what are the effects? Does philanthropy perpetuate poverty? Does it cause the multiplication of the unfit? Does it harm society if the weak are made well and the hungry fed? Would it be better if the children of the poor were allowed to grow up in rags and misery, illiterate, ignorant, and vicious?

These are some of the questions which the authors of the chapters in this volume were to answer. Those who have written were chosen for their competence, but since the questions all deal with current problems they are necessarily in controversy. No limitations were laid down for these authors, and the hope was less to provide the reader with a final answer than to secure a representative formulation of expert opinion to guide the reader in making his own decision. We first sought the historian that the problems of the present might appear in the setting of the past. For the past is never dead. It is a living past in the sense that our life today bears influences that have come down from the years before the flood. And the historian has shown us that charity has always existed, though the changing conditions have repeatedly altered the form and changed the motive. One sharp contrast that our modern life has brought out (did we not read about it so often it would seem incredible) is that poverty was once glorified as an ideal. Perhaps an enjoyment of poverty can only exist where wealth is at hand to feed the mendicant appropriately. Be that as it may, poverty became so general in the disorganized periods of history that none had to seek it since it sought so many.

But the historian shows us that distress has always prompted men to relieve it even when those who were poor desired to be so. And the picture of the charitable foundations of the Roman Empire and of the medieval monarchs and municipalities makes it clear that we are dealing with an ancient habit of our race which will resist change just as other ancient habits always do. Leaving out of account for the moment the possible harmful effects of charity, it is clear in the first place that what has characterized our common life for hundreds of generations cannot lightly be expected to pass away. Another lesson of history reveals the sharp and painful changes which a crisis enforces. The advent of the machine age and the nineteenth-century experience in charity is chiefly instructive in telling us how not to do it. The state tried its hand, and with the motives operating they worked out a scheme the results of which are about as cheerful to contemplate as the ravages of the plague.

If we may venture to summarize in a sentence the historian's word to the reader of this book we would say our ancient forefathers recognized always the need of charity, but either the conditions were so different as to have little to teach us, or the methods were so inept as to furnish a warning. The twentieth century furnishes new occasions which teach new duties. There are no exact precedents for today in any of the situations of the past.

With thanks for the historian's message we turn to the teachers of religion and listen to three voices speaking in a representative capacity for the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant faiths. It seemed necessary to have all three represented, partly to avoid the appearance of bias in this book, partly because all three groups are actively interested in charity, and, finally, because it was desired to know what differences, if any, would appear in the statements of the three.

And while the differences are not without significance, the similarities are rather striking. All three emphasize the double obligation to relieve the stress on religious grounds and for religious motives, and all three explicitly recognize that the religious man should try to get behind the individual case of need and control the basic causes of misery. Moreover, in all three there is the explicit statement that the church in its charitable activities must keep abreast of science, employ and welcome the results of modern scientific research to improve the technique of their work. The motive they assign to religion; the method, they agree, is to be learned from science.

If we turn now to the differences in formulation we can discern in the Jewish attitude a more definite trend toward humanism and a transfer of what was formerly considered an attribute of deity to human compassion. The Catholic differs most from this formulation, service to the poor being definitely conceived as a divine command which must be obeyed and cannot be questioned. The Protestant view appears to be intermediate. To them charity is not so much a command of God as an expression of the spirit of Jesus. For the Protestant a man should be charitable because he is saved, and not in order to be saved, and yet, because God is love, the Christian in performing charity is expressing the love of God and can count on the co-operation of God.

Another difference appears in the attitude toward the actual administration of charity. The Jewish institutions tend to remain Jewish, probably because the Jewish community continues to exist inside the larger community. The Catholic charities tend to remain under the control of the church since charity is a religious duty and religious duties do not belong to the state. In contrast with these Protestant charities tend to become secularized, the administration of the vast funds which are constantly growing being confined to agencies over which the church does not exercise any administrative control.

Concerning the basic questions which we raised, the three chapters on religion and philanthropy seem particularly free from controversy. The motives which they assign indeed vary, but the obligations which they recognize are constant. The relief of suffering is a responsibility of the individual and also of the community, and the causes of misery must be sought and remedied. Assuming, then, that we have chosen qualified representatives to speak, the voice of religion seems clear to the effect that charity is needed and demanded in our day with a technique that must be progressively examined and improved.

Now let us turn to the economist from whom we receive a clear and cogent word. To the economist the goal of business welfare is social welfare. It is not enough to say that business is better when social welfare is enhanced; rather must we say that the object of business is to promote the good of society, and if this be admitted it is the obligation of business to modify the economic organization in the interest of social welfare. This is the first charge on modern business. If the business man asks the economist for details the answer is that they are to be progressively worked out as problems can be clearly isolated, and specifications are not lacking. The necessary efforts differ with the area and era, but among others are presented the necessity of regulating unemployment, paying a living wage, devising a family wage for the classes with most pressing needs, and insurance for the various forms of deprivations such as accidents, sickness, and old age.

These are, of course, all concerned with the prevention of poverty rather than the relief of it, and such is the logical order on which the economist is prepared to insist. But it is recognized that at present no possible distribution of a national income would obviate the need of social protection on the part of an irreducible minimum of our people. If, then, we ask the economist for the justification of philanthropy the answer is again that it is social welfare. Society gains when the weak and needy are cared for, and no one is the gainer in a city where the poor are evicted and the children cry for food. The world is better and not worse if its inhabitants have income enough and health and peace of mind, and leisure and joy in work and play. Business does not need poverty, and it is convincingly denied that charity discourages initiative, or that poverty encourages it.

The teaching of economics, then, as here represented is very lucid. Prevention of poverty is good business; the neglect of the poor is not good business, the conditions as they change will demand intelligence and readjustment, but only the technique need be altered. The welfare of our people is the consistent goal of our endeavor.

And now we turn to ethics and listen to the voice of the philosopher whose life is devoted to the task of understanding the motives and effects of our conduct. In this chapter charity is set forth as more than the response to the bare kindly impulses to help. Such impulses exist but they are primitive and animal-like. Charity arises from the distinctly human power to put ourselves in the place of another which leads us to consider the causes of his wretchedness and gives us the power to conceive of a better world in which the evils would not exist. It is thus that we come to plan for social betterment.

Charity is not charity if we are forced to give; it becomes what it is when we do more than we are bound to do. The good of the one with whom we sympathize seems greater to us when we give than the good which would result were we to spend the money on ourselves. And this is possible only if we regard the victim as our neighbor and think of him as belonging to a community to which in our imagination we belong.

Charity is not charity if we are forced to give, but giving to charity is an obligation. It is not a legal but a moral obligation and begins to compel us not mainly on account of the distress but rather as a result of our ideals and the community values. And when we see what the life of the community ought to be, and in addition realize the accidental nature of our own advantages and are convinced that the poor are denied the right to enjoy life which they would have in an ideal social order, our own right to spend money on luxuries may appeal to us as the equivalent of a denial of the right of education for the poor boy. I have a right to my own money but if I feel that it would not be just to let my neighbor starve I have a conception of a better world which, if made clear and influential, will raise the public standards of education and welfare.

Ethics considers that the common goods of life such as science and art get their value through their very universality. They should therefore be accessible to common enjoyment. The more nearly we approximate universality in enjoyment and participation the nearer we approach an ideal society. Every step toward this universal enjoyment of the goods of society is an approximation, and these steps we call progress.

Ethics finds its justification of charity, then, in the constructive imagination which gives us power to conceive a better world and makes us strive to bring it into existence.

The sociological chapter is devoted to emphasizing the evils of unwise and poorly planned giving. The results of the operation of the English poor-law have already been discussed by our historian, and the picture is vividly painted by the sociologist. Nevertheless, there is here no counsel that relief should be denied; it is rather a caution against harming the recipients by doing it unwisely.

The chief insistence of the sociologist is on the value of prevention, and this note has been sounded by most of those who have spoken here. It is obviously a matter for economic organization and for specific professional groups, such as the medical profession in public-health programs and in lowering the cost of medical care.

A third contribution of the sociologist has to do with the tendency of endowed foundations to develop institutionalism, which often means a tendency to be indifferent, formal, obsolete, or absolute. The recommendation of the sociologist that these foundations might wisely limit their term of life and that they go out of existence at the end of a term of years is not, of course, original since some foundations have actually been thus constituted.

If we turn to the expert in social work we are made aware of the history and present activities of those who have been called the social engineers of our time. Out of the earlier forms of charity has grown the profession of social work, attempting to define clearly a task and to develop a skilled technique that can be taught and applied. The social worker has been influenced by the development of biology, psychology, and sociology, and is profoundly indebted to the democratic movement of the last three generations. Instead of confining their activities to friendly visiting as Lady Bountiful used to do, the social worker emphasizes the adjustment of personal relations and the rehabilitation of family groups. Social settlements were originally the homes of cultivated neighbors but tend to grow into community-improvement associations with a more objective attitude and an increasing emphasis on causes. The older chaotic stage where each agency was in competition has been succeeded by central reference bureaus which form a clearing house for applicants and also by community chests which avoid duplication and reduce competitive struggle. Professional schools are now training social workers not as uplifters but as specialists interested in applying all available human knowledge to the immediate demands for succor but with no less interest in the remediable causes of misery.

In the chapter on "Legal Aspects of Philanthropy" it is made clear that the right to dispose of one's property as the owner sees fit is not absolute. A bequest in perpetuity or an endowment must meet with certain conditions and with the approval of the laws interpreted by the courts. The welfare of society and considerations of public policy are superior in importance to the will of the individual. Just as the right to private property is not absolute, so also with its disposition. The rights of the donor are conferred upon him, not inherent in him. The courts may alter the terms of an obsolete bequest and interfere for the protection of a trust, but in spite of all the legal precautions there is serious doubt whether the protection against the trustees of a fund can ever be wholly adequate.

The state is shown to be engaged in charitable work which touches every area of our life. The list includes the care of the poor, provision for sanitation, free education of all, subsidizing of religious schools under certain narrow restrictions, the provision of hospitals, pensioning of soldiers and widows, the training of doctors, lawyers, dentists, and engineers, and recently the care of mothers and children. The Department of Agriculture with its experiment stations, its county agents, and its home demonstrators is a vast social service agency. So is the Department of Labor with its Children's Bureau and its provision for maternal care and the prevention of infant mortality.

In the care of the insane the state has almost a monopoly, and most of the expense of caring for the blind and deaf is borne by the public. There is a public institution where the deaf can receive a college education. Research in pure science is undertaken by the government on a large scale not only as a part of university activities but also by bureaus like the Bureau of Ethnology, not to mention such activities as the Bureau of Standards which serve as well practical interests.

Our legal chapter shows that humiliation is easy to avoid when the provisions are public, and argues convincingly that the rigidity of governmental agencies is not a necessary aspect of such institutions.

Philanthropy cannot, however, be divided into public and private. Mixtures exist. The Smithsonian Institution was privately endowed but publicly supported, and so are the Carnegie libraries. Sometimes also the government grants money to private insane asylums and to private cultural agencies. Some museums are built on public land by private organizations and tax exemptions constitute a subsidy.

Finally, the legal chapter makes it clear that while there is a vast amount of private philanthropy, yet liberality is the normal thing for the public and exceptional for private activity. Government provisions do not make the headlines so easily. Moreover, the end is not yet. Old-age pensions are no more illogical than the free public education of lawyers.

If we may then attempt to summarize the conclusions of this chapter we may point out first that while private property is surrounded by constitutional and statutory defenses it is nevertheless not an absolute right; it is the duty of the state to protect property, and security is the gift of the state. Property is a relative right, and when the interests of the public admittedly conflict the right disappears. Appealing to eminent domain, the state may take away the land of the unwilling citizen. If, then, the right of property is relative the obligations of a social and public nature are real.. They tend to assume an ethical form, however, and are not institutional or statutory. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the protection which property receives implies an obligation on the part of him who owns.

With the vast increase of the corporate institutions in modern life the freedom and responsibility of the individual have become progressively less. We cannot justly blame all the poor for being poor. An industrious and frugal victim of technological unemployment is a complete refutation of the older view that those who do not succeed are the undeserving.

We have reserved to the last the discussion of the biologist, for the objections to charity have of late been primarily concerned with an appeal to certain assumptions about heredity. It has already been admitted that unwise giving may have injurious psychological consequences but everyone would admit that there are no necessary evils if the giving be wise. The modern social worker who is neither hard hearted nor sentimental, but rather sympathetic and intelligent, can and does administer relief without injuring the self-respect of the recipient or sapping his energy and will-power. On the contrary, countless clients have had their wills strengthened and their self-respect immeasurably increased by the skilful efforts of the modern social workers. It is therefore not the psychological arguments or facts or considerations that loom as important to the thoughtful inquirer who wishes to know what the effects of charity will be.

The problem is a highly technical one. To what extent is social inadequacy due to physical heredity? Tuberculosis and diseases of infants are admittedly more frequent among the poor. Then there is feeble-mindedness, delinquency, truancy, certain forms of sexual immorality, etc. If these and similar undesirable traits are inherited it has been repeatedly argued that to give relief to the poor is to perpetuate the undesirable members of society and thus interfere with the beneficial workings of nature. The biologist who writes in this book has had these problems clearly in mind and writes with the authority of a specialist in his field. The technical questions are presented so clearly that the educated layman will have no difficulty in understanding the facts set forth. The conclusion which is presented to the reader is nothing short of startling. The estimated number of feeble-minded in the United States is 330,000. The biologist shows that if all these were sterilized or shot or allowed to starve there would be a diminution in the next generation of about 11 per cent, so that a generation later there would be 297,000 feeble-minded in the United States. He further shows that if these 297,000 were, as the opponents of charity advocate, murdered by the slow torture of starvation, all of them, and not a one allowed to reproduce, there would be in the third generation 297,000, that is to say, no diminution at all. Laymen will speak modestly in dealing with a technical question such as this. The second important point which our biologist brings out is equally interesting and equally undeniable. The social worker who will eliminate hunger, poverty, and the other environmental causes of deficiency will not only not hinder the biological advance of the race but will actually help it. What the biologist needs most to know is the limit of heredity. At present environmental factors are hopelessly confused. Let the social worker eliminate these and biology can then, but not until then, speak with competence and begin to form a program.

The individualism of the nineteenth century was a simple, naïve faith in the benevolent character of the social and economic processes. Men of light and learning taught that it was enough to follow one's own self-interests for by so doing one would best promote the general good. Laissez faire insisted that employers ought to pay the least possible wages and sell for the highest obtainable prices. If the wages were too low, a law of nature (the law of supply and demand) would soon rectify any temporary evil since workers would go elsewhere. There must be no government interference with business, competition being not only the life of trade but the guarantor of happiness. God was in his heaven, all was right with the world, and if life could be seen "whole" it would prove to be good.

The results did not fulfil these rosy expectations. The crowded factories did not teem with happy people, and the underpaid worker found no place to go. Hogarth only drew pictures of what men were seeing every day. In spite of the warning to keep hands off, the poor-laws were enacted and the picturesque peasant became the unlovely and rebellious factory hand when he was not the dissipated and despairing object of poor-relief.

The doubts of the Victorians would have been more pronounced but for a new voice, the voice of evolutionary biology. While it was undeniable that the crowded almshouses made clear that the self-interest of each was not the good of all, men began to doubt whether the good of all should really be sought. The new biology rationalized their selfishness. It was now felt that all people were not fit to live and some ought to go to the wall. It was easy to believe in the survival of the fittest and easy to define the fit as the economically successful. The poverty-stricken family was assumed to be axiomatically unfit. To the wall they went, but they didn't quite pass out of the picture. They huddled together under the shadow of the wall and brought forth vice and crime, disease and pestilence, resentment and discontent, and also many children.

It seems a bit belated for men of our day to repeat the phrases of sixty years ago in the light of two generations of combinations, consolidations, trusts, and unique changes. The responsibility of a man for his own poverty is not so easy to prove as formerly, any more than is the individual credit for great wealth. Poverty may result from social and economic changes for which the sufferer is in no way responsible and which he could not have prevented. The enlightened captains of industry of our time are coming to view their work in the light of the effects on the whole community, including the children of those who do the work, for wealth is possible only when society by its laws, its army, and its police makes it possible and protects the interest of the strong. Those who receive the benefits which the state insures are increasingly scrupulous that the debt be paid.

Justice which the law enjoins is partly negative in forbidding antisocial actions. But justice is not and never can be wholly negative, for a man has justice only when he has his due, so that if all were to receive justice there would be no need for charity. The state cannot be just to the workers if these are starving in the sight of plenty. Nay, more, if there is any obligation to show mercy then it is clear that the obligation is not met until mercy be shown. If a man really deserves mercy it is just that he have mercy, and if he deserves mercy and does not receive it he has not received justice. If we think the matter through we must conclude that there really can be no conflict between justice and mercy, for justice without mercy is not justice.

Psychologically it all depends on the area of group consciousness. It is easy to say "we" in talking of one's kindred, and it seems to all of us entirely natural to help a poor nephew. Our poor next-door neighbors are easily helped since they belong to "our neighborhood." We have only to enlarge the circle to think of "our city" and of "our people." This attitude comes quite natural to Jewish philanthropy in considering Jewish poverty, but it is not different in principle from a Chicago philanthropist in considering Chicago's poor or a benevolent Englishman planning for the poor of England. The "we group" exists when in our imagination we draw a circle, and it is a mark of moral maturity to include a wider and wider area in the conception of one's own.

It is not out of place to stop and ask what would happen were modern charity to be suddenly abandoned. The poor would be neglected but they would not all die, nor would charity cease. There would be a great deal of indiscriminate giving with the pauperizing activities of sentimental people so that a bad matter would become far worse. There is no adequate scientific charity in China or India but there are veritable armies of beggars. In those lands the poor go to the wall but it is not a wall of death, it is a wall of despair, misery, disease, lost self-respect, and menace. Moreover, beggars can breed, and it will be generations before the Orient can attain to the level of the West though our level is low enough. All social workers realize the difficult problem created by unwise and unintelligent giving which still survives from the prescientific era, and it would immediately recur were our intelligent efforts to cease.

The testimony in this volume results in a unanimous vote. History, sociology, religion, law, economics, biology, and psychology unite to say that charity is a necessary activity if men live in a society. The methods are to be improved, the weak places strengthened, and both motives and techniques subjected to the freest criticism. But the poor and sick belong to us, and we must do the best we can to help to heal.

What about prevention? Here there is no argument anywhere, nor any difference of opinion among specialists or laymen. Every social science and indeed nearly every science offers some assistance and hopes to increase its contribution. The great foundations are not unmindful of the possibilities in this field and are planning new attacks as the problems change. Slowly our world grows more comprehensible. The future will be better in the measure in which we shall have been sincere in motive and intelligent in method. And who are the future? Our children are the future and the children of our children whom they shall see and love.

Progress is always paid for in disorganization, for rapid change means that some areas of a social order are thrown into confusion. Improvement may come through deliberate planning or it may follow from isolated inventions, but the alteration of one relation necessitates the adaptation of many more, and these adjustments cannot be made simultaneously. Thus results the inevitable cultural lag. Industry had to maim and kill its thousands before workmen's compensation took care of some of the damage. The rapid assembling of workmen in the great industrial centers brings new but inevitable conditions of congestion, overcrowding, breakdown of family discipline, delinquency, high morbidity, and the attendant social problems. In a world of utopian perfection all these conditions would be foreseen and met in advance, but in a world of human imperfection we cannot foresee them all, nor do we know just how to meet them when they are discovered.

There is hardly an instance of scientific progress that doesn't hurt someone. We praise the radio, but musicians face poverty as an indirect result. The automobile is not an evil, but the poverty of the farmer who sold forage is not a good. Yet the automobile caused the poverty without intending to. Factories require factory laws, but the laws come long after the factories. Public education of children is almost an ideal value, but it represents a heavy economic loss to many a parent. We find ourselves unable to change without sacrificing someone, for the remedy lags behind the disease and the solution is not even sought until the problem becomes acute. We cannot change without causing suffering, and we cannot avoid change. Some way must be found to remedy the ills, and "welfare work" is the general name for it.

We have never been able to plan our collective life intelligently because when we make progress we know not what we do. We are not masters of our fate, and, lacking mastery, we drift. In the present partial knowledge we have of economics and sociology we can only say that poverty and disorganization are inevitable and will continue for a long time to come. We have unwittingly brought them about in the past and will continue to make them appear in the future.

Whether we try to palliate the effects and to remove the causes by governmental agencies or by private initiative is apparently a matter of expediency. No principle has been found which would assign any specific field to either of these agencies. It takes a longer time to move a legislature than to persuade a good man to help a worthy cause. Moreover, some conditions are so pressing that we must act without waiting, and, besides all this, the individual philanthropist can experiment more easily and more freely. Many causes seem worthy to a good man which will not appeal to a majority of a legislature. Our discussions have shown that only expediency can decide. Governmental philanthropy touches all aspects of our life, and private effort, varied as it is, does nothing which the state does not at some time, somewhere, perform. We may conclude, then, that social science as represented in this book not only justifies philanthropy but enjoins it. To see the need of our people, to bind up the wounds of the broken-hearted, to help to heal, and, most satisfying of all, to remove the causes of misery and of inefficiency—these impulses are rooted deep in our past, and are even more insistently imperative in this age of cities and machines.

We have not learned in this book just how to give nor have we discovered what causes are most worthy. No science can ever answer the details of such practical questions, nor, indeed, can all the sciences together answer them. Science must deal in principles and generalizations, the specific application of which belongs to the field of applied art.

But we have here learned that giving is good, that it is still necessary, and when wisely done blesses him that gives and him that receives. We have a developing vision of a better world. To realize that vision many kinds of effort are required, and not the least of these is a cheerful, sympathetic, and intelligent philanthropy.

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
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